SWAZILAND

The mysterious man with a strange worm-illness

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION

Immigration Research Programme
Measuring the Economic Impact of Immigration: A Scoping Paper
December 2004
prepared by
Jacques Poot and Bill Cochrane
Population Studies Centre
University of Waikato

Table of Contents
Executive Summary…..…..…………………………………………………………...1
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………....4
2. Impact of immigration on the labour market………………………………….…8
3. Productivity and technological change………………………………………….21
4. Trade and international relations………………………………………………..24
5. Fiscal impact…………………………………………………………………….26
6. Social cohesion, inequality and crime………………………………………..…28
7. Spatial clustering and housing………………………………………………..…30
8. Economy-wide macro and CGE modelling…………………………………..…32
9. A wish list of potential research topics………………………………………….36
10. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………38
Appendix……………………………………………………………………..………41
References……………………………………………………………………...…….44
Figures and Tables
Figure 1 Population growth in New Zealand: 1950-2004…………………………..5
Table 1 Important dimensions of the economic impact of immigration………...…7
Table 2 International studies on the effect of immigration on wages…………….13
Figure 2 The distribution of coefficients measuring the impact of
immigration on wages……………………………………………………14
Table 3 Regional variation in immigration rates in New Zealand…………….….17
Figure 3 Assessing ‘level’ and ‘relative change’ effects by means of
CGE models…………………………………………………...................35
Appendix
Table A.1 Occupational groups in the Joanna model……………………………….41
Table A.2 Industry groups in the Joanna model…………………………………….42
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper i
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper i i
Executive Summary
Immigration is a complex phenomenon that affects New Zealand in many different ways. This report is concerned with measurement of economic aspects of the impact of immigration. Qualitative research and broader consequences fall outside the scope of the report.
Quantitative research on the economics of migration was already carried out in New Zealand during the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when the topic received relatively little attention in the rest of the world except for in the other ‘New World’ countries.
Since then, immigration has become closely linked to global economic integration and demographic change, and affects many countries. A burgeoning literature on the economic impact has emerged.
The last literature review of the economic impact of immigration in New Zealand was conducted in 1994. The present report summarises key contributions to the international and New Zealand literature since then and identifies major gaps in our understanding of the economic impact of immigration on New Zealand.
While much can be learnt from the international literature, there are many rather unique features of Aotearoa New Zealand (history, the changing birthplaces of migrants, the migration of New Zealanders themselves, the volatility in the flows, the relationship with Australia, etc.) that suggest that many research findings from abroad may not be readily transferable.
The 1994 reviews concluded that the major constraint on New Zealand-based research was an absence of suitable data. The data situation has much improved since then with new surveys (such as the Income Supplement of the Household Labour Force Survey and the Longitudinal Immigration Survey), access to unit records through Customised Unit Record Files and the Statistics New Zealand data laboratory, and new techniques and software to analyse the data.
Immigrants affect both the demand for goods and services and the supply side of the economy in a number of different ways. The best way to combine all these influences is through a large scale model of the economy that can predict economic outcomes at both micro and macro levels.
It is therefore recommended that further research adopts a multi-stage approach that combines new knowledge on each of the economic aspects of immigration into subsequent simulations that permit an assessment of the implications of various migration scenarios.
Such scenarios should take into account that the composition of migrant flows have changed radically in terms of skilled/business migration, family-sponsored migration, refugee migration, student flows and temporary permit holders.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 1
The research on each of the economic aspects of immigration, such as the impact on the labour market, international trade, innovation, and consumption patterns will be valuable in their own right and are best carried out by experts in each of these areas.
Besides being informative for policy, there are opportunities for New Zealand immigration research to be innovative by international standards. High quality research on this topic is likely to attract considerable interest abroad.
In terms labour market research, New Zealand research on initial experiences and adaptation of immigrants is relatively well developed. The impact of changing policies can be assessed by updating earlier econometric research. However, research on the impact of immigration on wages of locally-born workers is virtually absent and needs to be developed, using recent modelling techniques used abroad.
A meta-analysis of 18 papers from the international literature suggests that the effect of immigration on local wages is very small. An increase in the proportion of migrants in the workforce by 1 percentage point may reduce wages by no more than 0.1 percent. However, the effect on workers who are close substitutes for immigrants may be larger. Differences between studies are due to institutional factors, the geographic scale of measurement of the impact, variation in composition of the flows across countries and ways in which the studies have been conducted.
Research on labour market outcomes should include consequences for labour force participation and unemployment rates, and labour turnover (e.g. quits and hires). It should rely on data from both workers and firms, ideally linked.
Little is known about the impact of immigration on technological change and productivity. Yet this is a central issue for economy-wide modelling of the impact of immigration. Research needs to be conducted both at the macro-level on changes in Total Factor Productivity resulting from immigration and at the micro-level (on innovation, entrepreneurship and agglomeration benefits from migrant clustering).
Immigration leads to an increase in international trade. However, the effect on imports (e.g., through migrant preferences for products from home countries) is stronger in the short run than the effect on exports (through migrants assisting in opening new markets and reducing transaction costs). Further research on both channels is needed. In the long-run, efficiency gains through immigration may lead to an improved balance of payments.
The effect of immigration on government consumption, tax revenue and social security payments has been extensively researched, both in New Zealand and abroad. However, New Zealand research in this respect lags behind through having taken a short-run snapshot approach rather than a lifecycle approach. The marginal impact of a migrant on fiscal balance over his or her lifecycle should now be calculated.
Immigration may affect social cohesion and, in turn, social cohesion impacts on the level and distribution of wellbeing in society. Thus, comprehensive overviews of the economic impact should include a discussion of issues such as the impact of
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 2
geographical and occupational clustering of immigrants, inequality, social mobility across generations, cultural diversity and cross-cultural relations, crime, etc. Recent New Zealand research on attitudes toward immigrants is informative. The implications of such attitudes (including discrimination, where present) for labour market outcomes are still to be assessed.
Housing is an area of major importance in terms of the economic impact of immigration. Recent econometric work on the New Zealand housing market can be extended to specifically address the national and regional impact of varying immigration levels.
Large scale economic models are available in New Zealand that can be used to assess the economy-wide and sectoral implication of varying immigration levels. Using new information on labour market, trade, domestic consumption and technological consequences of immigration, the use of such models would be the final stage of a new programme of research on the economic impact and could significantly improve upon work of this nature conducted during the 1980s.
Further research on the economic impact should also investigate the regional distribution of the impact, and the economy-wide and sectoral effects of student and temporary worker flows.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 3
1. Introduction
Of all forms of international flows, migration flows are the most complex. Overall, a reduction to barriers in international migration benefits not only the migrants, but also the world as a whole, as has been shown in various studies, most recently by Martin (2004) for the Copenhagen Consensus project. However, despite such an overall net economic gain, there are losers and winners in sending and receiving countries and there are many economic, social, institutional and environmental aspects of the impact of migration that go beyond the effect on GDP of a country.
Given the significance of immigration for the societies of sending and receiving countries, there has been a large volume of research on the impact of immigration (and to a lesser extent emigration), particularly coinciding with global liberalisation during the last two decades. The collection of 102 papers in Zimmermann and Bauer (2002); and major surveys such as Borjas (1999a) demonstrate what research has achieved to date. Policy and stakeholder-oriented reviews include Glover et al. (2001) for the UK, Borjas (1999b) for the US, OECD (2003b) for Canada, Roodenburg (2003) for The Netherlands, DIMIA (2002) and OECD (2003a) for Australia, OECD (2003c) for New Zealand; Bauer et al. (2004) for the European Union and Coppel et al. (2001) for OECD countries generally.
Comprehensive research that attempts to assess the full range of economic consequences of immigration is a major undertaking that in the past has tended to be carried out by large teams of researchers, leading to reports of several hundred pages, such as the studies edited by Norman and Meikle (1985) for Australia and by Smith and Edmonston (1997) for the United States. The last comprehensive study of the overall economic impact of immigration in New Zealand was Poot et al. (1988) – not of the same magnitude as the Australian and US studies, but covering macro, labour market and sectoral aspects, and incorporating some public sector stakeholder input.
The question of the economic impact of immigration is particularly important for New Zealand, given that past international inward and outward flows have contributed to a population of which 19 percent was foreign born at the time of the 2001 census. Thus, in-depth insight into the various dimensions of the economic impact of immigration is important for the formulation of policies concerning the admission and settlement of new permanent and long-term residents (through the skilled/business stream, but also through the family-sponsored and humanitarian streams). However, in the current age of high international mobility, migration streams are much more diverse and include temporary work permit holders and students. The latter groups may have a significant impact on the domestic (and local) economy too. Infometrics (2000) calculated estimates of the positive short-run impact, but the long-run effects and spillovers are yet to be investigated. For example, international students may positively affect trade and some may become permanent or long-term highly skilled residents. In addition, repeated migration and circulation is a phenomenon of growing importance, particularly among professionals, with different policy implications from permanent settlement.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 4
The present scoping paper has three objectives. Firstly, it provides a brief review of recent international empirical research on the labour market impact of immigration. The synthesis of this literature is facilitated by reference to the results from a recent meta-analysis of the impact of immigration on wages. Secondly, the paper briefly reviews international research on other dimensions of the economic impact of immigration, namely productivity and technical change, trade and international relations, the fiscal impact, socio-economic impacts and externalities, and economy-wide (general equilibrium) effects. Thirdly, the paper seeks to identify suggestions for further research that would add to our knowledge of the impact of immigration in New Zealand while being feasible given current, or soon to be available, data.
The international research forms the benchmark against which previous New Zealand-based research is placed. OECD (2003c) noted that while there are comprehensive surveys of the labour market experience of New Zealand migrants (Boyd 2003; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998) and the direct contribution to the public sector finances (Nana et al. 2003), there have not been any full scale attempts since Poot et al. (1988) to model the overall and longer term impact of immigration on the labour market and the economy.
Immigration and emigration
A feature more peculiar to New Zealand than to other developed economies is the extensive and fluctuating international movement of New Zealanders themselves leading – combined with varying numbers of controlled immigration – to strongly fluctuating rates of net migration. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Population growth in New Zealand: 1950-2004 New Zealand Population Growth, March Year 1950-2004-1.5-1-0.500.511.522.53195019551960196519701975198019851990199520002005Year ending 31 March%Net mig rateNat incr ratePop growth rate
Source: Statistic New Zealand (total net migration, natural increase); Population Studies Centre (estimated de facto population at 31 March) ___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 5
Figure 1 has been drawn with respect to the estimated de facto population (equivalent to the ‘census night’ population), as from the point of view of domestic demand for everyday goods and services the physical presence of people is more important than their residency status. With this in mind it is clear that net international migration and short term movement can have a major impact on economic conditions in the short run. The balance, however, has been a net inward flow into New Zealand. Aggregated over the quarter century until 31 March 2004, the net inflow has been about 9,000 per year, which accounted for only one quarter of population growth.1 The small net inflow coincides with an average annual net inflow of some 25,000 foreign citizens ‘substituting’ for a net total of 16,000 departing New Zealand citizens.
However, the present paper is primarily concerned with the movement of persons requiring visas or permits, and research on the free movement of New Zealanders and Australians across the Tasman is not reviewed. However, where migrants are defined by birthplace, Australian migration to New Zealand is included in immigration, although such migrants may well be children of New Zealand citizens returning home.
Emigration may be expected to have important consequences too and there is much research in recent years on the positive benefit that may be obtained from strengthening links with the diaspora. The international research on the potential contribution of diaspora to the sending country includes the theory of Hercowitz and Pines (1997) and the evidence on homeland investment by diaspora residing in the USA by Gillespie et al. (1999). When emigration coincides with a significant loss of human capital, we would expect that this would have a detrimental effect on economic growth. Under certain circumstances, however, a brain drain can be beneficial (see Beine et. al. (2001). An important question in the New Zealand case is the extent to which immigration policy aims at compensating quantitatively and qualitatively for a structural long-run net outflow of New Zealanders to Australia and elsewhere. While there may be net losses of workers in specific occupations, the evidence suggests that New Zealand’s international migration is on the whole a process of ‘brain exchange’ rather than brain drain (Glass and Choy 2001).
A classification
In classifying the various types of impact, it is important to distinguish between a short-run and a long-run perspective. This distinction between short-run and long run is not entirely clear cut and will vary with the context. Moreover, short-run fluctuations can have permanent effects (a so-called ‘path dependency’), such as a long-term disadvantage to migrants that may arise from their arrival in times of recession (e.g., Aydemir 2003). A distinction must also be made between macro level and micro level effects. The combination of macro versus micro and short-run versus long-run effects leads to a two-way classification that is helpful to categorise the various types of economic impact. This is illustrated in Table 1. Topics which have
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 6
1 Considering the half century until 31 March 2004, net immigration was on average about 8,000 per year and accounted for only one fifth of total population growth.
been researched in New Zealand during the last decade are identified in the Table, so that it is easy to gauge where there are major gaps in knowledge in this area.
The intent of the present paper is quite limited. The study of the economic impact of immigration in New Zealand has a long history, starting with Belshaw (1952). The literature up to the mid 1980s was reviewed by Poot (1986) and the literature for the following decade by Chapple et al. (1994). Since then, there have been further reviews, such as Poot (1998) and Winkelmann (2000), but the present paper is in a sense a decadal update of Chapple et al.
Table 1 Important Dimensions of the Economic Impact of Immigration
SHORT-RUN
LONG-RUN
MICRO
Initial migrant wages and (un)employment NZ++
Relative wages between and within migrant and native groups
Job search
Discrimination in the labour market NZ+
Housing
Effects on other consumption: food, transportation, etc.
Migrants’ post-settlement human capital investments NZ+
Social security
Business investment NZ++
Saving behaviour
Labour market flexibility
Business practices
Innovation and entrepreneurship NZ+
Migrant adaptation and ‘catch up’ NZ++
Migrant geographical and social clustering NZ+
Social mobility across generations
Migrants’ net fiscal balance over the lifecycle
Remittances and international networks
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 7
MESO/
MACRO
Population size, composition and geographic distribution NZ++
Capacity utilisation, the business cycle and expectations
National and sectoral accounts
Health and education expenditure, fiscal balance NZ++
International balance of payments
Unemployment NZ+
Aggregate wage level
Inflation
Interest rates
Income distribution
Congestion and utilisation of public infrastructure
Fertility and population ageing NZ+
Real income per head and the long-run rate of economic growth
Sectoral composition of the economy
Public and private infrastructure
Technological change
Economies of scale
Total factor productivity
Foreign debt
Public debt
International trade patterns NZ+
Social cohesion, cross cultural relations and crime
The environment
Note: NZ+ and NZ++ indicate that there has been, respectively, some or extensive post-1994 empirical New Zealand research on this topic
However, no attempt is made to provide a complete review of the literature during the last decade. Instead, the same approach is followed for various types of impact. In each case, the main issues are identified first, followed by key international references and, where available, New Zealand references on the particular type of impact. The gaps in NZ research are then identified. Suggestions for feasible New Zealand projects are made and gathered together in the penultimate section.
2. Impact of immigration on the labour market
There is a consensus among immigration researchers that, broadly speaking, immigration is not detrimental to the host labour market or economy generally (e.g., OECD (2003c)). However, for policy analysis and a better scientific understanding of the impact of immigration on labour markets and the economy, it is useful to complement such broad qualitative conclusions with a more precise quantitative research synthesis. As was noted in OECD (2003c), there has been little New Zealand research on the impact of immigration on labour market outcomes locally and nationally. A meta-analysis of international research can identify common findings that are also likely to apply to New Zealand, and can also identify research questions that are best addressed with additional New Zealand-based research.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 8
Impact on wages
Most of the research on the labour market impact of immigration has been concerned with the impact of immigration on wages rather than labour force participation or unemployment rates. A recent meta-analysis of the international literature focuses therefore on wages. The results of this study, Longhi et al. (2004), are briefly summarised below.2 Borjas (2003, p 1335) recently noted that ‘the measured impact of immigration on the wage of native workers fluctuates widely from study to study (and sometimes even within the same study) but seems to cluster around zero’.3 This observation is rather puzzling from the perspective of standard economic analysis, as an increase in labour supply may be expected to put downward pressure on wages in a competitive labour market. Indeed, a common fear expressed by many people who oppose immigration is that immigration shocks put downward pressure on the wages of those who are potential substitutes for immigrants in the labour market. However, surveys of the empirical literature suggest that the effect of immigration on wages of natives is rather small, often negligible and sometimes even with a positive sign (e.g. Friedberg and Hunt (1995); Borjas (1999a)). These findings appear to contradict standard neoclassical theory in which a positive supply shock in a closed labour market may be expected to lower the price of labour. Three sets of explanations can be put forward: either the conducted econometric analyses have been inappropriate, or there are market forces at work that offset the potential downward effect on wages, or institutional factors stop markets from adjusting as expected following an immigration shock. The first two explanations have been investigated in the literature (e.g. Borjas (2003)), but the third one appears at present still under-researched.
The key problem is the non-experimental nature of the two common empirical approaches in the literature. They are the ‘area’ approach and the ‘factor proportions’ approach. The area approach exploits the fact that immigration is spatially highly concentrated, so that a negative spatial correlation may be expected between the proportion of the labour force in local labour markets that are immigrants and the wages of natives who they can substitute for. However, the specification of the regression equation in the area approach is rarely built up from theoretical microfoundations.
In contrast, the factor proportions approach has a much stronger theoretical basis in that it uses a general equilibrium model that can calculate the effect of a supply shock in a market with different types of labour and a specific production technology. However, as in all computable general equilibrium models, the empirical results are derived by means of simulation rather than estimation. Thus, after assuming a certain elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers (usually derived from other studies), it is a foregone conclusion that a migration shock of a particular type of workers will lower the relative wage of all workers of that type. In addition, the factor ___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 9
2 An extension of this study to the effect of immigration on employment is currently being undertaken.
3 Recent theoretical modelling is also consistent with that. Ben-Gad (2004) develops a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties, which shows that changes in factor prices (i.e. wages and the rate of return to capital) from changes in immigration policy will be very modest.
proportions approach may also suffer from the omission of certain influences on local labour markets such as changes in the composition of demand and capital inflows.
The issue of model misspecification is best illustrated by means of the area approach. The generic regression model to test the impact of immigration on local labour market outcomes is (Borjas (1999a, p 1735 ),
)',(')',()',(ttuttmttyjsjsjs++Δ=Δαxjsβ (1)
in which is the change between years t and t’ in the measure of the labour market outcome experienced by natives who live in region j and belong to skill group s, is the change in the stock of immigrants in that region for that skill group over that period, x)',(ttyjsΔ)',(ttmjsΔjs is a vector of control variables with coefficient vector α and ujs is the stochastic error. The coefficient of interest is β. Estimates of β vary across studies and even within studies across time periods. There are three potential explanations for this. Either the equations are misspecified due to omitted variable bias, or the migration shock itself is endogenous, or the ‘true’ effect depends on the specific situation that has been analysed (country, period, type of data). The case of a varying parameter β is referred to as the case of heterogeneity in meta-analysis.
With respect to the first issue (misspecification), Borjas (1999a) notes that the wages observed in local labour markets may change over time due to spatial forces that are not well understood and in any case not modelled in the regression equations. With respect to the third issue (heterogeneity), there are statistical tests to identify this (e.g. Shadish and Haddock (1994)). Meta-regression analysis is commonly used to identify specific causes of heterogeneity.
With respect to the second problem it should be noted that migrants are particularly attracted to regions where wage growth is the most. The endogeneity of the immigrant shock suggests that ordinary least squares (OLS) leads to inconsistent estimates and that an instrumental variable (IV) approach is essential.
One of the main problems in this literature is to find suitable instruments: variables that explain inward immigration, but are not directly related to changes in natives’ wages. As governments do not force migrants to settle in specific locations following some ‘experimental design’ (and in most countries internal migration is free in any case so that the within-country movement of immigrants could offset an exogenous settlement policy), a common instrument is the migrant stock in the previous period. Because there is a well-established fact that migrants cluster and trot well-worn paths from areas of origin to areas of destination (e.g. Gorter et al. (1998) ), this instrument usually has a high correlation with current inflows. Nonetheless, the predetermined migrant stock is not a good instrument when there is spatial persistence in wage growth.4
4 When there is spatial persistence in wage growth, the past migrant stock will be highly correlated with current wage growth and therefore not suitable as an instrument for the current migrant inflow rate.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 10
Given the problem of finding correct instruments, there has been a search for truly exogenous immigration shocks in local labour markets such as the 1980 influx of Cuban immigrants to Miami (the so-called Mariel boat lift) which increased Miami’s labour force by 7 percent almost overnight. By means of the standard difference-in-differences estimator, this ‘natural experiment’ suggested that the large immigration shock had no impact on Miami’s native outcomes (Card (1990)).
The example of the Mariel boatlift suggests that even when very good instruments are available, the wage effect β is still not estimated correctly in (1) and may continue to be small or statistically insignificant due to various processes not being taken into account. These processes include: (i) the growth in local demand due to immigrant expenditures, (ii) the inflow of capital in response to increasing local demand and the increase in the rate of return to capital, (iii) outward migration of natives, (iv) a local re-allocation of resources across sectors and associated adjustment of interregional (and international) trade (the Heckscher-Ohlin effect), (v) and real wage growth of natives due to technological change and/or economies of scale (see Section 3).
Given such endogenous processes following an immigration shock, we can conclude that the wage effect will be larger in more closed labour markets, and it will also be larger in the short run (when the offsetting factors have not had sufficient time to influence the local labour market) than in the long run. This suggests that the wage effect is best measured where there is no native adjustment process possible. A clever approach, adopted by Borjas (2003), focuses on the distribution of workers across levels of experience in the US national labour market, which may be considered closed with respect to natives, as US emigration rates are small. Given the concentration of new immigrants in certain (low) experience groups in the US, the effect on wages of workers in these experience groups can be identified. This research suggests a value for β with respect to weekly wages of around -0.6, which can be converted for the US into an elasticity of -0.4, i.e. a 10 percent supply shock in a particular skill/experience group lowers the wage in that group by 4 percent. It is therefore not surprising that this small wage effect is swamped in practice by the other endogenous processes following an immigration shock outlined above.
There is, however, as yet no agreement on which adjustment process is primarily responsible for the small effect of an immigrant shock on wages. There is, for example, no conclusive evidence that an immigration shock leads to net outward migration of natives. Card and DiNardo (2000) find the opposite effect: the same areas tend to attract both immigrants and natives. However, earlier, Borjas et al. (1997) argued that such observations are spurious due to the spatial variation in the growth paths of regions and correct estimation of the effect of an immigration shock on the local growth path then involves double differencing of the data. After carrying out such double differencing, Borjas et al. (1997) find strong evidence of displacement of natives by immigrants. Borjas (1999a), p.1752 concludes that ‘the specification of a clear counterfactual is crucial in measuring and understanding the link between immigration, native migration decisions, and the impact of immigrants on the wage structure’.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 11
Results from the meta-analysis
Longhi et al. (2004) identified 18 published studies in the international literature on the impact of immigration on wages, spanning research between Grossman’s seminal (1982) study and Borjas’ (2003) study. The studies are listed in Table 2, together with the number of estimates of β (the so-called ‘effect sizes’ in meta-analysis) derived from each of the 18 studies. The total number of collected effect sizes is 348. A histogram of these (excluding three outliers) is given in Figure 2.
The overall mean is -0.119, which can be compared with the recent estimate by Borjas of -0.6 mentioned earlier. The interpretation is as follows. If immigrants increased as a proportion of the labour force by 1 percentage point (e.g. from 10 to 11 percent), the natural logarithm of the average wage would decrease by 0.00119, i.e. wages would decrease on average by a little over 0.1 percent.5 For most countries, an increase in the proportion of immigrants in the labour force of one percentage point would be quite a major change. The impact on wages of such an immigration shock is rather small. Meta-analysis has thus reinforced Borjas’ observation of the wage effect of immigration being very small.
However, there is considerable variation around the mean and some of it is systematic. The best way to identify the causes of systematic variation is a meta-regression model. Such a model provides an analysis of variance with study characteristics represented by dummy variables. Across a range of specifications, Longhi et al. (2004) identify a number of robust effects. Firstly, the downward effect on wages is larger in labour markets that have greater institutional rigidities (such as in western Europe) rather than in flexible labour markets in which workers may also have high geographical mobility (such as in the USA). This result is consistent with the evidence of Angrist and Kugler (2001) who found for a panel of European countries in the 1908s and 1990s that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact of immigration. Secondly, studies that don’t control for endogeneity of the proportion of immigrants in the local labour market underestimate the effect on wages, because migrants are attracted to regions with higher wage growth. Thirdly, across the studies in the sample, the estimates obtained from factor allocation models tended to be closer to zero (less negative) than those from the area approach.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 12
5 Note that equation (1) is linear. The effect on the local wage is therefore independent of the proportion of the workers that were immigrants before the new influx occurred. In practice some non-linearity (with a declining coefficient for higher proportions of migrants in the labour force) would seem plausible.
Table 2 International studies on the effect of immigration on wages
Study’s
Identification Number
Author(s)
Number of
Effect Sizes Collected
I
Grossman (1982)
3
II
Borjas (1987)
48
III
Altonji and Card (1991a)
28
IV
Hunt (1992)
5
V
De New and Zimmermann (1994)
8
VI
Enchautegui (1995)
16
VII
Borjas (1996)
20
VIII
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1996)
8
IX
Greenwood et al (1997)
32
X
Bauer (1998)
18
XI
Pedace (1998)
12
XII
Winter-Ebmer and Zimmermann (1998)
8
XIII
Card (2001)
28
XIV
Friedberg (2001)
15
XV
Addison and Worswick (2002))
23
XVI
Hartog and Zorlu (2002)
20
XVII
Hofer and Huber (2003)
8
XVIII
Borjas (2003)
48
Total
348
Source: Longhi et al. (2004)
Another very robust conclusion is that the wages of earlier immigrants are much more affected by new immigrants than the wages of the native born population. For example, Zorlu and Hartog (2002) provide some evidence for The Nethelands, the United Kingdom and Norway. This is in line with the theoretical expectation, as recent and earlier immigrants tend to be closer substitutes in the labour market than recent immigrants and the locally born. Moreover, studies that identified immigrants in terms of ethnicity, rather than country of birth, or years in the host country were less able to detect a negative impact of immigration on wages. In general, the degree of substitutability or complementarity between skill groups of migrants and natives drives the magnitude of the effect on wages. Much of observed variation in effect sizes across model specifications in the original studies reflect that in most of the studies for Europe and the USA the typical migrant is much lower skilled than the typical native. Thus, highly skilled immigrants then generate a greater downward push on wages of the locals because they are greater substitutes to the average locally born than the reference group (low skilled migrant workers). Conversely, the average immigrant (i.e., low skilled in the US and Europe) has a positive impact on the wage of highly skilled locally-born workers because they are complements rather than substitutes in production.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 13
Figure 2 The distribution of coefficients measuring the impact of immigration
on wages
020406080100-5.0-2.50.02.5Series: ESTIMATIONSample 1 345Observations 345Mean -0.118686Median -0.036900Maximum 4.460000Minimum -5.349000Std. Dev. 1.028249Skewness -0.473231Kurtosis 12.09635Jarque-Bera 1202.316Probability 0.000000
Source: Longhi et al. (2004)
The meta-analysis also suggests that it is important to make a distinction between the effect on hourly wages and the effect on annual earnings. If the labour supply curve of the locally born has the usual positive slope, a downward effect on the wage would lead to a decline in both hours worked and labour force participation. This would make the effect of an immigration inflow on annual earnings greater than on hourly wages.
Effect on other labour market outcomes
Besides the impact on wages, another important question for policy is the impact on employment outcomes and specifically whether an influx of immigrant workers leads to an increase in the demand for labour in excess of the immigrant supply effect, or to a response in labour supply by the locally born. This can be analysed by looking at the effect on labour force participation and (un)employment rates. However, taking labour market dynamics into account (with transition matrices of flows between states of being in work, unemployed, or out of the labour market), the impact of immigration on layoff rates or hiring rates can also be investigated. Structurally, all these issues can be analysed in the same way as in Equation (1), by replacing the wage variable on the left-hand side with another labour market indicator. The international literature on the impact of immigration on (un)employment is less extensive than on wages and the impact of immigration on labour turnover and transitions appears as yet not researched.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 14
It is in this context important to stress that most research concerned with labour market impact is supply-side oriented, using data on immigrants and locally-born workers. It is equally important, particularly in the context of research on worker-job matching and labour turnover to also consider a demand-side perspective, i.e. to integrate into the analysis data from workplaces and firms.
An example of research on the relationship between immigration and the short-run job prospects of unemployed residents is Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999). They found that an increase in immigration increases unemployed residents’ employment probabilities in the short run. These authors developed a theoretical model that was calibrated with data from the first wave of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia.
The difference between the short-run and the long-run impact is not always the same across countries. Gross (2002) found, using French data from the mid 1970s to the mid 1990s, that in the long-run both legal and amnestied immigrant workers and their families lower the unemployment rate permanently but that in the short-run, the arrival of immigrants increases unemployment slightly with an impact effect similar to that of an increase in domestic labour-force participation. As in the case of wage effects of immigration, the composition of the immigration flows matters when assessing the effect on (un)employment and labour force participation rates.
Combining wage and employment effects, the question arises to what extent immigration affects earnings inequality. Reviews of growing earnings inequality such as Katz and Autor (1999) identify immigration as one of the supply-side causes of growing earnings inequality. However, the evidence is primarily for the US which has had in recent decades rapid growth in unskilled immigration. The question is whether growing immigration of skilled workers also increases individual earnings inequality. Simulations of the Irish labour market between 1994 and 1997 by Barrett et al. (2000) show that an increase in skilled labour there through immigration does reduce earnings inequality. In any case, even the US evidence suggests that growing income inequality is primarily due to changes in institutional factors and the increasing rate of return to skills and increasing performance-related bonuses for managerial responsibility. Butcher and DiNardo (2002) found that if recent immigrants in 1970 in the US had faced the 1990 wage structure, their wage distribution would have closely resembled that of recent immigrants in 1990.
New Zealand research on labour market outcomes
As was noted by OECD (2003c), research on the labour market impact of immigration in New Zealand has to date been primarily on adaptation of migrants rather than on the impact on the locally born. Some evidence was obtained during the 1980s that net immigration does not operate “to the detriment of the host labour market” (Poot et al. (1988 ,p. 145). This evidence included a macroeconomic study of causality in time-series data on immigration and unemployment (Poot (1986)). This analysis led to the conclusion that the hypothesis that net immigration ‘Granger-caused’ unemployment could be rejected (Poot (1986, pp. 30-31). Shan et al. (1999) updated this type of
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 15
Granger-causality analysis for Australia and New Zealand. They found that there is no Granger causality running from immigration to unemployment.
In fact, the study of New Zealand’s business cycles during the second half of the last century suggests that net immigration generates a net demand effect in the short-run, potentially leading to higher inflation (in buoyant economic condition) or lower unemployment (in times of a slack labour market) (see Poot et al. (1988)). This conclusion is consistent with the recent evidence by Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999) for Australia already mentioned earlier. Poot et al. (1988, p. 148) concluded that there is certainly a danger that a deliberate procyclical immigration policy may exacerbate the amplitude of the business cycle.
Comparing the area approach to the factor proportions approach of measuring the labour market impact, it can be argued that the latter has been used in New Zealand, whereas the former has not. The CGE model simulations with the Joanna model reported in Poot et al. (1988) can be interpreted as an example of the factor approach, although taking a much wider range of effects into account (such as on preferences, technological change etc.) than overseas studies.
Poot et al. (1988) considered a range of immigration scenarios. The scenario with the most immigration assumed a net inflow of 15,000 persons per annum over a period of 16 years, starting in 1985, A net inflow of 15,000 persons per annum is certainly more than New Zealand’s past experience on average. This generates a population that would be 6.15 percent larger than the case with zero net immigration per annum in the end year. The additional labour supply could be absorbed by a decrease in the real wage of no more than 0.3 percent, implying a wage elasticity of about -0.05. This can be made comparable to β in equation (1) by multiplying it by the reciprocal of the associated change in immigration as a proportion of the population.6 The appropriate factor for New Zealand is 20.7 This would suggest β of about -1, rather to the left of the mean of -0.119 in Figure 2 and also larger than the estimate of -0.6 found by Borjas (2003). But this is a ‘base scenario’ that ignores any potential dynamic effects of immigration on productivity and efficiency. In what was referred to as a ‘plausible scenario’ in Poot et al. (1988), the increase in immigration could be absorbed entirely without a decrease in the real wage, suggesting that the value of β would be 0.
Which of these two ‘polar’ cases is more plausible in practice can be investigated by two different methods. One is to redo CGE simulations, but with building in some empirically derived estimates of the likely effects on productivity. The second is to carry out an area approach regression analysis along the lines of studies such as by
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 16
6 See Longhi et al. (2004).
7 The Joanna scenarios referred to the period 1985-2001. At the beginning, immigrants were 15 percent of the population. With an influx of 15,000 per annum this would increase to at least 20 percent in 2001, taking the emigration of New Zealanders into account. The difference in the proportions is 0.05 and the reciprocal 20.
Borjas for the USA. Any replication of the area approach in New Zealand would need to exploit that much of the inflow goes to Auckland, as can be seen in Table 3.8
Table 3 Regional variation in immigration rates in New Zealand
Inflow from Overseas as a percentage of initial population, by Region 1986-2001
1986-91
1991-96
1996-01
Northland
2.9
3.9
3.4
Auckland
8.5
11.4
12.3
Waikato
3.3
4.3
4.4
Bay of Plenty
3.2
4.4
4.3
Gisborne
1.9
2.6
2.3
Hawke's Bay
2.5
3.3
3.6
Taranaki
2.5
3.2
2.6
Manawatu-Wanganui
3.0
3.6
3.2
Wellington
6.1
5.9
6.3
West Coast
1.8
2.6
2.1
Canterbury
3.4
5.8
5.4
Otago
3.1
5.0
4.5
Southland
1.5
2.2
1.9
Nelson-Tasman
3.5
5.3
4.5
Marlborough
2.5
3.2
3.2
New Zealand
4.8
6.5
6.7
Note: Immigration defined as population usually resident in the region and resident overseas five years earlier as a percentage of the population usually resident in the region at the previous census
Source: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings
An example of a feasible study in New Zealand is a replication of Addison and Worswick (2002), who did a cross-sectional analysis in Australia using data from six consecutive income distribution surveys from 1982 to 1996. New Zealand would have greater regional aggregation, but could use the Income Supplement of the Household Labour Force Survey since 1997.
For estimating the impact of immigration on employment, unemployment and labour turnover indicators, the Household Labour Force Survey would be a valuable source of data. The survey does provide information on respondents’ years lived in New Zealand, thus enabling the identification of migrant groups. With the availability of long time series, since 1985, the regions to be used for the analysis can remain quite large as the econometric analysis will primarily be a matter of identifying an effect in
8 Note that spatial concentration has increased in recent years, coinciding with increased migration from non-traditional sources. Using birthplace statistics the proportion of immigrants is relatively greater in Wellington, because immigrants from traditional source countries were more likely to settle there. ___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 17
Auckland versus ‘the rest of New Zealand’. A time-series approach also has the advantage of going across a major shift in immigration policy in the early 1990s, thus generating a kind of ‘natural experiment’ (exogenous variation) that by means of a ‘difference-in-differences’ estimator enables the researcher to generate an unbiased estimate.
It would be useful to assess the labour market from the perspective of workplaces and firms, rather than just from the perspective of workers. A first attempt in this direction was made in New Zealand by Benson-Rea et al. (1998) who identified inadequate English language skills, a lack of local work experience and qualification recognition as important barriers for entry into the job market by highly skilled immigrants. Recent work by New Zealand Immigration Service (2003) also includes a survey of employers, but the sample size (387) limit the generalisation possible with this type of data.
The relationship between immigration and the short-run job prospects of unemployed residents can be studied using the Australian example of Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999). Data from a longitudinal survey of migrants in New Zealand (LisNZ) in New Zealand may permit a similar approach. Dunstan et al. (2004) describes the introduction of LisNZ and the results of the 2001-2002 two-wave pilot survey.
Another area of potentially interesting research is the measurement of the impact of immigration on internal migration patterns of the locally born. While Choy et al. (2002) argue that migration is a major adjustment mechanism in regional labour markets in New Zealand, the possible migratory responses of New Zealanders (internal and international) in regions that have large immigration inflows (Auckland and Wellington) has yet to be researched, and may be a fruitful avenue for future work on the labour market.
Migrant adaptation
Borjas (1999a) provides an extensive review of how researchers have analysed or should analyse the path of immigrant earnings since arrival, relative to the earnings of comparable natives. An important issue is the rate of convergence of immigrant earnings to native earnings. This is estimated by means of suitably enhanced earnings function, i.e. regression equations that explain the earnings of an individual in terms of human capital and other characteristics. There are several technical problems with this approach, such as the difficulty in identifying separately an effect on earnings of the calendar year of arrival, years since arrival, age at arrival, current age, and labour market experience. The empirical evidence for the US suggests that immigrants arriving after 1965 started there on average with a larger wage disadvantage and had a smaller rate of relative wage growth.
This topic has also been relatively well researched in New Zealand. Following descriptive pioneering work by Poot (1993), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) carried out the first formal econometric analysis of migrant adaptation in New Zealand. More recently, Boyd (2003) and Statistics New Zealand (2004a) provide further descriptive updates. These analyses suggest that after the introduction of the
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 18
points system in 1992 there was a phase during the 1990s in which skilled migrants had relatively greater difficulty in obtaining suitable employment in New Zealand, but the situation has improved in recent years. Although the recent descriptive updates are useful, further econometric research is needed to update the work of Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) and to take innovations in the international literature on migrant earnings functions into account that tries to separate out migrant characteristics (supply) and labour market conditions (demand) effects (see e.g. Borjas (1999a)). It will be particularly interesting to consider adaptation econometrically with LisNZ longitudinal data, once two waves from the full survey become available.
The longitudinal data will be helpful for many other research questions as well. These include the extent to which a bias is introduced in cohort analyses due to selective emigration of immigrants. Income convergence may be observed, for example, simply through selective emigration of those immigrants whose wages remain low in the host labour market. Hence there is a need to assess whether re-migrants are a random sample of the original survey respondents.
An interesting issue is also the extent to which initial wages of immigrants and the path of their wages over time are location dependent. The spatial concentration of migrants could lead to higher chances of employment (e.g. by immigrants employers) but lower wages (in segmented labour markets). Despite the very well documented geographical concentration of migrants in host countries, research on the effect of such clustering on migrants’ labour market outcomes is still remarkably incomplete. There is plenty of theory (such as Lutz (2001), Bauer et al. (2002) and de Graaff and de Groot, (2004) ), but little evidence. Aslund et al. (2001) found that ethnic concentration in Sweden actually provided an earnings gain to migrants of 4 to 5 percent. The impact of migrant clustering on natives is briefly discussed in Section 7. Longitudinal surveys in New Zealand may provide useful data to assess the impact of migrant clustering on their wages.
With respect to measurement of wages, it should be noted that New Zealand surveys would have sample size limitations to provide reliable wage data for immigrants (by country of birth and years since arrival), particularly at a regional level. Census data do enable much deeper disaggregation, but the limitations of the census measure of income must be kept in mind.
The catching up of migrants’ wages to those of comparable workers may be a process that takes many years and in some cases may not be achieved before retirement. In that case, an interesting question to ask concerns social mobility: do second or higher generations of migrants become virtually indistinguishable from natives? In Australia, the birthplace of the respondent’s parents is asked in the population census and this information can be used to study social mobility and the convergence across generations of immigrants. This information is not available from the New Zealand population census.9 Intergenerational mobility was taken into account by Smith and
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 19
9 A proposed survey of internal migration in New Zealand includes a question of the birthplace of parents, but the sample size may not be large enough to use such a data source for assessing intergenerational social mobility among immigrants.
Edmonston (1997) in their assessment of the long-run fiscal impact of immigration in the US. This has not been done yet in New Zealand.
Other useful information to assess migrant adaptation in the host labour market is the extent of occupational mobility. In theory, data on this could be obtained through a question of occupation at some previous point in time, but this information is rarely collected. Again, longitudinal surveys such as LisNZ or even SoFIE might provide useful data. There is some in-depth information of migrant adaptation already available in New Zealand, but is primarily for very small samples that may or may not not be statistically representative of the immigrant populations (such as those discussed e.g. in Ho et al. (1997) on the adaptation of East Asian migrants in New Zealand).
Permanent residency can be obtained through application from abroad but also though a change of visa status while already in the host country, e.g. on a temporary workers’ permit. Are there differences in labour market outcomes, including migrant adaptation, across these two channels of immigrant arrivals? This question, which has obvious policy implications, still needs to be researched.
With respect to immigrant adaptation, an important issue is also the adaptation of those who come in under the humanitarian stream. Some recent US evidence suggests that refugees there adapt generally well. Cortes (2004) finds that 1980 refugee immigrants who arrived in the previous five years did worse than comparable economic immigrants. A decade later, the refugees made greater gains than other migrants. Cortes (2004) explains this by a higher rate of human capital accumulation among refugees.
The post-settlement human capital accumulation of migrants is also an important issue. The wages of migrant workers may increase over time due to further investment in skills. Are the rates of return to such investment the same as for the native born, or maybe even higher? Borjas (1999a) find that there is weak relative complementarity in the US with respect to the skills that immigrants bring with them into the US and the skills they acquire in the post-migration period. In other words, skilled immigrants invest more in further training in the host country than unskilled workers. New Zealand adaptation research to date did not distinguish between pre- and post migration investment in qualifications.
The likelihood of migrants making human capital investments (through further education and training) upon arrival is undoubtedly related to the nature and extent of post-settlement services provided by government agencies. It is commonly argued that New Zealand’s immigration services are disproportionally geared toward recruitment rather than post-settlement services. However, such services have been expanded in recent years, although is questionable whether they have reached the level provided in Australia. The effectiveness of post-settlement services is an important aspect of the economic and labour market impact of immigration. Research in this area falls within the realm of social policy evaluation. Information in LisNZ on the use of post-settlement services may provide useful information for empirical research in this area. ___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 20
Finally, little is known about self-selection of immigrants to New Zealand relative to those going to other destinations from any given source country. The LisNZ pilot survey suggests that ‘lifestyle’ is an important reason for migrating to New Zealand and this reconfirms earlier evidence that migrants to New Zealand attach more weight to lifestyle than migrants to other destinations (e.g. mentioned in Poot et al. 1988, (1988, p. 10)). While it is reasonable to assume that “lifestyle migrants” accept lower initial wages and perhaps a lower growth rate in wages than those who purely motivated by maximising earnings potential, the question whether such self-selection affects outcomes for the host labour market and economy generally remains unanswered and may be difficult to assess unless some natural experiment can be identified (e.g. variation of the impact of two numerically and qualitatively similar groups of migrants – one group arriving after and motivated by some major overseas calamity (e.g. the Chernobyl disaster or 9/11) and one arriving in relatively less turbulent times). New information on the self-selection of migrants to NZ vis-à-vis other destinations could be researched by means of surveys of emigrants from source countries, where available. Surveys of emigrants from South Africa or from China at the point of departure may be good case studies.
3. Productivity and technological change
A general conclusion from the previous section is that there is little support from the empirical literature that in areas experiencing high levels of inward migration, there are negative labour market outcomes for natives (see also (Schultz 1998) on the US evidence). A number of potential reasons for the apparent lack of correlation between immigrant inflows and changes in wages have been advanced, focusing on the effects of changes in output mix, capital levels, native labour supply responses and productivity (Altonji and Card 1991b; Card 2001; Chiswick et al. 1992; Hanson and Slaughter 1999).
There are three ways in which immigration can lead to greater economic growth.10 These are (1) acceleration of convergence to the long-run steady state growth path through enhancing openness of the host economy and increasing the demand for new investment; (2) through promoting innovation and consequential long-run changes in total factor productivity; and (3) through improving allocative efficiency in the short run and long run, which again may boost total factor productivity. We shall discuss each of these in turn.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 21
The first effect of immigration on growth is through equilibrium or ‘steady-state’ effects in open economy growth models. The standard textbook reference for these models is Chapter 9 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) which develops the Brown model of migration and growth in section 9.1.3. This model allows for perfect capital mobility and imperfect labour mobility in a small open economy model and shows that higher immigration speeds up convergence to the long-run steady state growth rate. Another important reference in this area is Borjas (1999a), who reviews several models of substitution/complementarity between immigrants, natives and capital. Other examples include Nijkamp and Poot (1998) who combines interregional or
10 This section has benefited from the input of Steven Stillman.
inter-country labour mobility with endogenous technical change in a spatial growth model and Ben-Gad (2004) who explicitly incorporates the role of ‘imported’ human capital in an endogenous growth model. The importance of immigration coinciding with capital growth is made clear from a simple analysis by Kemnitz (2001). His very simple macro model of endogenous growth suggests that immigration will benefit an arbitrary native if and only if the average immigrant possesses more capital than the average native.
There is a variety of empirical work that can be grouped under this heading. For example, Walmsley and Winters (2003) use a global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model (see Section 8) to bravely investigate the impact of a freeing up of border controls on the global economy. They conclude that a 3 percent increase in developed economies’ quotas on both skilled and unskilled foreign labour would lead to an economic gain of more than 150 billion US dollars. Williamson and Hatton (1994; 1998) examine the relationship between historical migration patterns and long-run economic growth.
With respect to New Zealand, Poot et al. (1998) use the growth accounting framework to examine the relationship between immigration and New Zealand’s long-run growth rate. This analysis led to realistic assumptions regarding the expected change in total factor productivity (TFP) and the sector-specific scale effects of immigration that were fed into a CGE model of the New Zealand economy. Simulations with the CGE model then provide estimates of the long-run impact of immigration on macro aggregates such as consumption per head, wages, inflation and the government budget, but also estimates of the impact on specific production sectors and the labour market.
The second way that immigration can affect economic growth is through Schumpeterian innovation. In these models, migrants bring new ideas, work in new industries and occupations, and/or attract trade and FDI from their home countries. Thus, migration can be expected to affect entrepreneurship, innovation, etc. The theoretical work in this area is quite scattered and no obvious main citations exist. A variety of empirical work has looked at entrepreneurial activity by immigrants. For example, Borjas (1986) looks at the self-employment of US migrants. A recent special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2001) focuses solely on entrepreneurship.
Despite entrepreneurial immigration being a major feature of New Zealand’s immigration policy, scientific research in this area is actually rather under-researched and this may have contributed to the rather ad hoc policy changes that have occurred in this area since the early 1990s. Reviews of entrepreneurial immigration include Trlin and Kang (1992), but most of the research in this area is in the form of consultancy reports (such as Forsyte Research, (1998), and Hong, (2001)) rather than journal articles. While recent research by Law and Bryant (2004) shows that immigration may lead to increased international trade (see Section 4 below), there is as yet no strong evidence that this trade effect is greater for entrepreneurial migrants rather than other types of migrants. Ching and Chen (2000) find evidence that trade between Taiwan and Canada is enhanced by self-employed and entrepreneur-type immigrants from Taiwan to Canada, but that the effect of investor class immigrants
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 22
(those who only need to invest capital passively) on trade was negative. The evaluation of the 1999 Business Immigration Policy by New Zealand Immigration Service (2002) analysed the composition of business migration to New Zealand and found that the number of Long-Term Business Visa and entrepreneur migrants between 1999 and 2002 were of similar magnitude to the number of Investor migrants, with the latter primarily placing their money in passive investments. The contribution of business migration to innovation, and the spillovers to the economy generally, remain largely unmeasured.
The third way that immigration can affect economic growth is by improving economic efficiency. It can be argued that migrants are more responsive to economic signals because of a lack of 'cumulative inertia' and thus help keep the economy moving. The fact that migrants are younger, on average, also tends to make them more willing and able to adjust to economic change. Immigration also increases the size of the economy, which can potentially lead to more competition and efficiency. However, recent evidence suggests that it is not true that bigger economies perform better on average (e.g. Poot (2004)), although being in geographical proximity of large economy is economically advantageous, all else being equal.
Migrants are also more likely to cluster in major cities which may increase the growth rate through agglomeration effects. Borjas (2001) discusses ‘greasing the wheel’ models of migration in great detail. The theoretical and empirical work in this paper is very relevant to the link between immigration and growth. In fact, the paper estimates how much immigrants contribute to US GDP by ‘greasing the wheels’.
The impact of immigration on productivity has been inadequately researched throughout the world. In New Zealand, the only evidence comes from a macroeconomic causality analysis of net immigration and total factor productivity (TFP) growth, reported in Poot (1993). This analysis showed that there was only a weak effect of immigration Granger causing productivity improvements, but a much stronger effect of net migration responding positively at times when TFP growth was faster than usual. This type of causality analysis has some benefit, is relatively easy to do, and should be updated within a properly specified Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. At the macro level, the argument to justify TFP growth from immigration is a simple investment accelerator story. Immigration generates additional aggregate demand that can only be met by a higher level of production which, in turn, requires a greater capital stock. The new investment needed to increase the capital stock embodies the latest imported or locally-generated innovation. The qualitative improvement in the stock of capital then provides the productivity gains that lead to a higher TFP.
However, the major gap in knowledge here is at the micro-level: the transmission mechanisms through which immigrants increase productivity of individual firms: through ‘working and trying harder’ or as spillovers of their own skills to the locally born, or through their entrepreneurial activities. Nonetheless, there is a clear concern with immigrant quality, and hence productivity effects, in policy documents (see for instance “The Knowledge Economy: Six Key Issues for New Zealand to Address” (Ministry of Economic Development 2004)).
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 23
The literature on entrepreneurship and immigration is remarkably thin. For example, the earlier mentioned report by Forsyte Research (1998) identified the positive factors and barriers that business migrants faced when setting up businesses in New Zealand. However, this research was based on interviews with a sample of 30 business migrants, so that generalisations are impossible to make. Moreover, no evidence on spillover benefits of the migrants to innovation in New Zealand can be identified. Similarly, a survey of Asian business immigrants in Auckland by Hong (2001) was also based on just 48 respondents. While these surveys may provide useful qualitative information, they are not informative for economic modelling.
Little empirical evidence exists on how immigration affects productivity. The time frame may be important as well. Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002) examine the relationship between immigration and three factors – output-mix, labour productivity, and capital – in the skilled and unskilled sectors in the U.S. manufacturing sector at the state level. A simple two-sector model is then used to predict the effect of immigration on these three factors. The predictions of the model are then tested using data primarily from the 1982 and 1992 US Census of Manufactures. This study finds that productivity growth is lower in States with high inflows of immigrants than in States that attracted lower levels of immigration. This suggests that immigration lowers productivity growth, which contradicts the growth channels mentioned earlier. However, the authors argue that the productivity effect may be negative in the short run and then turn to positive in the long run. The long-run effect of immigration on productivity has yet to be researched. A problem with replicating a study of this type at a regional level using New Zealand data is the absence of certain types of regional data, such as on certain forms of taxation and the capital stock.11
4. Trade and international relations
A number of recent studies have found that immigration has a positive effect on trade between the immigrants host and home countries (Girma and Yu 2000; Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998; Ley and Tutchener 2001; Piperakis et al. 2003; Rauch 1999; Rauch and Trindale 1999; Wagner et al. 2002). Two basic causes for this effect have been identified. Firstly, immigrants tend to have a preference for the products from their home countries, as a matter of taste or due to emotional attachment. Secondly, immigrants can reduce transaction costs of bilateral trade with their home countries either through individual characteristics such as business contacts or through more generic traits such as language (Girma and Yu 2000).
While the positive correlation between immigration and trade has been generally confirmed, it is important to distinguish the effect on imports from the effect on exports. By and large, the elasticity of the effect of immigration on exports is less than the elasticity of the effect on imports. Several examples will illustrate this. Kohli (2002) found using Swiss data that immigration tends to stimulate imports and to shift
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 24
11 Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny include terms for the proportion of state revenue obtained from individual and corporate taxes in their regression analysis.
the output mix towards non-traded goods, thereby impacting negatively on the trade account. Ching and Chen (2000) found that migration from Taiwan to Canada had a greater impact on imports into Canada than on Canadian exports. Moreover, their study showed, as noted in the previous section, that the composition of the migrant flows matter. Girma and Yu (2000) found – when investigating the link between immigration and trade using U.K. data – that immigration from non-Commonwealth countries had a significant export-enhancing effect. By contrast, immigration from Commonwealth countries was found to have no substantial impact on exports. In another study on Canada, Wagner et al. (2002) found that the effect of the average new immigrant on imports is three times that on exports.
These results are all quite plausible as the short-run macroeconomic effect of immigration is an increase in aggregate demand which is partially met by a greater volume of imports. The effect on exports is less direct (and justifies the assumption of exogenous exports in traditional simple macro models). Thus, it can be concluded that immigration leads to a deteriorating trade balance, at least in the short run. The long run effect is less easy to determine as it is affected by the extent to which efficiency gains due to innovation and scale effects from immigration improve the competitiveness of the country through a lower real exchange rate.
Thus, in the simulations of the impact of higher immigration in New Zealand by Poot et al. (1988), it was found that in the ‘base’ scenario without technological change and economies of scale, population growth due to immigration of 6.15 percent led to deterioration in the balance of payments of -0.86 percent. When such technology-led efficiency gains were incorporated, the balance of payments effect turned slightly positive to 0.07 percent.
In a very recent New Zealand study, Law and Bryant (2004) investigated the relationship between the stock of migrants from a particular country and trade between that country and New Zealand using a modified gravity model of trade, finding that larger migrant stocks were probably associated with higher trade flows although the transaction costs interpretation was not completely supported.
Our review of the literature indicates that the approach adopted by Law and Bryant (2004) has been widely and successfully used internationally, though other approaches do exist.12 This leads us to the view that further work in this area should be, as Law and Bryant (2004) suggest, directed to elaborating and clarify their findings by employing a higher level of disaggregation of import/export commodity types and under different specifications of elasticities of trade.
Further macro level work in this area needs to be complemented by deeper investigation into the microeconomic causes of the trade effect. Changes in consumer demand (i.e. the preferences effect) are to some extent observable from the Household Economic Survey. The transaction costs effect is less easy to identify but it may be possible to use business directory and labour market data to assess whether firms that
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 25
12 See for instance Kohli (2002) who employs a production-theory based approach to investigate the impact of non-resident workers on the Swiss economy.
have an export orientation are indeed employing a relatively greater number of immigrants than firms that do not. The long-run efficiency gain effect of immigration is linked to the entrepreneurship and investment issues discussed in the previous section, whereby the obvious research question is whether such efficiency gains are greater in the traded goods and services sector than in the non-traded sector.
5. Fiscal impact
Concerns regarding the impact of immigration on fiscal and social policy are widespread, with some politicians and commentators citing an extensive array of largely detrimental effects of high inflows of migrants on indicators ranging from crime rates and house prices to the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state. The fiscal impact is briefly discussed in this section, while issues of social cohesion, crime, housing, etc. addressed in the subsequent sections.
The standard approach to the fiscal impact of immigration in the international literature consists of combining a demographic profile of the population before and after an immigration influx with the cost per capita of providing public consumption and transfer payments. Similarly, tax revenues are estimated based on the incomes and consumption patterns of different demographic groups. This literature suggests, by and large, that the fiscal impact of immigration is positive: immigrants add more to tax revenue than to government consumption or social security payments. The positive impact increases over time (at least up to the time of retirement). For example, Gustafsson and Österberg (2001) found that upon arrival in Sweden immigrants did generate a net burden on the public sector budget, but this was reversed after a few years. Refugees initially put a larger burden on the public sector budget, but the difference with other immigrants declines over the years.
The main cause of the positive net impact is the age profile of immigrants. They tend to be relatively young, and often also single. Given the very strong links between age and the major public expenditure items of health and education, immigration tends to increase education expenditure and lower health expenditure, with the net balance being a reduction in total expenditure.
However, it is important to take a lifecycle perspective rather than a single year or ‘snapshot’ perspective. Studies of the latter type (such as Nana et al. (2003) in New Zealand) are misleading because they do not take the lifecycle of migrants and their offspring into account. Lee and Miller (2000) note that “the only meaningful calculation is longitudinal, tracing the consequences of an immigrant’s arrival through subsequent years, and taking full account of all the immigrant’s descendants” (p.351). Taking such a longitudinal perspective, Lee and Miller (2000) find with US data that the Net Present Value of the fiscal impact of an additional immigrant (i.e. the marginal net fiscal benefit) starts out negative, then turns positive within the first 25 years and keeps on increasing from then on.
Because different cohorts of arrivals face different sets of fiscal policies, a popular approach to studying the fiscal impact is the methodology of generational accounting
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 26
that was initially developed by Alan Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff and others in the United States to consider the economic impact of population ageing and the net fiscal contribution of various generations facing different tax and social security arrangements. Thus, Auerbach and Oreopoulis ((1999a; 1999b) find that because new immigrants represent a larger fraction of future generations than of present ones, shifting the burden of net public expenditure onto future generations also shifts it relatively onto new immigrants. However, they argue that the impact of immigration on fiscal balance is rather small, so that immigration should be viewed as neither a major cause of budget deficits nor a solution to it. Other examples of the generational accounting approach are Bonin et al. (2000) for Germany and Collado et al. (2004) for Spain.
Since one of the main concerns with population ageing is the increasing transfers of current income needed to fund consumption of the elderly and since immigration has a positive fiscal impact, it is tempting to suggest that immigration is an alternative policy to higher savings or tax rates in ageing societies. It is certainly the case that immigration can slow down population ageing, but the effect is only small for even large inflows, as was shown for New Zealand by Poot et al. (1988) and more recently by Bryant (2003).13 What matters crucially are the forces of demographic change in the overseas born population vis-à-vis the locally born population, such as their re-migration rates but particularly also the fertility behaviour of immigrant families. See for example Rendall and Ball (2004) for a recent UK-based discussion. If immigrant fertility is similar to, or over time converges to, that of the native population, population ageing (which is ultimately driven by sub-replacement fertility) cannot be stopped. Indeed, immigration can be ‘addictive’ in that, unless a steady inflow of labour force aged migrants is maintained, the fiscal impact of ageing is exacerbated once the cohorts of the last migration wave reach retirement ages themselves.
Following the first pioneering assessment of the fiscal impact by (Poot 1988) the fiscal impact of migration to New Zealand is comprehensively covered in Nana et al. (2003). In their report for the New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) they cover the fiscal impact at both national and sub-national levels, under different levels of immigration, for specific cohorts of migrants and different categories of migrant. They conclude that for all migrant groups, differentiated both by region of residence and duration of residence, the age-adjusted per-capita net fiscal impact was positive.
While Nana et al (2003) and earlier studies provided some useful insights into the fiscal impact of immigration in New Zealand, the limitations of this type of research now need to be addressed as this will affect our understanding of how future immigration policies might influence fiscal balance. These limitations are:
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13 Bryant (2003) compared two sets of population projections: one with zero net migration in the long run and the other with net migration of 20,000 persons. The latter scenario implies an inflow of one million migrants over 50 years. However, the effect on dependency ratios is fairly modest: a reduction of the number of dependent per working age person in 2051 from 0.71 to 0.65. The implications for fiscal sustainability are still to be researched.
• There is no consideration of emigration of New Zealanders and earlier immigrants. The study is concerned with gross inward migration, not net migration.
• The fiscal impact is calculated in an accounting framework rather than by means of an economic model. Flow-on effects of immigration on the economy are not taken into account.
• As noted earlier, a ‘snapshot’ rather than a generational accounting approach has been taken.
In addition Nana et al. (2003) assume that migrants exhibit expenditure characteristics similar to those born in New Zealand within the same age and income category. Thus differences between sub-groups of immigrants in the fiscal impact are entirely due to differences between such groups in these two characteristics. If other characteristics don’t matter, then this assumption is adequate. For example, Vernez and McCarthy (1997) argue that the use of public services is not related to immigration status. However, there is usually limited information available and this assumption may not always be correct. For example, Tarzwell (2003) argued more recently that greater cultural diversity in Canada (measured in terms of ‘mother tongue’) increased government expenditure levels. Much earlier, Poot et al. (1988) identified in New Zealand, using unpublished household expenditure data, differences in consumption preferences across certain immigrant groups.
In conclusion, it is important to introduce now a generational rather than a cross-sectional “snapshot” approach to assessing the fiscal impact of immigration in New Zealand. Differences in economic profiles of migrant groups should be taken into account. Generational accounting has been done in New Zealand (see e.g. Baker (1999)), but only with one migration assumption, namely annual net immigration of 5000.
Besides generational accounting, there is also a need for new research that embeds the fiscal impact into a comprehensive economic model that takes flow-on, economy-wide, sectoral and long-run effects into account. The ideal vehicle for such an analysis is a CGE model. This is essentially what was done by Storesletten (2000) who simulated immigration scenarios with a CGE ‘overlapping generations’ model. A further discussion of CGE models can be found in Section 8.
6. Social cohesion, inequality and crime
In New Zealand, as in many other countries, the development of explicit measures of social cohesion is in its infancy (Statistics New Zealand 2004b) and in many ways remains mired in definitional issues. Peace (2001) provides a discussion of the elusive and challenging nature of the concept of social exclusion/inclusion in the European Union and in New Zealand. Nonetheless, if New Zealand is to be a socially inclusive society, policies for migrants need to be assessed in terms of providing the following elements of social cohesion: a sense of belonging, inclusion, participation, recognition and legitimacy (see Spoonley (2004)). The assessment requires the development of a range of quantitative and qualitative indicators.
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It is generally accepted that social cohesion can contribute to better economic outcomes (for a survey, see e.g. Killerby and Wallis (2002)). However, social cohesion is a complex mix of favourable social and economic outcomes, such as adequate incomes, low inequality, low crime, low unemployment etc. While the whole may be more than the contribution of individual factors, economic research has tended to focus on the direct links between measurable indicators and economic growth. It is therefore not surprising then that little work of an econometric nature has been done on the economic impact of immigration through its effect on social cohesion. There are nonetheless some reviews of the issues. Smith and Edmonston (1997) cover the social impact of immigration in the USA in their final chapter. They discuss issues such as the geographical and occupational clustering of immigrants, intermarriage and ethnic identity, education of second and higher generations, language, naturalization, contributions to the arts and sciences, interethnic relations and crime. Some of these issues are also addressed by Borjas (1999b) for the United States and by Glover at al. (2001) for the United Kingdom.
Growing inequality is one factor responsible for a less cohesive society. While there is substantial evidence of growing inequality at national and regional levels in New Zealand (see e.g. Karagedikli et al. (2000)), the relationship with immigration is yet to be investigated. It was noted in Section 2 that overseas research does not consider immigration as the major source of growing inequality. Yet Karagedikli et al. (2000) found that inequality grew the fastest in New Zealand in the metropolitan centres, which are also the main areas where migrants settle. However, the presence or absence of any causal link is still to be investigated.
Internationally, considerable attention has been paid to any possible link between immigration and crime, with empirical studies on the incidence of crime among migrants dating back to the early part of the twentieth century in the United States (Martinez and Lee 2000). A brief review of contemporary research into links between crime and ethnicity in general, and migrants in particular, can be found in an Australian study (Mukherjee 1999). Aside from reviewing research from a large number of countries, Mukherjee provides a largely descriptive overview of crime committed by and against migrant groups in Australia, drawing on censuses of inmates, police arrest data and court records. 14
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Such a descriptive overview would provide a valuable starting point for research in New Zealand. However, obtaining appropriate data may prove difficult. Ethnicity data is collected in the Census of Prison Inmates and Home Detainees (Department of Corrections 2003) but country of birth is presently not. The Census of Population and Dwellings does, at least in theory, allow the occupants of prisons and police lock-ups to be identified. This of course unjustifiably equates criminality with prosecution and imprisonment. A significant proportion of offences that occur in a community remain unsolved so that nothing is known about the perpetrators and crimes are in any case frequently unreported (Mukherjee 1999). While the issue of crime is peripheral to
14 Categorised into The United States, Canada, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, France, Europe and ‘Other’.
issues of economic impact, it should be noted that crime does have linkages with economic conditions. A New Zealand example is the econometric analysis by Papps and Winkelmann (2000), who find significant effects of unemployment on recorded crime. However, given that immigration is more likely to reduce unemployment rather than increase it (see Section 2), this would suggest that immigration could have a downward effect on crime.
With respect to social cohesion, it is important to have information on New Zealanders’ attitudes toward immigrants. Recently some survey data on this topic have been collected and results are reported in Gendall (2004) and Ward and Masgoret (2004). Ward and Masgoret show that New Zealanders generally support immigration and a multi-cultural society. However, there are marked Māori/Pakeha differences with the former having less positive attitudes toward immigration, due to seeing immigrants as a source of threat or competition. Given the skill composition of immigration, it remains to be shown by means of labour market impact studies such as reviewed in Section 2 that this threat is real rather than just perceived. A negative real wage effect would require substitutability rather than complementarity between Māori and migrant workers.
With respect to attitudes, it should be noted that there is some evidence of migrant discrimination in the New Zealand labour market. Dunstan et al. (2004) found within a small sample of some 500 pilot LisNZ respondents that one in five immigrants reported experience of discrimination. This is reinforced by a type of experimental research which involved sending fictitious resumes to recruitment agencies by researchers at Victoria University of Wellington.15 Based on samples of just over 40 resumes of two job applicants, a New Zealand citizen and a Chinese migrant, is was found that the New Zealand candidate was significantly more often asked for further contact than the Chinese candidate, although the resumes indicated equivalent training and experience. The causes and extent of such discrimination in the New Zealand labour market obviously warrants further investigation.
7. Spatial clustering and housing
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There is extensive evidence that migration is a spatially selective process, with most migrants being attracted to the major cities. Moreover, within cities, immigration has tended to lead to spatial segregation. Such segregation is the result of migrants seeking affordable housing and support of their network of friends and relatives, at the same time facilitated by the outward migration of the locally born. The patterns and impact of migrant clustering are discussed with case studies from several countries in, for example, Gorter et al. (1998). The spatial concentration of migrants may be advantageous for them in terms of the ethnic goods (food, cultural activities, etc.) and support networks. However, ethnic ‘enclaves’ may affect wages and employment opportunities either positively or negatively. Obviously, spatial segregation has implications for the provision of education, health and other social services. The segregation of immigrants and natives can have spillover effects that may lead to
15 Reported on the Internet at www.vuw.ac.nz/cacr/research/immigrant.aspx 4/10/2004.
worse economic and social outcomes in the long run. For example, Schnepf (2004) recently concluded with cross-country data on educational achievement that “high clustering of immigrants in some schools is neither favourable for the educational achievement of immigrants nor natives attending these schools” (p.35). As with the discussion of social cohesion, a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of social clustering is beyond the scope of the present paper.
It is generally believed that the concentration of immigration in Auckland contributes to problems of congestion and urban sprawl. Some policies have been introduced to encourage settlement in other regions. However, the effectiveness of incentives for settlement outside Auckland is still to be researched. For example, do migrants who settle in other regions converge back to Auckland over time, or is internal migration of immigrants a process of dispersion?
The impact of migration at the regional level certainly needs further investigation. This will be addressed in terms of CGE modelling in the next section. Immigration in Auckland is expected to have contributed to a housing boom and buoyant economic conditions. Yet recent research by Hall and McDermott (2004) could not find a relationship between immigration and the regional business cycle. This matter also needs further investigation.
In terms of urban conditions, one area where concern has been voiced over the impact of immigrants has been housing. Using a data base of house prices from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), covering 27 major housing markets and the otherwise inaccessible records of the Canadian Real Estate Association and the Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver, Ley and Tuchener (2001) examined house price movements in eight Canadian metropolitan areas between 1971 and 1996. They found that while there was considerable similarity in the metropolitan areas considered at the start of the period, rapid price inflation in Vancouver and Toronto saw from the mid-1980s increasing disparity in the house price structure of the metropolitan areas. Correlation and factor analysis conducted by Ley and Tuchner indicated that for Vancouver and Toronto regional and national factors declined in significance in determining house prices from the mid-1980’s, the onset of heavy and concentrated immigration into these cities while indicators of globalisation, such as immigration, became increasingly important.
This type of research can be conducted in New Zealand. The data necessary to replicate this study is available from a combination of Statistics New Zealand, the Real Estate Institute and Quotable Value New Zealand Limited.
Saiz (2003a) also considers the impact of immigration on destination cities. Using instrumental variables based on a ‘shift-share’ of national levels of immigration into metropolitan areas Saiz examined both the impact of immigration on housing prices and rents and found a pervasive positive association between immigration and both of these variables. Saiz also compared his results with the impact of immigration on labour markets, finding an effect an order of magnitude greater in the housing (and rental) market. The data used in Saiz’s study were drawn from US census and immigration data along with rental data from Department of Housing and Urban
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Development (HUD). Again, comparable data is available from similar sources in New Zealand.
In another interesting paper, Saiz (2003b) followed Card’s (1990) natural experiment of the influx into Miami from Cuba (the Mariel boatlift) that was already discussed in Section 2. This exogenous immigration shock added 9 percent to Miami’s renter population. Unlike the case of the labour market, where no effects were found, Saiz found that rents increased from 8 to 11 percent more in Miami than in comparable cities and that this rental effect was persistent.
Borjas (2002) considers a different aspect of the relationship between immigration and the housing market, focusing on the determinants of immigrant house ownership, using Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980 and 1990 decennial U.S. Census, and the 1998-2000 Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Surveys (CPS). He finds that the differential between native and immigrant groups in homeownership had increased markedly with time. However, only a comparatively small proportion of this difference can be attributed to variables such as household composition or income, whereas locational decisions on the part of migrants appeared to play a significant role in explaining the ownership gap.
It should be noted that housing research using census data has to overcome the usual problem of combining individual census forms (with information on e.g. country of birth and years in NZ) with the household reference person form (with information on housing) and then defining migrant households. In addition, the Statistics New Zealand data laboratory would be needed to analyse the required census microdata. The available and proposed Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURFs) would not provide the right data.
8. Economy-wide macro and CGE modeling
The previous sections of this paper reviewed recent research and suggested potential new projects on a range of economic impacts of immigration, such as on wages, technological change, trade, etc. These types of partial analyses provide helpful insights individually, but to assess how a particular immigration policy affects the New Zealand economy overall requires ultimately the integration of all these effects into an economy-wide model. Economy-wide models can be divided into those that focus primarily on macroeconomic outcomes (such as GDP, overall employment, the exchange rate, and the rate of inflation) and models that provide information at the level of sectors of the economy, goods and services traded, and types of workers. One class of models of the latter type is the class of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.
Both macro and micro general equilibrium models have their foundations in neoclassical economics and are built up from microfoundations, i.e. the behaviour of rational individual consumers and firms. Both types of models mimic the working of the market economy in that the price mechanism is expected to determine the
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allocation of resources such that demand and supply coincide (thereby generating equilibrium).
Macro analyses of immigration with models of the New Zealand economy can be undertaken. This may identify the inflationary effect of immigration for given monetary policy conditions, and the effect on the balance of payments. The RBNZ Forecasting and Policy System Model might be useful in this respect. However, there appears to be little interest by macroeconomists in modelling how immigration shocks affect New Zealand’s real and monetary aggregates. Particularly interesting is the question whether the inflationary impact of immigration would in itself be sufficient to induce a corrective response by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
For considering the implications of varying levels of immigration on the economy, and the sensitivity of such economic outcomes to immigration policy, the CGE model is a natural tool as micro-level factors such as the demographic and skill composition of immigrants can be taken into account. This does not imply that there is no need for analysis at the macro-level: CGE models principally calculate the market-driven allocation of a given total quantity of resources (labour, capital and natural resources) in the economy and they require an input of information (factors exogenous to the model) on certain macro-level variables, such as the total available capital stock and the rate of technological progress (these exogenous factors that are fed into the model are called the ‘model closure’).
CGE models remain popular throughout the world, particularly for applied analyses of international and interregional trade. At a global level, a CGE model has recently been used to calculate the gains to the global economy from removing restrictions on international migration (Walmsley and Winters, (2003), already mentioned in Section 3). There are not many CGE analyses of the impact of immigration on individual countries in recent years, but examples are Goto (1996) who assessed the impact of migrant workers on the Japanese economy, Chang (2004) who considered the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour in Australia, and Sarris and Zografakis (1999) who studied the impact on wages of skilled and unskilled workers due to an inflow of illegal immigrants into Greece.
In New Zealand, the CGE modelling approach was successfully adopted by Poot et al. (1988) to assess the impact of a range of immigration scenarios by means of the Joanna model. This analysis is now out of date for a number of reasons:
• The immigration scenarios used in the model reflect the composition of immigration flows as they were in the 1980s, before the major policy changes of the early 1990s. The composition of immigrants has changed drastically since then.
• The structure of the labour market has changed since the 1980s, with a decline in manufacturing and an increase in service sectors. The 1980s Joanna model allowed for 18 sectors and just 10 occupational groups, which is not informative enough to study current labour market conditions.
• Fed into the Joanna model were calculated effects of the migration scenarios on health, education and social security. Government policies are now very different and recent work on the fiscal impact of demographic change (such as
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 33
by Creedy and Scobie 2002 and by Nana et al. 2003) would need to be taken into account.
• A major driver of the results reported in Poot et al. (1988) was a set of exogenous impacts of immigration on technological change and economies of scale. These exogenous inputs were calculated by an assessment of changes in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in relation to New Zealand’s post-World War II net immigration and by an independent assessment of the potential to reap economies of scale across New Zealand industries (both inputs reported in Chapter 4). Given globalisation, the impact of ICT on the economy, changes in the size distribution of New Zealand firms, etc. these issues must be re-addressed from scratch, as discussed in Section 3.
• Gross fixed capital formation (investment) is a major determinant of economic growth. The Joanna model made strong assumptions about investment, namely that the overall capital-labour ratio and the share of investment in GDP would neither be affected by immigration. Both assumptions need to be investigated with new macro analyses.
• The shifts in domestic demand resulting from different levels of immigration can be taken into account when new household economic survey data are used to generate information on immigrant expenditure patterns.
• If migrants affect trading patterns, as suggested by Law and Bryant (2004) (see Section 4), such shifts in export and imports can be embedded in CGE model simulations.
• Another issue is the impact of immigration on housing. Because new house building is an important part of overall construction activity and housing outlays are a large component of household expenditure, any new economy-wide modelling requires a reassessment of how the housing sector is affected by immigration.
In conclusion, a CGE model provides the best framework to reassess the economy-wide and in-depth sectoral impacts of immigration. New simulations with a CGE model would not be simply a matter of updating Poot et al. (1988). On many issues related to immigration new knowledge has accumulated in the subsequent decade and a half, both in New Zealand and abroad. It is envisaged that a new CGE analysis would require the input of a wider range of experts than was the case with the 1980s project. A carefully conducted CGE analysis is likely to attract international attention and may lead to replication elsewhere, given that the economic impact of immigration is a growing concern in many developed countries.
New Zealand has the modelling infrastructure available to do an improved CGE model analysis of immigration. There are two types of models: CGE models that calculate ‘level effects’ and models that calculate ‘change relative to a base scenario’. The distinction is illustrated in Figure 3.
Both models start with the current situation at T1, and an observed economic variable Y1. Under current policy conditions, a ‘level’ model would calculate that the variable changes to Y2 at time T2. Feeding the new policy into the model leads to a further predicted change to Y3.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 34
A model that calculates ‘change relative to base scenario’ is more pragmatic. Such a model would not calculate Y2, because it can be argued that many – presently still unknown – factors can change the variable between T1 and T2. The model would simply calculate the relative (percentage) change in Y after the policy change as compared with the base scenario.
The Joanna model used by Poot et al. (1988) is of the second type. This approach is particularly useful when looking at long-run changes (ten years or more), because a level model would then require a number of inputs that are hard to predict. However, for forecasting short-run effects (say, up to 5 years), a level model may be more informative.
Figure 3. Assessing ‘level’ or ‘relative change’ effects by means of CGE models
The Joanna is currently still in use by BERL in an improved and expanded form.16 CGE modelling of immigration is effectively similar to another CGE exercise that was conducted earlier this year to assess the economy-wide impact of the release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in New Zealand (BERL 2004a). The similarity arises from the fact that both types of simulations require issue-specific exogenous information (consumer attitudes in the case of the GMOs; the demographic composition of the population and the associated effects on average consumer preferences in the case of immigration), the combination of different models (an agricultural trade model and a CGE model in the case of GMOs; models of total factor productivity and/or trade and a CGE model in the case of immigration) and the input of a broad range of experts and stakeholder organisations in both cases.
Another project that has similarities with a CGE analysis of immigration is BERL’s study of expected employment by occupation and industry until 2011, which takes
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 35
16 A ‘level effect’ model, like Joanna originally developed by the Research Project on Economic Planning at Victoria University of Wellington during the 1980s, is currently in use by Infometrics.
into account projections of export demand, productivity and a range of other economic indicators over the medium term (BERL 2004b). The range of occupations and industries used for both types of analyses are given in the Appendix to this paper. This disaggregates employment into 49 industries and 40 occupations. Such a level of disaggregation of industries and occupations would appear to be sufficiently informative for an immigration CGE analysis as well.
It should be noted that a backbone for CGE modelling is information on inter-industry transactions in New Zealand, also called an input-output table. The latest available information at present appears to be the 1996 input-output table, partially updated. Up to date information on inter-industry transactions would improve the quality of the results obtained from new analyses with the Joanna model.
Given that immigration is highly clustered into a few regions, an important extension to a national-level analysis of the economy-wide effects of immigration would be a multi-regional analysis. Again a CGE model is a very suitable tool for this. Multi-regional CGE models are extensively used in Australia (e.g., Groenewold et al. (2003)). Another recent example of multi-regional CGE analysis is Kim and Kim (2003) who assess the impact of growth policies in Korea.
Given the spatial concentration of immigration to the Auckland region, the level of regional disaggregation required need not be very extensive. It is possible that a four-region model that consists of the Auckland and Wellington regions, the rest of the north Island, and the South Island, may be sufficient. The greater the level of spatial disaggregation, the harder it will be to obtain useful regional-level data from the available national surveys.
It should be noted that the applications and policy-oriented CGE models in New Zealand have a high degree of disaggregation, but are restrictive in terms of their assumptions. As noted earlier, the models calculate a new equilibrium after some economic shock, but they do not trace the path from the initial equilibrium to the new one. Thus, the models are comparative static rather than dynamic. In addition, economic agents in the models (firms and households) do not have forward looking expectations and their decision making also takes place in a one-period setting. Models that relax these restrictions are called dynamic inter-temporal CGE models. An example is Chang (Chang 2004) already mentioned in Section 2. Chang calculated the impact of immigration in Australia on the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labour. It should be stressed that the higher degree of sophistication of such a model compared to the traditional ‘workhorses’ such as Joanna is that the sophisticated dynamic models can only be simulated a with a high degree of aggregation (i.e., with just a few sectors and skill groups or occupational groups).
9. A wish list of potential research topics
Throughout the previous sections a range of projects have been suggested that could be undertaken in a New Zealand context. Suitable data would be available in principle for most topics, although the Statistics New Zealand data laboratory is likely to be
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 36
needed for access to micro level data. For some issues (such workplace discrimination) special surveys may need to be conducted. The following topics can be identified from what was earlier discussed in the paper:
i. The impact of immigration on wages and employment using the geographical area-based approach, the experience-based approach, or the factor proportions approach, using census or HLFS income supplement data.
ii. The impact of immigration (including effects of policy changes) on employment, unemployment and labour turnover indicators by means of time series data from the Household Labour Force Survey.
iii. The relationship between immigration and the short-run job prospects of unemployed residents by means of the methodology of e.g. Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999).
iv. The measurement of the impact of immigration on internal and international migration patterns of the locally born.
v. An update of Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) of migrant adaptation by means of econometric earnings functions.
vi. Selective emigration of former immigrants and the impact on local labour markets.
vii. The impact of migrant geographical clustering on migrant wages, employment, productivity and innovation.
viii. The spillover benefits from entrepreneurial migration.
ix. The relationship between immigration and Total Factor Productivity growth.
x. The post-settlement human capital accumulation of migrants and differences in rates of return to such investment for migrants and for the native born.
xi. The efficiency and effectiveness of post-settlement services and assistance.
xii. Immigrant self-selection and motives for migration to New Zealand.
xiii. The contribution of business migration to innovation, and the spillovers to the economy generally.
xiv. The relationship between migration and international trade at a disaggregated level.
xv. A generational accounting approach to assessing the fiscal impact of immigration.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 37
xvi. The effect of immigration on income inequality.
xvii. The incidence and impact of migrant discrimination in the labour market.
xviii. Internal migration patterns of international migrants.
xix. The effect of immigration on local housing markets: house prices and rents, new building activity and homeownership rates.
xx. Macro analysis of immigration with models of the New Zealand economy to assess the impact on GDP, the rate of inflation for given monetary policy conditions, and the effect on the balance of payments.
xxi. The long-run consequences of the inflow of students.
xxii. Long-run differences in the economic impact of temporary worker migration and permanent settlement.
xxiii. The impact of immigration on Gross Fixed Capital Formation (investment) other than housing.
xxiv. Differentials between immigrant groups in consumption patterns.
xxv. A full scale CGE model analysis of the economy-wide, sectoral and labour market effects of specific immigration scenarios.
10. Conclusion
Immigration is a complex phenomenon that affects New Zealand in many different ways. This report has been primarily concerned with measurement of economic aspects of the impact of immigration. Qualitative research and broader consequences were outside the scope of the report.
The last literature review of the economic impact of immigration in New Zealand was conducted in 1994 (Chapple et al. 1994). The present report summarised key contributions to the international and New Zealand literature since then and identified major gaps in our understanding of the economic impact of immigration on New Zealand.
While much can be learnt from the international literature, there are many rather unique features of Aotearoa New Zealand (history, the changing birthplaces of migrants, the migration of New Zealanders themselves, the volatility in the flows, the relationship with Australia, etc.) that suggest that many research findings from abroad may not be readily transferable.
Chapple et al. (1994) identified 11 areas in which further research on the economic impact of immigration in NZ was needed. They are (1) descriptive information on
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recent immigration; (2) substitutability/complementarity of immigrants and wage effects; (3) distributional issues with respect to taxes/benefits; (4) economic adaptation of immigrants; (5) regional impact of immigration; (6) technical change and economics of scale; (7) attitudes toward immigrants; (8) comprehensive analysis of unemployment effects; (9) immigrant catch up; (10) business immigrants; investment performance; and (11) inflation effects.
While progress has been made during the subsequent decade on some of these topics (specifically (1), (3), (4), (7) and (9)), further research on all these areas is important (given the changes in policies, economic conditions and the composition of immigration flows). Moreover, research on topics (2), (5), (6), (8), (10) and (11) is still non-existent or has been inadequate. In addition, the following areas should also be addressed with new or additional research: (12) trade patterns, tourism and international relations; (13) student flows; (14) temporary worker flows; (15) social cohesion, inequality and crime; (16) housing; (17) the spatial clustering of migrants; and (18) the efficiency and effectiveness of post-settlement assistance.
Chapple et al. (1994) concluded that the major constraint on New Zealand-based research was an absence of suitable data. The data situation has much improved since then with new surveys and better access to data. The availability of unit record data through the Statistics NZ Data Laboratory and the recent introduction of Customised Unit Record Files (CURFs) create great potential for in-depth research. In terms of data sources, it will be clear from the discussion in previous sections that LisNZ will, once the second and, later, the third wave of data are available, provide a powerful data source for immigration research. Nonetheless, there are other surveys in New Zealand that include information of birthplace and/or years lived in New Zealand. With sample sizes of 20,000 or more (and that is the catch, as many surveys have much smaller samples), a sufficient number of immigrants would be captured to lower sampling errors to reasonable levels. An example of a potentially useful survey is the longitudinal Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE), which will provides detailed information on some 23,000 individuals, including – for foreign born – their years since arrival in NZ and country of birth.
Consequently, the peak of data availability will be reached this decade from around 2007 onwards (when also 2006 Census data will be available), but many projects can be conducted with data presently available and exploit new methodologies and software introduced in overseas research to analyse the data.
Finally, it should be recalled that regulated immigration is only one component of New Zealand’s international migration, and the migration of New Zealanders can have major economic consequences too. This suggests that there is a need for a parallel research program on the economic consequences of the free flows of people in and out of New Zealand (with the trans-Tasman flows playing a major role). This paper did not address topics related to such migration of New Zealanders that may nonetheless be of great importance for economic and social policy. Such topics include macroeconomic research on the impact of overall net migration volatility on the business cycle and long-run growth, research on forecasting migration fluctuations (for example, through an update of Gorbey et al. (1999)), the causes and
___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 39
consequences of skill shortages due to emigration, the effect of the student loan scheme on emigration rates, the potential contributions of our diaspora to the New Zealand economy, the circulation of New Zealand professionals, and causes of fluctuations in the propensity of New Zealanders to return home.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 40
Appendix
Table A.1. Occupational groups in the Joanna model
#
Code
OCCUPATION
NZSCO
1
LEGA
Legislators and administrators
11
2
CORP
Corporate managers
12
3
SCIP
Physicists, chemists, mathematicians and related professionals, life science professionals
211, 212, 221
4
COMP
Computing professionals
213
5
AREN
Architects, engineers and related professionals
214
6
HLTP
Health professionals, nursing & midwifery
222, 223
7
TETP
Tertiary teaching professionals
231
8
OTEP
Other teaching professionals
232-235
9
BUSP
Business professionals
241
10
LEGP
Legal professionals
242
11
OTHP
Other professionals
243-245
12
SCIT
Physical science and engineering technicians, life science technicians and related
311, 321
13
CMEC
Computer equipment controllers
312
14
OPEC
Optical and electronic equipment controllers
313
15
OCTS
Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians
314
16
HLAP
Health associate professionals
322, 323
17
FSAP
Finance, sales and administrative associate professionals
331, 332
18
GVAP
Government and social work associate professionals, careers and employment advisors
333, 334, 335
19
OTAP
Safety and health inspectors, environmental protection and other associate professionals
315, 337, 338
20
WAES
Writers, artists, entertainment and sports associate professionals
336
21
OFCK
Office clerks
41
22
CSCK
Customer services clerks
42
23
TRAV
Travel attendants and guides
511
24
REST
Housekeeping and restaurant services workers
512
25
POCW
Personal care and other personal service workers
513, 514
26
PRSW
Protective services workers
515
27
SALE
Salespersons, demonstrators and models
52
28
FARM
Farmers, growers and animal producers
611-612
29
FRST
Forestry and related workers
613
30
FISH
Fishery workers, hunters and trappers
614
31
BDTW
Building trades workers
71
32
MMTW
Metal and machinery trades workers
72
33
PRTW
Precision trades workers
73
34
OCTW
Other craft and related trades workers
74
35
IPMO
Industrial plant operators, stationary machine operators
81, 82
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 41
36
RAIL
Railway engine drivers, ships deck crews and related workers
831, 834
37
MOVD
Motor vehicle drivers
832
38
AGEO
Agricultural, earthmoving and other materials handling equipment operators
833
39
BLRW
Building and related workers
84
40
LBSW
Labourers and related elementary service workers
91
Table A.2. Industry groups in the Joanna model
#
Code
INDUSTRY
ANZSIC
1
HFRG
Horticulture and fruit growing
A011
2
MLVC
Mixed livestock and cropping
A0121, A0122, A01591
3
SHBF
Sheep and beef cattle farming
A0123-A0125
4
DAIF
Dairy cattle farming
A013
5
OAGR
Other farming and services to agriculture, hunting & trapping
rest A01, A02
6
LOGG
Forestry & logging
A03
7
FISH
Commercial fishing
A04
8
COAL
Coal mining
B11
9
OILG
Oil & gas extraction and exploration
B12, B1511, B1512
10
OMIN
Other mining & quarrying and services to mining
B13, B14, B1514, B1520
11
MEAT
Meat processing
C2111
12
DAIR
Dairy product manufacturing
C212
13
OFOD
Other food processing & mfg
rest C21
14
TCFL
Textiles, clothing, footwear & leather mfg
C22
15
WOOD
Log sawmilling, timber dressing & other wood product mfg
C231, C232
16
PAPR
Paper and paper product mfg
C233, C239
17
PPRM
Printing, publishing & recorded media
C24
18
PETR
Petroleum
C251, C252
19
CHEM
Chemical and chemical product mfg
C253, C254
20
RBPL
Rubber and plastic product mfg
C255, C256
21
NMMP
Non-metallic mineral product mfg
C26
22
BASM
Basic metal manufacturing
C271-C273
23
FABM
Structural, sheet and fabricated metal product mfg
C274-C276
24
MACH
Machinery and equipment mfg
C28
25
OMFG
Other manufacturing
C29
26
EGEN
Electricity generation
D361pt
27
EDIS
Electricity transmission & supply
D361pt
28
GASS
Gas supply
D362
29
WATS
Water supply
D3701
30
BLDG
Construction
E
31
TRDE
Wholesale & retail trade
F, G
32
ACCR
Accommodation, cafes & restaurants
H57
33
ROAD
Road transport
I61, I661
34
WRAI
Water and rail transport
I62, I63, I662
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 42
35
AIRS
Air transport, services to transport, storage
I64, I65, I663,I664, I67
36
COMM
Communication services
J71
37
FIIN
Finance and insurance
K
38
OWND
Ownership of owner-occupied dwellings
L771190pt
39
OPRS
Other property services
rest L77
40
SCIT
Scientific research & technical services
L781, L782
41
COMP
Computer services
L783
42
LAOB
Legal, accounting & other business services
L784-L786 (xL7865-66)
43
GOVD
Govt administration & defence
M, Q9631-Q9633
44
SCHL
Pre-school, primary, secondary & other education
N84 (xN843) O871
45
OEDU
Post-school education
N843
46
HOSP
Hospitals, nursing homes, aged accommodation & other community care
O861, O872
47
OHLT
Medical, dental and other health services
rest O86
48
CULT
Cultural and recreational services
P
49
PERS
Personal and other services, pest control and cleaning services, waste disposal & sewerage services
D3702, L7865-66, Q (excl Q9631-Q9633)
___________________________________________________________________________________
Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 43
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—. 2004b. "Sustainable Development: Social cohesion." Wellington: Statistics New Zealand.
Storesletten, Kjetil. 2000. "Sustaining Fiscal Policy Through Immigration." Journal of Political Economy 108:300-323.
Tarzwell, Gordon. 2003. "The Impact of Diverse Preferences on Government Expenditures." Applied Economics Letters 10:695-98.
Trlin, Andrew D and Jye Kang. 1992. "The Business Immigration Policy and the Characteristics of Approved Hong Kong and Taiwanese Applicants, 1986-1988." Pp. 48-64 in New Zealand and International Migration: A Digest and Bibliography Number 2, edited by A. D. Trlin and P. Spoonley. Palmerston North: Department of Sociology, Massey University.
Wagner, Don, Keith Head and John Ries. 2002. "Immigration and the Trade of Provinces." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 49:507-25.
Walmsley, Terri Louise and Alan L. Winters. 2003. "Relaxing the restrictions on the temporary movement of natural persons: a simulation analysis." London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Ward, Colleen and Anne-Marie Masgoret. 2004. "New Zealanders' Attitudes Toward Immigration and Immigrants." in New Directions, New Settlers, New Challenges - Building and Enhancing Communities End-users Seminar. Wellington New Zealand.
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Measuring the economic impact of immigration: a scoping paper 53

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Facts About Human Trafficking
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, DC
May 24, 2004
What is human trafficking?
Trafficking in persons is modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced, defrauded or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation. Annually, about 600,000 to 800,000 people -- mostly women and children -- are trafficked across national borders which does not count millions trafficked within their own countries.
People are snared into trafficking by many means. In some cases, physical force is used. In other cases, false promises are made regarding job opportunities or marriages in foreign countries to entrap victims.
What impact does human trafficking have on the world?
Human trafficking is a multi-dimensional threat: it deprives people of their human rights and freedoms, it is a global health risk, and it fuels the growth of organized crime.
Human trafficking has a devastating impact on individual victims, who often suffer physical and emotional abuse, rape, threats against self and family, passport theft, and even death. But the impact of human trafficking goes beyond individual victims; it undermines the safety and security of all nations it touches.
What is the United States doing to stop trafficking?
Trafficking impacts many nations, including the United States. That’s why the U.S. Government has taken a number of serious and significant actions to combat trafficking occurring at home. A few examples of American efforts include:
• Congress passed legislation so Americans who sexually prey on children abroad can be prosecuted and sentenced to as many as 30 years in prison.
• The Department of Justice has focused on increasing the number of trafficking victims rescued and the number of prosecutions and convictions of traffickers.
• The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is certifying trafficking victims so they may qualify for the same assistance available to refugees. HHS is also running a major public awareness campaign to alert victims in the U.S. that help is available through the hotline number 888.3737.888.
• The Department of Defense has implemented a zero-tolerance stand against any actions by Defense personnel that contribute to human trafficking and is instituting a service-wide mandatory training program.
• The Departments of Labor and Homeland Security, USAID, and other government agencies are executing action plans to combat human trafficking.
What is the U.S. doing to help other countries?
Because human trafficking is transnational in nature, partnerships between countries are critical to win the fight against modern-day slavery. The U.S. is reaching out to other countries in a number of important ways:
• In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush raised the issue of human trafficking and asked leaders of the world to work together to end it.
• The State Department is working extensively with governments on action plans for prevention, protection of victims, and prosecution.
• Congress last year strengthened anti-trafficking legislation and provided more than $70 million in funding worldwide for efforts to end slavery. The U.S. is providing money around the world for:
o Rehabilitation and work training centers for victims
o Special housing shelters for victims
o Law enforcement training and legal reform assistance
o Information and awareness campaigns
o Voluntary repatriation for displaced victims
o Training for immigration officials, medical personnel and social workers
o Combating sex tourism
o Rescuing victims from slave-like situations
What needs to be done?
When dealing with an issue of this importance and urgency, there is much to be done. The U.S. is asking governments to immediately take action to step up their anti-trafficking efforts:
• There is a critical need for increased rescues of trafficking victims and prosecutions of traffickers.
• People freed from slavery must be treated as victims of crime, not criminals.
• The demand for modern-day slaves must be stopped. This is not a victimless or harmless crime, and the public should be informed of the risks involved with it.
What are the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and the Trafficking in Persons Report?
Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in 2000 and strengthened it in 2003. This law provides tools for the U.S. to combat trafficking in persons, both domestically and abroad.
One of the key components of the law is the creation of the Trafficking in Persons Report. The Department of State produces this annual report assessing government response in each country with a significant number of victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons. Countries in the annual report are rated in tiers, based on government efforts to combat trafficking.
What do the tiers of the Trafficking in Persons Report mean?
• Tier 1: Countries that fully comply with the act’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.
• Tier 2: Countries that do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.
• Tier 2 Watch List: Countries on Tier 2 requiring special scrutiny because of a high or significantly increasing number of victims; failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons; or an assessment as Tier 2 based on commitments to take action over the next year.
• Tier 3: Countries that neither satisfy the minimum standards nor demonstrate a significant effort to come into compliance. Countries in this tier are subject to potential non-humanitarian and non-trade sanctions.
For more information, please log on to the Web site of the State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at www.state.gov/g/tip.

Every year, thousands of women, children and men are victims of human trafficking, whether for sexual exploitation or other purposes, both within and beyond the borders of their country. This phenomenon has taken on such unprecedented proportions that it can be described as a new form of slavery.
The Council of Europe Campaign to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings was launched in 2006 under the slogan 'Human being – not for sale!' The Campaign aims to raise awareness, among governments, parliamentarians, local and regional authorities, NGOs and civil society, of the extent of the problem.
The goal of the Council of Europe campaign, which ended in February 2008, was for all countries to adopt the European Anti Trafficking Convention and provide the strongest possible international defense against trafficking.
The Convention is a comprehensive treaty focusing on the protection of victims of trafficking and the safeguarding of their rights. It also aims to prevent trafficking and to prosecute traffickers. In addition, the Convention sets up of an effective and independent mechanism to monitor that the states respect their obligations.

News & Updates
Cambodia's Thriving Child Prostitution Industry
October 28, 2008
Al Jazeera's investigation found underage girls working in brothel's around Phnom Penh.
Girls as young as 14 work in brothels' around Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, and while the industry is often shown as serving predatory foreign tourists, local men have been found to be the mainstay of clients.
Thousands of children are bought and sold for sex every day in Cambodia an investigation by Al Jazeera found.

Al Jazeera filmed secretly at several brothels, and in each case found much the same thing - rooms full of young women in their early twenties, as well as teenagers. "For my virginity they gave me $200," Ya Da, a 16-year-old former prostitute, said.

Ya Da worked in a brothel for two years before she ran away. Now, she lives in a safe house with other former prostitutes and abused children. "There were just a few foreign customers [at the brothel]," she said. "I never slept with any, I slept only with Cambodian men."

'Local customers'
Mu Sochua, a politician with the opposition Sam Rainsy Party and a former minister for women's affairs, told Al Jazeera that most of Cambodia's sex industry was supported "by local customers".

"And some of these local customers are high-ranking officials. You have the military, the police and civil servants. you have rich businessmen who have lots of money," she said. The involvement of high-ranking officials has been one reasons, NGOs say, that the sex industry has thrived in Cambodia.

"Very often these brothels and criminal networks are being supported and protected by high ranking officials," Mark Capaldi, from Ecpat International, an orgnaisation working to eliminate child prostitution, said. "The problem is not just as abusers but also the impunity and lack of law enforcement in closing down these brothels and karaoke bars."
Daniela Reale, an advisor from Save the Children, told Al Jazeera: "The reality is that we do know local demand is the force driving this abuse. "We also know it is around 70 per cent of local demand rather than sex tourism."

But General Bith Kim Hong, from the Cambodian national police force, rejected allegations that the officials focused their efforts to curb prostitution almost exclusively on foreigners. "The national police are concerned about anyone who commits a crime, who has sex with children, whether they are foreigners or Cambodian," he told Al Jazeera.

"We have a very high commitment to prevent child prostitution."

Few arrests
Last year, the Cambodian police arrested only 21 people for committing sex crimes with children - eight of those arrested were foreigners and 13 were Cambodians. The police also admit that the brothels they shut down in high-profile raids often reopen a few weeks later.

In 2002, Gary Glitter, the British pop star, was expelled from Cambodia amid child-sex allegations.
But while the arrest and conviction of foreigners make the headlines, most child sex trafficking supplies local demand, Mu Sochua said.

"It is easier to catch a foreigner and also the government wants to have showcases to make itself look good - that Cambodia is actually taking care of this problem of human trafficking, which is really not the truth," she told Al Jazeera.

Reale said that governments need to combat the worldwide problem: "They need to address their legal system and their law enforcement." To tackle the poverty that forces girls into prostitution, Reale said that governments must provide support systems to help families match their needs.

She said that the 3rd World Conference on Sexual Exploitation of Children in Rio de Janeiro next month will be as a big opportunity to make real and genuine committments.

Adapted from: "Cambodia - Child Sex Trade Soars in Cambodia." Al Jazeera. 21 October 2008.
VIDEO Direct Link:
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2008/10/20081021560267677.html
WHAT’S HAPPENING...
Immediate Action Needed - SF's Proposition K


BACKGROUND:
Not For Sale is against all forms of slavery: Anywhere and everywhere in the world. It is for this reason that we are deeply concerned that San Francisco (Full Disclosure: where we are based) is on the verge of passing Proposition K.
At first blush Prop K’s language appears to be an attempt to decriminalize prostitution; the terrible truth hidden within Prop K is that it would:
• (1) severely hinder –if not completely stop- local law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes of trafficking and slavery, by making it illegal for police to garner funds to investigate crimes of trafficking.
• And (2) de-fund programs that assist survivors, women and children, exiting the sex industry.
The measure directs the San Francisco Police Department and the District Attorney's office to refuse to enforce the State of California's prostitution laws. These sections include the laws used to investigate and prosecute traffickers and those involved in exploiting children. Non-enforcement of these laws would send an invitation out to pimps, traffickers, and johns.
According to San Francisco’s District Attorney Kamala Harris, Prop K, “would expressly bar the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking crimes. Human trafficking is a serious problem in San Francisco. Many people in the commercial sex trade have been trafficked and forced to participate in commercial sex. This measure would attempt to provide safe harbor to their traffickers." (italics added)
The Not for Sale Campaign is opposed to Prop K.
THE ACTION:
We need you to call, email, carrier pigeon your friends, acquaintances, sister churches, business partners who live in San Francisco to encourage them to vote NO on Prop K.
If you live in San Francisco, or the Bay Area, please contact Kilian Moote to find out how you can mobilize and act to stop Prop K.
For more information on Proposition K, please visit our local partners at http://www.noonk.net/.
-Louisa Barry
Not For Sale, No On K Program Coordinator
Not For Sale in Southern California!
If you are within walking, driving, or flying distance of Orange County, California, then please join us for 2 days of incredible Not For Sale Events!
And if you can't make it, how 'bout contacting us to host something similar in your own area!
Details below....
CSUF Irvine Campus LEGACIES Fall 2008, 2 day event: NOT FOR SALE.
Thursday, November 6, 2008,
5:00PM-7:00PM
The Backyard Abolitionist Event
An Evening with David Batstone author "Not For Sale"
• A gathering for those who want to learn how global slavery has invisible links into their own neighborhood in Southern California.
• Experience a “movie on stage” with video, live music, and spoken word about what human trafficking and what slavery looks like in the 21st century, how to expose it, and what to do about fighting it.
Friday, November 7, 2008 beginning at 12:30PM
What: NOT FOR SALE Southern CA Rally and Training “Backyard Abolitionist Academy”, led by Professor David Batstone, a workshop featuring:
• How to get involved locally with tangible actions to fight human trafficking and slavery in Orange County
• How to research, identify, and investigate local trafficking cases
• How to build a local abolitionist network
• How to link local actions to global economic, political and cultural shifts that will be necessary to end slavery
• Online tools for the backyard abolitionist – how to use them effectively in your community.
Where: CSUF Irvine Campus
This community friendly event is free! Parking on campus is $5.
RSVP to Student Affairs 949-936-1650 and irvineadvisor@fullerton.edu to secure your spot.
For more information about Not For Sale Southern California, contact Deb Griffith – Not For Sale Southern California State Director at deb@notforsalecampaign.org

For directions to the CSUF Irvine Campus, click HERE
Hope to see you there!
NFS Makes a Splash in Canada
David Batstone, President - "We’re watching the movement grow in Canada! This past week we named our first “state” director, Addie Houston for the province of New Brunswick.
Then on October 23 I launch a two-week Not For Sale tour across the eastern half of Canada. I’ll be speaking at various sites in Vancouver, Victoria, Prince George, Calgary and Red Deer. After seven days, I tag team with our Not For Sale Cambodia director, James Pond, who will take up the tour in Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina and Winnipeg.
On these tours we not only aim to create awareness, we focus on movement building. We are looking for backyard abolitionists, individuals who will make the commitment to fighting the trade in human beings in their own backyard. I’m 100% optimistic that those backyard abolitionists will emerge and connect to our movement on this tour."
An Executive Invitation: Washington, DC
Mark Wexler, Managing Director - "I was invited to attend a roundtable discussion at the White House on October 28th, sponsored by the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives and the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. The roundtable will consist of governmental, NGO, and faith-based leaders from within the anti-trafficking movement. The discussion will cover successes in combating modern-day slavery and strategies for future and promising practices, such as the important role of the backyard abolitionists –Meaning: YOU– throughout the USA."
In the field: Dominican Republic
Kique Bazan, Executive Director - "This past week I visited Dejabon, a city in the Dominican Republic that borders Haiti, and I saw the heart-wrenching realities of forced labor within these two countries.
One woman that I met pointed out three younger women to me, and said that she'd rescued them from Haiti. She claimed that without her help their lives "would be nothing." But the reality is that she herself is now holding these young women in bondage, because without their labor she cannot afford to send her son to school. The young women work all day selling products for the older woman in the streets, and in the afternoon they work in her home. They have never been to school or been paid, and their owner still believes that she is doing them a favor.
In Haiti, exchanging children as Restavek, or slaves, is not uncommon. The people that buy them will even use religious language to justify their actions, and the messianic perception of the slaveholders is a big challenge for the modern day abolitionists in Haiti and in the DR."
Not For Trade Show: South Carolina
Kilian Moote, Program Director - "I recently returned from the College of Charleston located in the picturesque city of Charleston in South Carolina, who's history is deeply entwined with the 16th century Atlantic slave trade. While in Charleston I hosted a "Not for Trade Show" where I met and discussed modern day slavery in South Carolina with students from College of Charleston, Clemson University, and Georgia State. I left Charleston inspired and energized by the desire and tenacity within the students I met to help "re-abolish" slavery by exposing and documenting human trafficking in their own backyards. Driven to become experts on human trafficking in their backyard's these students will inform their State that slavery did NOT end in the U.S. with the 13th Amendment."
To have the "Not For Trade Show" come to your area email Kilian
From Headquarters:
Free 2 Work is on its Way!
Allison Trowbridge, Program Director - "Have you ever wondered if the chocolate you're eating is created from cocoa plants harvested by slaves? Or if the rubber in your tires is obtained through forced labor? I sure have. This is why we are working away to get Free2Work.org ready for launch! This incredible new site will allow all of YOU to share and participate in monitoring slavery in corporate supply chains. The site will both feature companies that engage in "Free 2 Work" practices, as well as offer the public a place to monitor and red flag companies that engage in slave labor. I can't wait to see companies and individuals coming together to fight slavery on a corporate level! Just one of the many great undertakings you can expect to see soon from Not For Sale..."
Great things are happening at Not For Sale. Thanks for being a part of the movement!
Advocacy Days: A Tremendous Success!

NFS Advocates with Jonathon Stivers, Senior Advisor to Nancy Pelosi
Last week, 150 Abolitionists from across the country gathered in Washington, DC to advocate on behalf of the 27 million people in slavery around the world.
Not For Sale advocates were welcomed at Georgetown University by United States Ambassador Lagon. Music performances by artist Brant Christopher and presentations by NFS staff and the Ricky Martin foundation both educated and inspired everyone in attendance! Together we learned about the numerous fronts on which the Not For Sale movement is happening to fight slavery, while engaging in break-out sessions and small group dialog with other Abolitionists.
Click here to read what Joy had to say about it!
In the spirit of "Smart Activism," the Sheridan Group equipped us to effectively discuss the TVPRA with congressional staff -- the driving purpose for the event! This bill, which protects the rights of human trafficking survivors, is up for congressional reauthorization, and we saw an opportunity to share the crucial nature of this issue with our government. Small groups of Abolitionists met with the offices of their Senators and House Representatives from across the country, including the California offices of Senator Diane Feinstein, Representative Jackie Speier, and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. We were blown away by the time and consideration these offices gave to human trafficking, and are thrilled at the prospects for future collaboration.
Consider setting up a meeting with one of your Congressional Representatives. You'll be amazed at the power of a conversation, and how much opportunity you have to speak on behalf of those in bondage!

To close out this fantastic event, Abolitionists held a candlelight vigil before attending a premier screening of Call + Response, the new independent film that features the work of Not For Sale and its president David Batstone alongside critically acclaimed artists and prominent cultural figures. What an incredible way to finish off Advocacy Days!
Wishing you hadn't missed out?? Keep your eyes peeled for next years annual Advocacy Days, with locations in DC and abroad!
Not For Sale - Cambodia
NOT FOR SALE NEEDS YOUR HELP TO CONFRONT SEX SLAVERY IN CAMBODIA
And we need to act fast. We have one week to raise the $10,000 necessary to sustain our newest international project:
Transitions Cambodia
Please WATCH this remarkable video.
At the Transitional Living Center (TLC), Vietnamese and Cambodian girls, ages 13-18, rescued from the slave trade are immersed into an innovative and holistic development program. Where most aftercare shelters experience a tragic 70% rate of failure - meaning the girls are re-victimized by traffickers or voluntarily return to the sex industry - Transitions Cambodia has a success rate of 75% and climbing! Graduates from similar programs often lack adult life skills, or are unable to secure a sustainable income with their substandard job training.
Transitions, however, champions an adult life skills program, integrated psychological therapy, exercise, spiritual reflection, and career training for the 21st century job market. Through this holistic approach, the young women are restored, empowered, and able to realize their dreams.
One MORE reason why we're excited about our partners at Transitions: they have found a system that cuts the cost of aftercare in half! By outsourcing services for education, training, and vocational placement, Transitions supports local business, while reducing its own overhead. This system in Cambodia costs approximately $250,000 a year to successfully support 20 girls through the program -- a small number when compared to other programs around the world. These costs ensure safe shelter, quality medical and dental care, counseling and therapy, as well as superior job training and education for every girl coming through "TLC." The success is both astonishing... and invigorating! Restoring and empowering girls through belief and opportunity transforms these young women from victims... into survivors.
Hope and Action
Please consider partnering with us now to raise $10,000. This is the minimum needed to sustain the work of our Transitions Cambodia project through the month of October. Each dollar you give makes a difference. Partnered together, we feel confident that we can meet this need, and will continue to do so far into the future.
Donate HERE to fight Slavery in Cambodia.
For more information, download our information PDF (10 MB).
Not For Sale - Peru
Veronica's House: Generacion
Recently, the Not For Sale team at Generacion met a girl named Veronica in need of a haven from traffickers. Unable to house her, the team had to release Veronica back to the streets. One week later, her tiny body was found in a hotel room, strangled to death by one of the men she'd been forced to have sex with.
Veronica's death serves as a reminder of the real danger children face on the streets of Lima. Not for Sale is building an emergency shelter and safe house in Lima, to be named "Veronica's House" in her honor. We are determined to save Veronica's peers from a similar fate, while offering them a better life in the process. Our shelter will be a haven for twenty teens to live and thrive, safe from the threat of traffickers.
But Not for Sale needs your help. Partner with us in this effort by making a donation today!
To Donate Click Here.
Launched: Freedom Store Outpost Program

You can be one of the first to sell Not for Sale merchandise!
For the first time ever, we are offering our merchandise at wholesale prices in bulk amounts. By opening your own Freedom Store Outpost, you can create sustainable business opportunities for emancipated people, as well as help to spread the global message that no human being is ever for sale. By generating revenue and creating your own profit margins, you can raise money for the campaign in whatever way you choose. The money you make is yours to act with!
Maybe you see an opportunity to sell Not For Sale merchandise at your church or school. Maybe you own a store already and want to include our Not For Sale items to spread awareness! Whether you’re doing house parties or online sales, the opportunities are limitless. We’re excited to witness your creative initiative!
It is our desire that owning an Outpost will give you the opportunity to use your entrepreneurial abilities to benefit the global fight against human trafficking.
Ready to get started? All you need to do is create a new account at our Freedom Store. You will be directed to a list of our merchandise with wholesale pricing. Once you make your first qualifying purchase of $950 or more, you will be recognized as an Outposter every time you log in. After that first purchase, we only require you to buy ten items or more each visit.
CLICK HERE to learn more about opening YOUR Freedom Store Outpost today!
Just one more way that Not for Sale is equipping you to become a modern-day Abolitionist. Thank you for your partnership with us in this cause.
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Human trafficking
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Human trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, harbouring, or receipt of people for the purposes of slavery, forced labor (including bonded labor or debt bondage) and servitude. The total annual revenue for trafficking in persons is estimated to be between $5 billion and $9 billion.[1] The Council of Europe states that "[p]eople trafficking has reached epidemic proportions over the past decade, with a global annual market of about $42.5 billion."[2][3] Trafficking victims typically are recruited using coercion, deception, fraud, the abuse of power, or outright abduction. Threats, violence, and economic leverage such as debt bondage can often make a victim consent to exploitation.
Exploitation includes forcing people into prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. For children, exploitation may also include forced prostitution, illicit international adoption, trafficking for early marriage, or recruitment as child soldiers, beggars, for sports (such as child camel jockeys or football players), or for religious cults.[4]
Contents
[hide]
• 1 Overview
• 2 Extent
• 3 Causes of trafficking
• 4 Human trafficking and other vulnerability issues
o 4.1 Human trafficking and Sexual exploitation
• 5 Efforts to reduce human trafficking
o 5.1 Government actions
o 5.2 International law
o 5.3 Council of Europe
o 5.4 United States law
o 5.5 Non-Governmental Organizations
• 6 Criticisms
o 6.1 Lack of accurate data and possible overestimation
o 6.2 Focus on "sex trafficking"
• 7 Human trafficking in popular culture
• 8 See also
• 9 Notes
• 10 External links
o 10.1 Articles and Resources
o 10.2 Government and international governmental organizations

Overview
Human trafficking differs from people smuggling. In the latter, people voluntarily request smuggler's service for fees and there may be no deception involved in the (illegal) agreement. On arrival at their destination, the smuggled person is usually free. On the other hand, the trafficking victim is enslaved, or the terms of their debt bondage are highly exploitative. The trafficker takes away the basic human rights of the victim. [5] [6]
Victims are sometimes tricked and lured by false promises or physically forced.[7] Some traffickers use coercive and manipulative tactics including deception, intimidation, feigned love, isolation, threat and use of physical force, debt bondage, other abuse, or even force-feeding with drugs to control their victims.[8] People who are seeking entry to other countries may be picked up by traffickers, and misled into thinking that they will be free after being smuggled across the border. In some cases, they are captured through slave raiding, although this is increasingly rare.
Trafficking is a fairly lucrative industry. In some areas, like Russia, Eastern Europe, Hong Kong, Japan, and Colombia, trafficking is controlled by large criminal organizations. [9] However, the majority of trafficking is done by networks of smaller groups that each specialize in a certain area, like recruitment, transportation, advertising, or retail. This is very profitable because little startup capital is needed, and prosecution is relatively rare.[10]
Trafficked people are usually the most vulnerable and powerless minorities in a region. They often come from the poorer areas where opportunities are limited, they often are ethnic minorities, and they often are displaced persons such as runaways or refugees (though they may come from any social background, class or race).
Women are particularly at risk from sex trafficking. Criminals exploit lack of opportunities, promise good jobs or opportunities for study, and then force the victims to become prostitutes. Through agents and brokers who arrange the travel and job placements, women are escorted to their destinations and delivered to the employers. Upon reaching their destinations, some women learn that they have been deceived about the nature of the work they will do; most have been lied to about the financial arrangements and conditions of their employment; and find themselves in coercive or abusive situations from which escape is both difficult or dangerous.
Trafficking of children often involves exploitation of the parents' extreme poverty. The latter may sell children to traffickers in order to pay off debts or gain income or they may be deceived concerning the prospects of training and a better life for their children. In West Africa, trafficked children have often lost one or both parents to the African AIDS crisis.[11]. Thousands of male (and sometimes female) children have also been forced to be child soldiers.
The adoption process, legal and illegal, results in cases of trafficking of babies and pregnant women between the West and the developing world. In David M. Smolin’s papers on child trafficking and adoption scandals between India and the United States,[12][13] he cites there are systemic vulnerabilities in the intercountry adoption system that makes adoption scandals predictable.
Thousands of children from Asia, Africa, and South America are sold into the global sex trade every year. Often they are kidnapped or orphaned, and sometimes they are actually sold by their own families.[14]
Men are also at risk of being trafficked for unskilled work predominantly involving forced labor which globally generates $31bn according to the International Labour Organization [15]. Other forms of trafficking include forced marriage, and domestic servitude.
Extent
Due to the illegal nature of trafficking and differences in methodology, the exact extent is unknown. According to United States State Department data, an "estimated 600,000 to 820,000 men, women, and children [are] trafficked across international borders each year, approximately 70 percent are women and girls and up to 50 percent are minors. The data also illustrates that the majority of transnational victims are trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation."[16] However, they go on to say that "the alarming enslavement of people for purposes of labor exploitation, often in their own countries, is a form of human trafficking that can be hard to track from afar." Thus the figures for persons trafficked for labor exploitation are likely to be greatly underestimated.
Research conducted by University of California at Berkeley on behalf of the anti-trafficking organisation Free the Slaves found that less than half of people in slavery in the United States, about 46%, are forced into prostitution. Domestic servitude claims 27%, agriculture 10%, and other occupations 17%.[17][18]
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the impoverished former Eastern bloc countries such as Albania, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine have been identified as major trafficking source countries for women and children.[19][20] Young women and girls are often lured to wealthier countries by the promises of money and work and then reduced to sexual slavery.[21] It is estimated that 2/3 of women trafficked for prostitution worldwide annually come from Eastern Europe, three-quarters have never worked as prostitutes before.[22][23] The major destinations are Western Europe (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK, Greece), the Middle East (Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates), Asia, Russia and the United States.[24][25] An estimated 500,000 women from Central and Eastern Europe are working in prostitution in the EU alone.[26]
An estimated 14,000 people are trafficked into the United States each year, although again because trafficking is illegal, accurate statistics are difficult.[27] According to the Massachusetts based Trafficking Victims Outreach and Services Network (project of the nonprofit MataHari: Eye of the Day) in Massachusetts alone, there were 55 documented cases of human trafficking in 2005 and the first half of 2006 in Massachusetts.[28] In 2004, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) estimated that 600-800 persons are trafficked into Canada annually and that additional 1,500-2,200 persons are trafficked through Canada into the United States.[29] In Canada, foreign trafficking for prostitution is estimated to be worth $400 million annually.[30]
In the United Kingdom, the Home Office has stated that 71 women were trafficked into prostitution in 1998. They also suggest that the actual figure could be up to 1,420 women trafficked into the UK during the same period.[31] However, the figures are problematic as the definition used in the UK to identify cases of sex trafficking - derived from the Sexual Offences Act 2003 - does not require that victims have been coerced or misled. Thus, any individual who moves to the UK for the purposes of sex work can be regarded as having been trafficked - even if they did so with their knowledge and consent. The Home Office do not appear to be keeping records of the number of people trafficked into the UK for purposes other than sexual exploitation.
In Russia, many women have been trafficked overseas for the purpose of sexual exploitation, Russian women are in prostitution in over 50 countries.[32][33] Annually, thousands of Russian women end up as prostitutes in Israel, China, Japan or South Korea.[34] Russia is also a significant destination and transit country for persons trafficked for sexual and labor exploitation from regional and neighboring countries into Russia, and on to the Gulf states[35], Europe, Asia, and North America.
In poverty-stricken Moldova, where the unemployment rate for women ranges as high as 68% and one-third of the workforce live and work abroad, experts estimate that since the collapse of the Soviet Union between 200,000 and 400,000 women have been sold into prostitution abroad—perhaps up to 10% of the female population.[36][37] In Ukraine, a survey conducted by the NGO La Strada Ukraine in 2001–2003, based on a sample of 106 women being trafficked out of Ukraine found that 3% were under 18, and the U.S. State Department reported in 2004 that incidents of minors being trafficked was increasing. It is estimated that half a million Ukrainian women were trafficked abroad since 1991 (80% of all unemployed in Ukraine are women).[38][39]
The ILO estimates that 20 percent of the five million illegal immigrants in Russia are victims of forced labor, which is a form of trafficking. However even citizens of Russian Federation have become victims of human trafficking. They are typically kidnapped and sold by police to be used for hard labor, being regularly drugged and chained like dogs to prevent them from escaping. [40] There were reports of trafficking of children and of child sex tourism in Russia. The Government of Russia has made some effort to combat trafficking but has also been criticized for not complying with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.[41] [42]
In Asia, Japan is the major destination country for trafficked women, especially from the Philippines and Thailand. The US State Department has rated Japan as either a ‘Tier 2’ or a ‘Tier 2 Watchlist’ country every year since 2001 in its annual Trafficking in Persons reports. Both these ratings implied that Japan was (to a greater or lesser extent) not fully compliant with minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking trade. There are currently an estimated 300,000 women and children involved in the sex trade throughout Southeast Asia.[43] It is common that Thai women are lured to Japan and sold to Yakuza-controlled brothels where they are forced to work off their price.[44][45]By the late 1990s, UNICEF estimated that there are 60,000 child prostitutes in the Philippines, describing Angeles City brothels as "notorious" for offering sex with children. UNICEF estimates many of the 200 brothels in the notorious Angeles City offer children for sex. [46]

Many of the Iraqi women fleeing the Iraq War are turning to prostitution, while others are trafficked abroad, to countries like Syria, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Iran.[47] In Syria alone, an estimated 50,000 Iraqi refugee girls and women, many of them widows, are forced into prostitution.[48] Cheap Iraqi prostitutes have helped to make Syria a popular destination for sex tourists. The clients come from wealthier countries in the Middle East - many are Saudi men.[49] High prices are offered for virgins.[50]
As many as 200,000 Nepali girls, many under 14, have been sold into the sex slavery in India. Nepalese women and girls, especially virgins, are favored in India because of their light skin.[51][52]
In parts of Ghana, a family may be punished for an offense by having to turn over a virgin female to serve as a sex slave within the offended family.[53] In this instance, the woman does not gain the title of "wife." In parts of Ghana, Togo, and Benin, shrine slavery persists, despite being illegal in Ghana since 1998. In this system of slavery of ritual servitude, sometimes called trokosi (in Ghana) or voodoosi in Togo and Benin, young virgin girls are given as slaves in traditional shrines and are used sexually by the priests in addition to providing free labor for the shrine.[54]
Reporters have witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces moved in. Peacekeeping forces have been linked to trafficking and forced prostitution. Proponents of peacekeeping argue that the actions of a few should not incriminate the many participants in the mission, yet NATO and the UN have come under criticism for not taking the issue of forced prostitution linked to peacekeeping missions seriously enough. [55] [56][57][58]
In the western world, Canada in particular has a major problem with modern-day sexual slavery. In a 2006 report the Future Group, a Canadian humanitarian organization dedicated to combatting human trafficking and the child sex trade, ranked eight industrialized nations and gave Canada an F for its "abysmal" record treating victims. The report, titled "Falling Short of the Mark: An International Study on the Treatment of Human Trafficking Victims", concluded that Canada "is an international embarrassment" when it comes to combating this form of slavery.[59]
The report's principal author Benjamin Perrin wrote, "Canada has ignored calls for reform and continues to re-traumatize trafficking victims, with few exceptions, by subjecting them to routine deportation and fails to provide even basic support services."
In the report, the only other country to do poorly was the United Kingdom, which received a D, while the United States received a B+ and Australia, Norway, Sweden, Germany and Italy all received grades of B or B-. The report criticizes former Liberal Party of Canada cabinet ministers Irwin Cotler, Joe Volpe and Pierre Pettigrew for "passing the buck" on the issue.
Commenting on the report, the then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Monte Solberg told Sun Media Corporation, "It's very damning, and if there are obvious legislative or regulatory fixes that need to be done, those have to become priorities, given especially that we're talking about very vulnerable people."[60]
Causes of trafficking
Some causes of trafficking include:
• lack of employment opportunities
• organized crime and presence of organized criminal gangs
• regional imbalances
• economic disparities
• social discrimination
• corruption in government
• political instability
• armed conflict
• uprooting of communities because of mega projects without proper Resttlement and Rehabilitation packages.
• Profitability
• Growing deprivation and marginalization of the poor
• Insufficient penalties against traffickers
• According to the UN a major factor that has allowed the growth of sexual trafficking is "Governments and human rights organizations alike have simply judged the woman guilty of prostitution and minimized the trafficker's role."[61]
• Driven by demand; demand is high for prostitutes and other forms of labor in host countries; therefore there is a very profitable market available to those who wish to become handlers.[opinion needs balancing]
Trafficking in people has been facilitated by porous borders and advanced communication technologies, it has become increasingly transnational in scope and highly lucrative. Unlike drugs or arms, people can be "sold" many times. The opening up of Asian markets, porous borders, the end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the former Yugoslavia have contributed to this globalization.
Human trafficking and other vulnerability issues
Human trafficking is not a stand alone issue. It is closely related other issues that threaten security well being of the victims. Victims are exposed to continuous threats of physical violence by traffickers to ensure compliance. Many are held in bondage and beaten to suppress resistance. Other threats include absolute poverty due to wage deprivation. They are unprotected by labor laws,long working hours and lack of holiday is common. For example, 15 is the standard working hours per day among Chinese victims in France. In Japan, Thai trafficking victims also complained of breach of work contracts, non-payment of wages, mandatory night work and poor accommodation [65].
Human trafficking and Sexual exploitation
There is no universally accepted definition of trafficking for sexual exploitation. The term encompasses the organized movement of people, usually women, between countries and within countries for sex work with the use of physical coercion, deception and bondage through forced debt. However, the issue becomes contentious when the element of coercion is removed from the definition to incorporate facilitating the willing involvement in prostitution. For example, In the United Kingdom, The Sexual Offences Act, 2003 incorporated trafficking for sexual exploitation but did not require those committing the offence to use coercion, deception or force, so that it also includes any person who enters the UK to carry out sex work with consent as having being trafficked.[62]
As Save the Children have said "The issue gets mired in controversy and confusion when prostitution itself is considered as a violation of the basic human rights of both adult women and minors, and equal to sexual exploitation per se..... trafficking and prostitution become conflated with each other.... On account of the historical conflation of trafficking and prostitution both legally and in popular understanding, an overwhelming degree of effort and interventions of anti-trafficking groups are concentrated on trafficking into prostitution" [63]
Sexual trafficking includes coercing a migrant into a sexual act as a condition of allowing or arranging the migration. Sexual trafficking uses physical coercion, deception and bondage incurred through forced debt. Trafficked women and children, for instance, are often promised work in the domestic or service industry, but instead are usually taken to brothels where their passports and other identification papers are confiscated. They may be beaten or locked up and promised their freedom only after earning – through prostitution – their purchase price, as well as their travel and visa costs [64][65]
The main motive of a woman (in some cases an underage girl) to accept an offer from a trafficker is better financial opportunities for herself or her family. In many cases traffickers initially offer ‘legitimate’ work or the promise of an opportunity to study. The main types of work offered are in the catering and hotel industry, in bars and clubs, modeling contracts, or au pair work. Traffickers sometimes use offers of marriage, threats, intimidation and kidnapping as means of obtaining victims. In the majority of cases, the women end up in prostitution. Also some (migrating) prostitutes become victims of human trafficking. Some women know they will be working as prostitutes, but they have an inaccurate view of the circumstances and the conditions of the work in their country of destination.[66][67]
In Japan the prosperous entertainment market had created huge demand for commercial sexual workers, and such demand is being met by trafficking women and children from the Philippines, Colombia and Thailand. Women are forced into street prostitution, based stripping and live sex acts.[68] However, from information obtained from detainees or deportees from Japan, about 80 percent of the women went there with the intention of working as prostitutes [69]
Trafficking victims are also exposed to different psychological problems. They suffer social alienation in the host and home countries. Stigmatization, social exclusion and intolerance make reintegration into local communities difficult. The governments offer little assistance and social services to trafficked victims upon their return. As the victims are also pushed into drug trafficking, many of them face criminal sanctions.
Efforts to reduce human trafficking
Governments, international associations, and nongovernmental organizations have all tried to end human trafficking with various degrees of success.
Government actions


A human trafficking awareness poster from the Canadian Department of Justice.
Actions taken to combat human trafficking vary from government to government. Some have introduced legislation specifically aimed at making human trafficking illegal. Governments can also develop systems of co-operation between different nation’s law enforcement agencies and with non-government organisations (NGOs). Many countries though have come under criticism for inaction, or ineffective action. Criticisms include failure of governments in not properly identifying and protecting trafficking victims, that immigration policies might re-victimize trafficking victims, or insufficient action in helping prevent vulnerable people becoming trafficking victims.
A particular criticism has been the reluctance of some countries to tackle trafficking for purposes other than sex. In the United Kingdom, after intense pressure from Human Rights organisations, trafficking for labour exploitation was made illegal in 2004 (trafficking for sexual exploitation being criminalised many years previously). However, the 2004 law has been used very rarely and by mid-2007 there had not been a single conviction under these provisions. [62]
Other actions governments could take is raise awareness. This can take on three forms. Firstly in raising awareness amongst potential victims, in particular in countries where human traffickers are active. Secondly, raising awareness amongst police, social welfare workers and immigration officers. And in countries where prostitution is legal or semi-legal, raising awareness amongst the clients of prostitution, to look out for signs of a human trafficking victim.
Laws against trafficking in the United States exist at the federal and state levels. Over half of the states now criminalize human trafficking though the penalties are not as tough as the federal laws. Related federal and state efforts focus on regulating the tourism industry to prevent the facilitation of sex tourism and regulate international marriage brokers to ensure criminal background checks and information on how to get help are given to the potential bride.
Raising awareness can take on different forms. One method is through the use of awareness films [70] or through posters [71].
International law
In 2000 the United Nations adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also called the Palermo Convention, and two Palermo protocols there to:
• Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; and
• Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.
All of these instruments contain elements of the current international law on trafficking in human beings.
Council of Europe
The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings [72] was adopted by the Council of Europe on 16 May 2005. The aim of the convention is to prevent and combat the trafficking in human beings. The Convention entered into force on 1 February 2008. Of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, so far 21 have signed the convention and 17 have ratified it.[73]
United States law
The United States federal government has taken a firm stance against human trafficking both within its borders and beyond. Domestically, human trafficking is a federal crime under Title 18 of the United States Code. Section 1584 makes it a crime to force a person to work against his will, whether the compulsion is effected by use of force, threat of force, threat of legal coercion or by "a climate of fear" (an environment wherein individuals believe they may be harmed by leaving or refusing to work); Section 1581 similarly makes it illegal to force a person to work through "debt servitude." Human trafficking as it relates to involuntary servitude and slavery is prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Federal laws on human trafficking are enforced by the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section.
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 allowed for greater statutory maximum sentences for traffickers, provided resources for protection of and assistance for victims of trafficking and created avenues for interagency cooperation. It also allows many trafficking victims to remain in the United States and apply for permanent residency under a T-1 Visa.[74]. The act also attempted to encourage efforts to prevent human trafficking internationally, by creating annual country reports on trafficking and tying financial non-humanitarian assistance to foreign countries to real efforts in addressing human trafficking.
The United States Department of State has a high-level official charged with combating human trafficking, the Director of the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons ("anti-trafficking czar"). The current director is Mark P. Lagon. [3]
International NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have called on the United States to improve its measures aimed at reducing trafficking.They recommend that the United States more fully implement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children and for immigration officers to improve their awareness of trafficking and support the victims of trafficking. [75][76]
Several state governments have took action to address human trafficking in their borders.
Florida state law prohibits forced labor, sex trafficking, and document servitude, and provides for mandatory law enforcement trainings and victim services. A 2006 Connecticut law prohibits coerced work and makes trafficking a violation of the Connecticut RICO Act.
Non-Governmental Organizations
Human rights organisations, including Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery International and Human Rights Watch have campaigned against human trafficking. Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights organizations have been formed to combat human trafficking. Some of these include:
Somaly Mam Foundation[4] Founded in 2007 at the United Nations with the support of UNICEF, UNIFEM, and IOM, the Somaly Mam Foundation is known for empowering victims of human trafficking to become activists and agents of change. With the leadership of world renowned Cambodian activist, Somaly Mam, the organization has garnered support from influential leaders and celebrities such as Susan Sarandon, Daryl Hannah, Diane von Furstenberg, and Hillary Clinton. The foundation also runs activities to support Rescue and Rehabilitation of victims in Southeast Asia and works to increase global awareness to inspire action.
Polaris Project[5]- Polaris Project, founded in 2002, is an international anti-human trafficking organization with offices in Washington DC, New Jersey, Colorado, and Japan. Polaris Project's comprehensive approach includes operating local and national human trafficking hotlines, conducting direct outreach and victim identification, providing social services and housing to victims, advocating for stronger state and national anti-trafficking legislation, and engaging community members in grassroots efforts [6].
National Human Trafficking Resource Center[7] The National Human Trafficking Resource Center (NHTRC) is a program funded by the Department of Health and Human Services. The NHTRC operates the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline 24-hours a day, 365 days a year.
Criticisms
Lack of accurate data and possible overestimation
Estimates of the number of people trafficked for sexual purposes is contentious - problems of definition can be compounded by the willingness of victims to identify as being trafficked.[77]
Distinguishing trafficking from voluntary migration is crucial because the ability of women to purposefully and voluntarily migrate for work should be respected. In a 2003 report the Thai sex worker support organization EMPOWER stated that many anti-trafficking groups fail to see the difference between migrant sex workers and women forced to prostitute themselves against their will. They documented a May 2003 "raid and rescue" operation on a brothel in Chiang Mai that was carried out without the consent of the workers, resulting in numerous human rights violations.[78]
In her 2007 book Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry, sociologist Laura María Agustín has likewise criticized what she calls the "rescue industry" for viewing most migrant sex workers as victims of trafficking that need to be saved, with the effect of severely restricting international freedom of movement. Agustín does not deny human trafficking or forced prostitution takes place, but rather that the ‘rescue industry’ overestimates figures.
Much criticism of the recent publicity around sex trafficking and the associated demands for legal sanction against prostitutes or their customers, has come from sexual health / AIDS organisations. Their principle concern being that such measures hinder efforts to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. The epidemiologist Elizabeth Pisani, in her book The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels, and the Business of AIDS, examines the phenomenon of sex trafficking and its impact on HIV prevention in detail. She concludes that forced trafficking (as opposed to voluntary involvement in sex work) is wildly over estimated.
Focus on "sex trafficking"
Whilst most mainstream human rights groups acknowledge all forms of trafficking, there is growing criticism of the focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation at the expense of tackling other forms such as domestic or agricultural trafficking. Ambassador Nancy Elly Raphael, the first director of the U.S. Federal Trafficking in Persons Office, resigned over what she saw as misrepresentation of the issue in order to provide support for the anti-prostitution lobby. She says "It was so ideological.. Prostitution, that's what was driving the whole program. They kept saying, 'If you didn't have prostitution, you wouldn't have trafficking.' I was happy to leave." [79]
In many countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, the overwhelming majority of interventions concentrate on sex trafficking. For example, on 8th July 2008, Fiona Mactaggart MP, a prominent UK government spokesperson on the issue, admitted that the UK government concentrated on disrupting sex trafficking. Quoting from Sigma Huda, UN special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, she said "For the most part, prostitution as actually practised in the world usually does satisfy the elements of trafficking..." [80]
Human trafficking in popular culture
Lilya 4-ever, a film based loosely on the real life of Dangoule Rasalaite, portrays a young woman from the former Soviet Union who is deceived into being trafficked for exploitation in Sweden. Human trafficking has also been portrayed in the Canadian/UK TV drama Sex Traffic.
Based on true events, Svetlana's Journey by Michael Cory Davis depicts the trials of a 13-year-old who loses her family and is sold to human traffickers by her adoptive family. Drugged, raped, and forced to endure continuous abuse by her 'clients' and traffickers, she attempts to commit suicide, but survives.
River of Innocents follows the 17-year-old Majlinda into the world of modern-day slavery, where she struggles to hold on to her humanity and to help the stolen children around her survive. [8]
A Movie by Dzmitry Vasilyeu, about Human-trafficking in Eastern Europe
Holly (2006) is a movie about a little girl, sold by her poor family and smuggled across the border to Cambodia to work as a prostitute in a red light village. The Virgin Harvest is a feature length documentary that was filmed at the same time.[9]
The 2007 film Trade deals with human trafficking out of Mexico and a brother's attempt to rescue his kidnapped and trafficked young sister. It is based on Peter Landesman's article about sex slaves, which was featured as the cover story in the January 24, 2004 issue of New York Times Magazine.
Human Trafficking (2005) (TV) by Christian Duguay stars Mira Sorvino, Donald Sutherland, and Robert Carlyle. A sixteen-year-old girl from the Ukraine, a single mother from Russia, an orphaned seventeen-year-old girl from Romania, and a twelve-year-old American tourist become the victims of international sex slave traffickers. Sorvino and Sutherland are the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents who struggle to save them.
Ghosts (2006 film) a documentary by independent film maker Nick Broomfield, follows the story of the victims of the 2004 Morecambe Bay cockling disaster, in which smuggled immigrants are forced in to hard labour.
The Jammed, an Australian film about human trafficking in Australia. [10]
The new film The Sugar Babies (2007) by Amy Serrano is a documentary that highlights the plight of Haitian victims of human trafficking in the Dominican Republic. It was produced by Thor Halvorssen and funded by the Human Rights Foundation.
The European series Matroesjka's deals with girls from ex-Soviet countries, who have been deceived into sex slavery in Belgium.
The 2007 film Eastern Promises by David Cronenberg deals with a British midwife who unravels a gang of Russian slavers when she seeks relatives to a baby of a sex slave named Tatiana.
The 2008 film Taken (film) by Pierre Morel, casting e.g. Liam Neeson, which is about girls who are "trafficked" with the purpose of forcing them to prostitution. Link to IMDB for movie details
See also
• Child camel jockey
• Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
• Comfort woman
• Commercial sexual exploitation of children
• Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women
• John Bowe (author)
• La Strada Program
• Rape
• Prostitution
• Prostitution of children
• Slavery
• Visayan Forum
• Redlight Children Campaign
• Economics of cocoa
Notes
1. ^ Economic Roots of Trafficking in the UNECE Region - Regional Prep. Meeting for Beijing+10 - pr2004/04gen_n03e.htm
2. ^ channel4.com / More4 / Ghosts / Stop the Traffik campaign
3. ^ Council of Europe says human trafficking has reached 'epidemic proportions' - Europe - International Herald Tribune
4. ^ uefa.com
5. ^ Distinguishing between Human Trafficking and People Smuggling, UN Office on Drugs and Crime
6. ^ People smuggling/people_smuggling/ Amnesty International
7. ^ Local women fall prey to sex slavery abroad
8. ^ - Trafficking in Human Beings
9. ^ Counter-Trafficking, International Organization for Migration
10. ^ HumanTrafficking.com ~ The Online Research and Training Center
11. ^ West Africa: Stop Trafficking in Child Labor, Human rights news
^ Borderline Slavery: Child Trafficing in Togo, 15, Human Rights Watch, April 2003, http://hrw.org/reports/2003/togo0403/. Retrieved on 5 October 2008
12. ^ "The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the Indian Adoption Scandals" by David M. Smolin, Seton Hall Law Review, 35:403–493, 2005.
13. ^ "Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping, and Stealing Children" by David M. Smolin, bepress Legal Series, Working Paper 749, August 29, 2005.
14. ^ UNICEF - Child protection from violence, exploitation and abuse - Trafficking and sexual exploitation
15. ^ "A global alliance against forced labour", ILO, 11 May 2005)
16. ^ I. Introduction
17. ^ HIDDEN SLAVES: Forced Labor in the United States, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, September 2004 isbn=0-9760677-0-6, http://web.archive.org/web/20070830033751/http://freetheslaves.net/files/Hidden_Slaves.pdf. Retrieved on 5 October 2008 (archived from the original on 2007-08-30)
18. ^ The Carnegie Legal Reporting Program at Newhouse - Blog Comments
19. ^ Eastern Europe Exports Flesh to the EU
20. ^ Local women fall prey to sex slavery abroad
21. ^ Crime gangs 'expand sex slavery into shires'
22. ^ Eastern Europe - Coalition Against Trafficking of Women
23. ^ A modern slave's brutal odyssey
24. ^ Moldova: Lower prices behind sex slavery boom and child prostitution
25. ^ The Russian Mafia in Asia
26. ^ For East Europe’s Women, a Rude Awakening
27. ^ Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress on U.S. Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons Fiscal Year 2005
28. ^ [1][dead link]
29. ^ Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery - Canada
30. ^ Women & The Economy - Globalization & Migration
31. ^ Stopping Traffic: Exploring the extent of, and responses to, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK
32. ^ Russia: With No Jobs At Home, Women Fall Victim To Trafficking
33. ^ Court acquits brothers in assault and detention case
34. ^ Police bring home 3 sex slaves from China
35. ^ Sex worker on trial for abortion
36. ^ Sold as a sex slave in Europe
37. ^ Jana Costachi, "Preventing Victimization in Moldova" Global Issues, June 2003
38. ^ The "Natasha" Trade - The Transnational Shadow Market of Trafficking in Women
39. ^ Poverty, crime and migration are acute issues as Eastern European cities continue to grow
40. ^ Correspondent's hour by RFE/RL
41. ^ [2][dead link]
42. ^ Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery - Russia
43. ^ Sex-slave trade flourishes in Thailand
44. ^ "Woman's Dying Wish: to punish traffickers who ruined her life" The Nation, January 23, 2006
45. ^ A modern form of slavery: Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand
46. ^ BBC Politics 97
47. ^ Iraqi sex slaves recount ordeals
48. ^ '50,000 Iraqi refugees' forced into prostitution
49. ^ Iraqi refugees forced into prostitution
50. ^ Desperate Iraqi Refugees Turn to Sex Trade in Syria
51. ^ Millions Suffer in Sex Slavery
52. ^ Fair skin and young looks: Nepalese victims of human trafficking languish in Indian brothels
53. ^ Slavery in Ghana. The Trokosi Tradition
54. ^ Ghana's trapped slaves, By Humphrey Hawksley in eastern Ghana, 8 February 2001. BBC News
55. ^ Nato force 'feeds Kosovo sex trade'
56. ^ Kosovo UN troops 'fuel sex trade'
57. ^ Conflict, Sexual Trafficking, and Peacekeeping
58. ^ UN troops cautioned on sex abuse
59. ^ - Falling Short Of The Mark: An International Study On The Treatment Of Human Trafficking Victim
60. ^ Canada an “International Embarrassment” on Sex Trafficking
61. ^ Treaty to Combat "Sex Slavery"
62. ^ a b Colla UK_Sarah_final
63. ^ Definition of Trafficking - Save the Children Nepal
64. ^ Migration Information Programme. Trafficking and prostitution: the growing exploitation of migrant women from central and eastern Europe. Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 1995.
65. ^ Chauzy JP. Kyrgyz Republic: trafficking. Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 20 January 2001 (Press briefing notes).
66. ^ Research based on case studies of victims of trafficking in human beings in 3 EU Member States, i.e. Belgium, Italy and The Netherlands, Commission of the European Communities, DG Justice & Home Affairs, 2001, http://www.prostitutie.nl/studie/documenten/mensenhandel/researchcasestraffick.pdf. Retrieved on 5 October 2008
67. ^ Causes of Human Trafficking
68. ^ Dinan K. Owed justice: Thai women trafficked into debt bondage in Japan. New York, NY, Human Rights Watch, 2000
69. ^ Pasuk Phongpaichit, "Trafficking in People," Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja, (Voices of Thai Women 5-10, October, 1997, p167
70. ^ Global TV Campaign on Human Trafficking, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003, http://web.archive.org/web/20071006161444/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_tv_campaign_2002.html. Retrieved on 5 October 2008 (archived from the original on 2007-10-0-6)
71. ^ Trafficking in Persons - Poster (English version)
72. ^ Council of Europe - Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No. 197)
73. ^ Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, CETS No.: 197, 16 May 2005
74. ^ DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ISSUES T VISA TO PROTECT WOMEN, CHILDREN AND ALL VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, U.S. Department of Justice, 24 January 2002
75. ^ U.S.: Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking and Slavery (Human Rights Watch, 7-7-2004)
76. ^ Stop Trafficking
77. ^ The Challenge of Measuring Slavery, Kevin Bales (MS-Word format) (archived from the original on 2006-02-20)
78. ^ A report by Empower Chiang Mai on the human rights violations women are subjected to when "rescued" by anti-trafficking groups who employ methods using deception, force and coercion, June 2003
79. ^ Joel Brinkley: An obsession with prostitution.
80. ^ Human Trafficking: 8 Jul 2008: Westminster Hall debates (TheyWorkForYou.com)
External links

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• Trafficking of women at the Open Directory Project
• Global Map of Human Trafficking
Articles and Resources
• National Human Trafficking Hotline - 1.888.3737.888 - Call the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline 24 hours a day to report suspected human trafficking, for general information about human trafficking and to request training and technical assistance for both community groups and law enforcement in the issued surrounding human trafficking and modern day slavery.
• Polaris Project - The website is a sizable web-based resource of news articles and general information about human trafficking and modern day slavery in the Unites States.
• Polaris Project Action Center -This website, operated by the National Grassroots division of Polaris Project, serves as a resource for those unfamiliar with the issues of human trafficking in the United States with the purpose of informing and enabling people to take direct action to stop human trafficking in their communities
• In Modern Bondage: Sex Trafficking in the Americas (Second Revised Edition)
• Reducing the Impact of Bias, Power and Culture When Assisting Trafficked Persons: A Guide for Service Providers (Humanatis LLC 2007)
• Gaining the Trust of Your Victim Witness: A Guide for Law Enforcement Working Human Trafficking Cases (Humanatis LLC 2007)
• 50 Ways Local Government Officials Can Combat Human Trafficking in Their Communities (Humanatis LLC 2008)
• 'Slavery in the 21st century - BBC
• 'Asia's sex trade is 'slavery' - BBC
• Asia's child sex victims ignored – BBC
• 'Race to break camel slavery - Scotland on Sunday
• 'Sex trade's reliance on forced labour - BBC
• 'A modern slave's brutal odyssey - BBC
• 'Child traffic victims 'failed'- BBC
• Europe warned over trafficking - BBC
• 'Balkans urged to curb trafficking - BBC
• 5,000 child sex slaves in UK - The Independent
• People trafficking: upholding rights and understanding vulnerabilities, Forced Migration Review, University of Oxford.
• People trafficking: upholding rights & understanding vulnerabilities - special issue of Forced Migration Review
• 'Coalition Against Trafficking in Women Factbook
• International Organization for Migration Data and Research on Human Trafficking 2005
• 'Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States: International and Domestic Trends - Coalition Against Trafficking in Women
• Fears of rising child sex trade – The Guardian
• Women and Children First: The Economics of Sex Trafficking. Lydersen, Kari. LiP Magazine, April 2002
• Human Trafficking, Fourth report of the Dutch National Rapporteur
• 'Kidnapped children sold into slavery as camel racers' - Guardian
• Amnesty International UK trafficking/forced prostitution
• Amnesty International USA - Human Trafficking
• Amnesty International - Council of Europe: Protect victims of people trafficking
• Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Patrick Belser, Globalization and the illicit market for human trafficking: an empirical analysis of supply and demand , ILO, 2006.
Government and international governmental organizations
• UN.GIFT - Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking
• Council of Europe - Slaves at the heart of Europe
• European Union: European Commission - Documentation Centre
• European Union: Eurojust and Human Trafficking
• U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, 2005
• US State Department - Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
• US Department of Justice Human Trafficking Website
• US Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs
• Report on US government activities combatting trafficking in 2005
• United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
• United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
• International Organization for Migration - Counter-Trafficking Programme
• United Nations - Trafficking in Human Beings (This site is an excellent source for international legislation and multi-media video files)
• Trafficking in Minors - United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
• OSCE Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
• International Labour Organization - Human Trafficking in Asia reports
• Diplomacy Monitor - Human Trafficking
• The ILO Special Action Programme to combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL)
• U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2007
• US Department of Health and Human Services Campaign to Rescue and Restore Victims of Human Trafficking



News & Updates
Trafficking of Filipinas in Singapore
June 03, 2008
The Philippine Embassy in Singapore reports on unabated trafficking of Filipinas to Singapore.
The Philippine embassy said the trafficking of Filipinas in Singapore "continues unabated."
The embassy’s admission came six month after INQUIRER.net first reported the sharp increase in the incident of the transnational crime in the island-state.
In the report it submitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) dated April 28, the Philippine embassy in Singapore reiterated its warning about the dangers of human trafficking.
The warning came in the wake of meetings between the Philippine embassy, Ambassador Steven Steiner of the United States Department of State's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and officials from the Philippine Presidential Task Force on Human Trafficking, who went to Singapore to assess the situation there.
In November 2007, INQUIRER.net posted a special report on the growing number of young Filipino women being lured to Singapore on the false promise of a high-paying job only to end up in prostitution.
The increased incidence of trafficking of Asian women, including Filipinas, to Singapore prompted the United States State Department to downgrade the city-state's rating from Tier 1 in 2006 to Tier 2 this year.
Philippine Ambassador to Singapore Belen Fule-Anota said Filipinas who want to work overseas must scrutinize their recruiters in the Philippines well and ensure they have valid contracts before leaving the country.
She also advised jobseekers to have their contracts duly verified by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) "before packing their bags for Singapore."
"They should not allow themselves to be deceived by the sweet tongue and false promises made by sex and labor traffickers because once they reach Singapore, they become more vulnerable to intimidation, deception, and exploitation," added the ambassador, who has served in the city-state for four years.
Steiner, who visited the Philippine embassy on the sidelines of a meeting in Singapore, acknowledged the ongoing bilateral cooperation between the two countries and the progress being made by the Philippines in fighting trafficking in persons.
He exchanged notes with embassy officials and discussed possible areas for strengthening bilateral cooperation.
In a separate meeting with the two-person team of the Presidential Task Force, the embassy proposed the improvement of inter-agency cooperation, particularly in the areas of rehabilitation, re-integration, and witness protection for the victims, and the prosecution of traffickers.
In a report submitted to the DFA early this year, the embassy in Singapore noted "an alarming increase" of 70 percent in human trafficking cases from 125 in 2006 to 212 in 2007. There were only 59 recorded cases in 2005.
Of the 212 human trafficking victims in 2007, a total of 57, or 27 percent, admitted to either having engaged in prostitution or being coerced by their Filipino and Singaporean handlers to prostitute themselves. Of the 57 victims, 39 were pub workers, 15 worked in escort service, while three were pick-up girls.
The embassy culled data from individual interviews, recorded statements, and affidavits of victims who reported to the embassy in 2007. The number is believed understated.
The Philippines considers trafficking in persons a serious transnational crime and human security issue requiring close international cooperation, particularly between the source and destination countries.
"Victims are considered as trafficked if they have been deceived, coerced or subjected to conditions of exploitation as defined by Republic Act 9208, a Philippine law otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," the embassy said in a statement.
It said the Philippine definition of trafficking in persons is consistent with the definition in the United Nations Convention Against Organized Transnational Crime and its two protocols, all of which had been signed and ratified by the Philippines.


Adapted from: Veronica Uy, "Trafficking of Filipinas in Singapore."
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20080428-133194/Trafficking-of-Filipinas-in-Singapore-unabated--embassy
globalnation.inquirer.net 22 April 2008
Human trafficking is the third largest criminal industry in the world. The trafficking of persons for sexual exploitation or forced labor is a grievous violation of the dignity of the human person and is a form of modern day slavery. Trafficking is one of the most difficult crimes to prosecute and most insidious problem to solve.
HL Paper 245–I
HC 1127–I
House of Lords
House of Commons
Joint Committee on Human
Rights
Human trafficking
Twenty–sixth Report of Session
2005–06
Volume I

HL Paper 245–I
HC 1127–I
Published on 13 October 2006
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£0.00
House of Lords
House of Commons
Joint Committee on Human
Rights
Human trafficking
Twenty–sixth Report of Session
2005–06
Volume I
Report, together with formal minutes
Ordered by The House of Lords
to be printed 9 October 2006
Ordered by The House of Commons
to be printed 9 October 2006
Joint Committee on Human Rights
The Joint Committee on Human Rights is appointed by the House of Lords and
the House of Commons to consider matters relating to human rights in the
United Kingdom (but excluding consideration of individual cases); proposals for
remedial orders, draft remedial orders and remedial orders.
The Joint Committee has a maximum of six Members appointed by each House,
of whom the quorum for any formal proceedings is two from each House.
Current Membership
HOUSE OF LORDS HOUSE OF COMMONS
Lord Bowness
Lord Campbell of Alloway
Lord Judd
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Lord Plant of Highfield
Baroness Stern
Mr Douglas Carswell MP (Conservative, Harwich)
Mary Creagh MP (Labour, Wakefield)
Mr Andrew Dismore MP (Labour, Hendon) (Chairman)
Nia Griffith MP (Labour, Llanelli)
Dr Evan Harris MP (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West &
Abingdon)
Mr Richard Shepherd MP (Conservative, Aldridge-Brownhills)
Powers
The Committee has the power to require the submission of written evidence and
documents, to examine witnesses, to meet at any time (except when Parliament
is prorogued or dissolved), to adjourn from place to place, to appoint specialist
advisers, and to make Reports to both Houses. The Lords Committee has power
to agree with the Commons in the appointment of a Chairman.
Publications
The Reports and evidence of the Joint Committee are published by The
Stationery Office by Order of the two Houses. All publications of the Committee
(including press notices) are on the internet at
www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/hrhome.htm.
Current Staff
The current staff of the Committee are: Nick Walker (Commons Clerk), Ed Lock
(Lords Clerk), Murray Hunt (Legal Adviser), Jackie Recardo (Committee
Assistant), Pam Morris (Committee Secretary) and Tes Stranger (Senior Office
Clerk).
Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to The Clerk of the Joint Committee on
Human Rights, Committee Office, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P
3JA. The telephone number for general inquiries is: 020 7219 2467; the
Committee=s e-mail address is jchr@parliament.uk.
Human trafficking 1
Contents
Report Page
Summary 3
1 Introduction 5
Our inquiry 5
The Government’s consultation on a UK Action Plan 7
2 Human rights standards 10
Human trafficking: international definitions 10
Smuggling 11
Human trafficking under UK domestic law 11
Key human rights obligations 12
Positive and negative obligations 12
Obligation to prohibit trafficking and related acts 13
Obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish traffickers 14
Obligation to protect victims of trafficking 15
Identification of victims 16
Non-refoulement 16
Voluntary repatriation 18
Consular assistance 18
Participation in the criminal justice process 19
Compensation 19
3 The Council of Europe Convention 20
Background to the Convention and Status of Ratification 20
Overview of specific provisions 21
Article 10 (Identification of the victims) 21
Article 11 (Protection of private life) 22
Article 12 (Assistance to victims) 22
Article 13 (Recovery and reflection period) 23
Article 14 (Residence permit) 23
Article 15 (Compensation and legal redress) 24
Article 16 (Repatriation and return of victims) 25
Article 17 (Gender equality) 25
Arguments for and against signature and ratification 25
Argument for 25
Argument against 26
4 The scale and nature of human trafficking in the UK 28
The UK as a destination and transit country 28
Scale and extent of the problem 28
Types of trafficking 30
Labour exploitation 30
Sexual exploitation 31
Legal and illegal migration 32
2 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
Who are the traffickers? 32
Who is being trafficked? 33
Trafficking push and pull factors 34
EU expansion and its possible implications 35
5 Prohibition, prevention and law enforcement 36
Prevention activities 36
In source states 36
Tackling demand 37
UK legislation to prohibit trafficking 39
Conclusions on prohibition of trafficking 40
Investigation, Prosecution and Punishment of Traffickers 41
Reflex 41
SOCA 42
UK Human Trafficking Centre 42
Operation Pentameter 43
Operation Maxim 43
Operation Paladin Child 44
Statistics on law enforcement in the UK 44
Conclusions on investigation, prosecution and punishment in the UK 45
6 Protection of victims 47
Identification and referral of victims 47
Protection of victims’ privacy and identity 51
Initial and early treatment of victims 51
Specific issues relating to children 54
Longer term treatment of victims 56
Asylum and removal 58
The Italian approach 61
Conclusions on protection of victims 64
Reflection periods and residence permits 65
Signature and ratification of the Council of Europe Convention 66
7 Conclusions and recommendations 67
Formal minutes 74
Witnesses 75
List of Written Evidence 76
Reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights in this Parliament 78
Human trafficking 3
Summary
In this Report, the Committee considers human trafficking, one of the most serious human
rights issues in the modern world. Human trafficking is first and foremost a criminal activity
perpetrated against its victims, but it also engages a number of crucial human rights
obligations which apply to the policies and practices adopted by Governments to combat
trafficking and afford protection to victims.
In Chapter 2 the Committee explains the principal human rights standards and obligations
which apply to the UK under the European Convention on Human Rights and other
international instruments to which the UK is a party. The three main obligations are to:
• prohibit and prevent trafficking and related acts
• investigate, prosecute and punish traffickers
• protect victims of trafficking.
In May 2005 the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings. This Convention has not yet come into effect, and the UK has not signed it.
In Chapter 3 of this Report the Committee describes the provisions of the Convention
which relate to the protection of trafficking victims, and explains the arguments for and
against signature and ratification of the Convention by the UK.
After examination of the evidence on the scale and nature of human trafficking in the UK
(Chapter 4), the Committee considers, in Chapter 5, the effectiveness of the UK’s fulfilment
of its obligations to prohibit trafficking and enforce the law against traffickers. In Chapter 6
the Committee considers the effectiveness of policies in the UK for the protection of victims,
and compares these with the approach adopted in Italy.
The Committee takes the view that, in acordance with human rights standards, the effective
protection of victims must be the starting point from which all other policies relating to
trafficking should flow (paragraph 138). In light of the evidence presented to it, the
Committee concludes that, although the Government has started taking some significant
steps to improve the protection of victims, the current level of protection as a whole is still
far from adequate (paragraph 197).
The Committee broadly agrees that the current legislative framework to prohibit and
criminalise trafficking complies with relevant human rights obligations (paragraph 115),
and it applauds the Government’s ongoing effort to improve investigation, and the bringing
to justice of traffickers, welcoming in particular the establishment of the UK Human
Trafficking Centre to provide further co-ordination and focus to law enforcement efforts
(paragraph 133). However, the Committee argues that the protection of victims should be
placed at the heart of the legislative framework to combat trafficking, and calls for the
Government to review immigration laws and policies in the context of their impact on
trafficking victims (paragraph 118). In relation to law enforcement, the Committee says that
this must always make the interests and needs of victims a primary consideration (paragraph
134).
4 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
To improve protection of victims, the Committee recommends, among other proposed
measures—
• the establishment of a national identification and referral system, along with improved
training in identification of victims (paragraphs 146 and 198)
• more comprehensive and securely financed support and assistance to victims once they
have been identified (paragraph 198)
• more assistance to those returned or voluntarily repatriated to their country of origin to
assist them in re-integrating into their society (paragraph 198).
The Committee considers the Government’s argument that the provisions of the Council of
Europe Convention relating to reflection periods and residence permits for trafficking
victims could act as a pull factor for migration into the UK for those willing to make
fraudulent claims of victim status. Taking into account the safeguards contained in the
Convention and the evidence it received on the subject, the Committee concludes that there
is no realistic likelihood of adoption of the Convention’s provisions acting as a pull factor
(paragraph 200). The Committee concludes that the Government should sign and ratify the
Council of Europe Convention (paragraph 205). It also concludes that the standard length of
time for reflection periods should be three months (paragraph 203), and residence permits
should be of six months duration (paragraph 204).
A full list of the Committee’s principal conclusions and recommendations is set out in
Chapter 7.
Human trafficking 5
1 Introduction
Our inquiry
1. In this Report we consider one of the most serious human rights issues in the modern
world, human trafficking, which in recent years has brought to the heart of Western
societies, the UK included, a new and pernicious form of slavery inflicting suffering on
many thousands of people across the world.
2. The phenomenon of human trafficking, which takes a variety of forms, is first and
foremost a criminal activity perpetrated against its victims. As we explain in this Report,
however, it also engages a number of crucial human rights obligations which apply to the
policies and practices adopted by Governments to combat trafficking and afford protection
to the victims of trafficking. Appropriate legal and policy responses to human trafficking
have been under detailed consideration by international organisations over the last decade
or so, and this consideration has resulted in the adoption of a number of international
instruments, notably by the UN, the European Union and the Council of Europe, defining
human trafficking and setting out the standards to be observed by member states in
combating it.
3. Within this context, at national level Governments have been fashioning their own
responses to trafficking, normally encompassing legislation to create specific criminal
offences of trafficking and to provide protection to victims. One of the main purposes of
this Report is to assess the extent to which the response made so far by the UK
Government has satisfied the human rights obligations by which it is currently bound. At
the same time, we are aware that UK policy and practice in relation to trafficking is
continually under review and development. In particular, the Government has recently
consulted on a UK Action plan to tackle human trafficking, and intends to produce a final
Action Plan later this year (see paragraphs 9 and 10 below).
4. The Government’s consultation on its Action Plan did not formally ask for respondents’
views on whether the UK should sign the Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings,1 though it did seek views on the provision of reflection
periods and residence permits to victims of trafficking, two of the core provisions of that
Convention, and in that context a large number of respondents took the opportunity to
urge the Government to sign up to the Convention. In this Report we consider the
provisions of the Convention relating to protection of victims in some detail, and weigh the
evidence for and against the Government’s current concern that those provisions could act
as “pull” factors to the UK, thus exacerbating the problem of trafficking.2 As we announced
in our call for evidence of 19 October 2005, our Report also considers more generally
whether or to what extent ratification of the Convention by the UK would enhance human
rights protection in relation to human trafficking, and assesses the changes to law, policy
1 Council of Europe Treaty Series/197. Henceforth “Council of Europe Convention” or “Convention”.
2 Appendix 1, para 67
6 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
and practice which would be necessary in order to ratify and successfully implement the
Convention.3
5. First, in Chapter 2 of this Report, we describe the most significant extant human rights
standards applicable to human trafficking, structured in accordance with the three
principal obligations imposed upon states—
to prohibit and prevent trafficking and related acts
to investigate, prosecute and punish4 traffickers
to protect victims of trafficking.
In Chapter 3 we explain the main provisions of the Council of Europe Convention relating
to the protection of victims of trafficking. This Convention has not yet come into effect.
Chapter 4 sets out the available evidence on the scale and nature of the problem of human
trafficking in the UK, and in Chapter 5 we consider current UK legislation and policy on
the prohibition and prevention of trafficking, and the enforcement of the law against
traffickers. In Chapter 6 we focus on UK practice on the protection of trafficking victims,
and also give a comparative account of the different approach adopted by Italy to this
matter, primarily in the context of the protection of victims. The discussions we held
during our visit to Italy made a profound impression on our thinking about the best ways
to address human trafficking, and the lessons we learnt resonate through the rest of this
Report. In this Chapter we also consider the impact which signing up to the Council of
Europe Convention would have on UK policy on protection of victims within the context
of its anti-trafficking strategy. Finally, in Chapter 7, we set out our principal conclusions
and recommendations.
6. One consistent thread runs through our consideration in this Report of the different
aspects of human trafficking in the UK. That is the question of whether the Government
has got the human rights balance right in its attempt to reconcile the various objectives of
enforcing the law against traffickers, preventing trafficking and illegal immigration when it
is associated with trafficking, and protecting the victims of trafficking. As we explain in the
rest of this Report, it is our firm belief, based on the evidence we have received, that the
Government needs to reconsider the balance it has struck between these different
imperatives. We are encouraged by our further belief that the Government is also
committed to achieving the best possible balance in its overall policy to combat trafficking,
grounding that policy in human rights standards, and has an open mind about how this
can best be achieved.
7. Written evidence received in our inquiry is published as Appendices to this Report. We
also publish with this Report the transcripts of oral evidence we took. In addition to this
formal oral evidence, we held informal meetings with representatives of Reflex and the
3 In this sense this Report reflects our recent undertaking to report on human rights treaties before their ratification,
if they raise any significant issues of which Parliament should be aware (Twenty-third Report of Session 2005-06, The
Committee’s Future Working Practices, HL Paper 239/HC 1575, para.68).
4 “Punish” is the word used in some places in the relevant instruments. We do not consider this word to mean
necessarily anything beyond bringing traffickers to justice and imposing sanctions.
Human trafficking 7
Metropolitan Police’s Clubs and Vice Unit at the start of our inquiry, and visited the offices
of the Eaves Housing for Women Poppy Project, where we met and talked to project staff
and two Eastern European women victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation who were
being supported by the project. Italy is often cited as a country which has adopted best
practice in its policy on human trafficking, and in June we visited Rome and Venice where
we had discussions with central Government Ministers and officials, as well as with local
government officials and NGOs running support schemes for trafficking victims, along
with others. We are most grateful to all those who assisted us in the course of our inquiry.
8. Two specialist advisers assisted us in this inquiry: Dr Vanessa Munro of King’s College
London and Dr Tomoya Obokata of Queen’s University Belfast. We record our gratitude
to them as well for their assistance.
The Government’s consultation on a UK Action Plan
9. As mentioned above, in parallel with our inquiry, but as an entirely separate exercise, the
Home Office launched on 5 January 2006 a national consultation exercise on proposals for
a UK Action Plan on Human Trafficking.5 Such Action Plans have been recommended by
international organisations including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).6 The Home Office has been considering what elements should be
included in the Action Plan, particularly in the areas of (a) prevention, (b) investigation,
law enforcement and prosecution, and (c) protection and assistance to victims. During the
consultation period, approximately 200 individuals and organisations both within and
outside the UK responded, and in June 2006, the Home Office published a follow-up
report which contains a summary of responses received. 7 The following is the list of key
points raised:
General
• The National Action Plan lacks a human rights focus.8 Trafficking should be seen not
merely as an organised immigration crime, but also as a grave violation of fundamental
human rights. The human rights of victims should be at the core of UK response to
trafficking.
• The National Action Plan must pay special attention to children and young people who
are trafficked, and also incorporate a gender perspective.9
• The National Action Plan is not legally binding, so it is difficult to hold authorities
accountable in case of non-compliance.10
5 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, Home Office and Scottish Executive,
January 2006
6 Appendix 1, para. 4
7 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses to the Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, Home
Office and Scottish Executive, June 2006
8 Ibid., p.7
9 Ibid., p.9
10 Q 31 [Ms. Patel]
8 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
• The National Action Plan must be as detailed as possible. It should contain specific
timeframes for implementation, allocation of resources and division of labour.11
Prevention
• There needs to be a stronger emphasis on demand reduction and tackling the causes of
trafficking in the National Action Plan.12
• The National Action Plan should promote research and intelligence gathering focused
not only on source states, but also on the UK itself. The Government needs to
understand what makes the UK an attractive destination and what deters traffickers
from using other countries.13
• The National Action Plan must include effective training and awareness raising
programmes both within UK and abroad, in co-operation with NGOs and other
concerned partners.14
Investigation, Law Enforcement and Prosecution
• Protection of the human rights of victims should be at the core of law enforcement in
the UK.
• The National Action Plan should promote effective co-ordination and co-operation
among competent authorities and with NGOs and other members of civil society to
avoid duplication of effort and expenditure.15
Protection and Assistance to Victims
• The National Action Plan fails to provide the minimum standards of care and
protection that the Council of Europe Convention would provide.
• The National Action Plan should promote a nation-wide victim protection/support
system, including effective identification and referrals, for all victims of trafficking.16
• The National Action Plan does not touch upon longer term protection of victims.17
10. In addition to these main points, the respondents proposed a number of other
recommendations in order to improve the current UK response to trafficking. We
welcome the Government’s consultation on its National Action Plan to combat human
trafficking, and urge the Government to take the responses to that consultation on
board in order to promote an effective human rights approach to combating
trafficking. While this Report is not a formal response to the Government’s
consultation, many of our conclusions and recommendations, as will be seen, mirror
11 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses, op.cit. , p.14.
12 Ibid., p.8.
13 Ibid., p.10.
14 Ibid., pp.10-11.
15 Ibid., pp.13-14.
16 Q 66 [Ms. Joshi]
17 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses, op.cit., p. 12.
Human trafficking 9
those submitted to the Government during that consultation. We expect the
conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report to be given serious
consideration by the Government when it decides the contents of that Action Plan.
10 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
2 Human rights standards
11. It has been widely accepted that trafficking of human beings is not merely a criminal
justice or migration issue, but also a human rights issue. Indeed, a number of positive
obligations have been assumed by the UK under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and other pertinent human rights instruments to which the UK is a party.
A human rights framework to address trafficking therefore has an important role to play.
12. The purpose of this Chapter is to identify existing human rights norms and principles
applicable to trafficking of human beings, and to articulate the human rights obligations
which are thereby imposed upon the UK. It starts by exploring the definitions of trafficking
of human beings adopted at national, regional and international levels. It then continues to
analyse the applicable human rights norms and obligations imposed upon States. All of the
instruments mentioned in this Chapter, except for soft law instruments, are ratified by the
UK unless otherwise stated. The provisions of the Council of Europe Convention relating
to the protection of victims are considered in more detail in Chapter 3.
Human trafficking: international definitions
13. Before proceeding to describe the appropriate human rights obligations and standards,
the definition of trafficking should be examined and key elements identified. There are
three key instruments which are important. The first is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 2000.18 The UK ratified this
instrument on 6 February 2006. Article 3 stipulates that:
“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring, or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at the minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or removal of organs”.
An identical definition of “trafficking in human beings” is given in Article 4 of the Council
of Europe Convention.
14. Another important instrument for the UK is the EU Council Framework Decision on
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.19 The UK, like other members of the EU, is
bound by this Framework Decision. Article 1 describes trafficking as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, subsequent reception of a
person, including exchange or transfer of control over that person, where:
18 A/RES/55/25 (2001), Annexe II. Henceforth “Trafficking Protocol”. It is also commonly referred to as the ”Palermo
Protocol”.
19 OJ L 203/1 (1/8/02). Henceforth “EU Framework Decision”.
Human trafficking 11
(a) use is made of coercion, force or threat, including abduction, or
(b) use is made of deceit or fraud, or
(c) there is an abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, which is such that
the person has no real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved,
or
(d) payments or benefits are given or received to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation of that person's labour or services, including at least
forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or
servitude, or
for the purpose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, including in pornography”.
Smuggling
15. Trafficking of human beings should not be confused with “smuggling” of human
beings. Although these two terms have been used interchangeably in the past, there is a
consensus now that they are different acts. This is illustrated by the adoption of the
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,20 also attached to the
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Under Article 3, smuggling is
defined as:
“the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is
not a national or permanent resident.”
16. The following key factors can be identified in distinguishing between trafficking and
smuggling. First, trafficking is carried out with the use of coercion and/or deception,
whereas smuggling is not, indicating that the latter can be a voluntary act on the part of
those smuggled. Second, trafficking entails subsequent exploitation of people, while the
services of smugglers end when people reach their destination. Third, trafficking can take
place both within and across national frontiers, whereas international movement is
required for smuggling. Finally, entry into a state can be legal or illegal in the case of
trafficking, whereas smuggling is characterised by illegal entry.
Human trafficking under UK domestic law
17. In the UK, although a specific definition akin to that contained in the Trafficking
Protocol and the Council of Europe Convention is not incorporated into domestic law,
there are several pieces of legislation which have been introduced to criminalise the
practice. The first was the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 145 of
which established an offence of trafficking for prostitution. This stop-gap provision was
repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which introduced wide-ranging offences of
20 A/RES/55/25 (2001), Annex III.
12 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
trafficking for the purpose of any sexual offence (sections 57-59). Finally, section 4 of the
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 criminalised trafficking
for labour exploitation and the removal of organs. With enactment of these domestic laws
on prohibition of trafficking, which we consider in more detail in Chapter 5, it has been
argued that the UK legislation is compatible with regional and international standards in
this respect.
Key human rights obligations
18. An examination of the existing human rights norms and principles reveals that certain
human rights obligations in relation to trafficking of human beings already exist. While
there may be a wide variety of obligations, this Report focuses on three key obligations
imposed upon all states, regardless of their status as source, transit or destination states.
They are obligations to:
1) prohibit and prevent trafficking and related acts,
2) investigate, prosecute and punish traffickers, and
3) protect victims of trafficking.
The Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking
200221 issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights affirm in this regard
(Principle 2) that “States have a responsibility under international law to act with due
diligence to prevent trafficking, to investigate and prosecute traffickers and to assist and
protect trafficked persons.”
Positive and negative obligations
19. Before describing specific obligations, it is worth explaining the major difference
between positive and negative obligations, concepts which appear often in human rights
discourses. The jurisprudence established by the European Court of Human Rights
provides us some guidance in understanding these concepts. A positive obligation requires
states to undertake specific actions, whereas they must refrain from taking certain actions
under a negative obligation. Most of the ECHR rights are said to be negative rights in that
member states are obliged to refrain from interfering with them. However, the European
Court of Human Rights recognizes the existence of positive obligations to take preventive
or protective actions to secure ECHR rights. Some examples include investigating killing,
protecting vulnerable persons from ill treatment, and securing respect for private life. As
will be shown below, there are several positive obligations related to trafficking of human
beings, and some of the concrete measures to fulfil such obligations are illustrated.
21 E/2002/68/Add.1. Henceforth UN Principles and Guidelines.
Human trafficking 13
Obligation to prohibit trafficking and related acts
20. There are various international human rights instruments which explicitly require
states to prohibit trafficking. Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women 1979 (CEDAW), for instance, provides that:
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress
all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”
21. In relation to children, Article 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989
(CRC) states that:
“States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any
purpose or in any form.” 22
22. With regard to instruments specifically on trafficking of human beings, the obligation
to prohibit is set out in Article 5(1) of the Trafficking Protocol, Article 1 of the EU
Framework Decision, and Article 18 of the Council of Europe Convention.
23. In addition to these legally binding instruments, some non-binding instruments are
relevant. They include:
• Article 5(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000
“Trafficking in human beings is prohibited.”
• Principle 12 of the UN Principles and Guidelines:
“States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures necessary to establish
as criminal offences, trafficking, its component acts, and related conducts.”
Guideline 4 of the UN Principles and Guidelines supplements this by illustrating detailed
legislative measures for states to take.
24. In addition to trafficking itself, other related acts are also prohibited under
international human rights law. Slavery and/or forced labour are good examples. Article 4
of the ECHR stipulates in this regard that:
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
25. The recent case of Siliadin v France is of great importance in relation to Article 4. In
this case, the European Court of Human Rights held that member states have a positive
obligation to penalise slavery and forced labour.23
22 Also relevant is the Optional Protocol on Sales of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2000. Although
the United Kingdom signed this instrument on 7 September 2000, it has not ratified it yet, though it has confirmed
its intention to do so at the earliest opportunity, an intention which we welcomed in our Report on the
Government’s recent review of international human rights instruments (17th Report of Session 2004-05, Review of
International Human Rights Instruments, HL Paper 99/HC 264, para.28.
14 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
26. Other pertinent instruments include the Slavery Convention 1926, the Forced Labour
Convention 1930, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966
(ICCPR),24 ILO Convention No. 183 (Worst Form of Child Labour Convention) 1999, and
Article 19 of the Council of Europe Convention. It has long been established that
prohibition of slavery is part of customary international law and constitutes jus cogens.25
27. Another pertinent obligation arises from the prohibition on torture and other
inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishments. States are under a clear obligation
to prohibit these acts. This obligation is stipulated in Article 3 of the ECHR, the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or
Punishment 1986, the UN Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, and Article 7 of the ICCPR. Similar to the
prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the prohibition on torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment is a part of customary international law and jus cogens.
Obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish traffickers
28. Another legal obligation imposed upon states is to investigate, prosecute and punish
non-state actors, including traffickers, with “due diligence.” One important case which
touched upon this was Ergi v. Turkey.26 In this case, the European Court of Human Rights
held that:
This obligation to (investigate) is not confined to cases where it has been established
that killing was caused by an agent of the State. Nor is it decisive whether members
of the deceased’s family or others have lodged a formal complaint about the killing
with the relevant investigatory authority. In the case under consideration, the mere
knowledge of the killing on the part of the authorities gave rise ipso facto to an
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation
...27
This obligation has been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in such cases
Osman v. United Kingdom,28 and Z and Others v. United Kingdom,29 and endorsed also by
23 Application No. 73316/01, Judgment of 26 July 2005, para. 112.This case was about a Togolese national who was
forced to work as a domestic servant on very low, sometimes non-existent, wages and in harsh living and working
conditions. The Court found that there had been a violation of France’s positive obligations under Article 4 ECHR.
24 Article 8.
25 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 provides that jus cogens is “a peremptory norm of
general international law” which is “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”
26 Application No. 23818/94, Judgment of 28 July 1998.In this case, a Turkish national of Kurdish origin claimed, among
other things, that his sister was unlawfully killed by the Turkish security force in violation of Article 2 ECHR, when
they opened fire indiscriminately in his village against PKK members.
27 Para. 82.
28 Application No. 23452/94, Judgment of 28 October 1998, paras. 115-116. This case involved a claim by the applicant
that the UK authorities had failed to protect her husband and son from a school teacher who developed an
obsession with her son.
29 Application No. 29392/95, Judgment of 10 May 2001, para. 109. In this case, Z and others, who were minors,
successfully argued that the local authority failed to protect them when they were subjected to ill-treatment and
neglect at home in contravention of Article 3 ECHR.
Human trafficking 15
other human rights mechanisms including the UN Human Rights Committee30 and the
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women.31
29. In relation to trafficking-related instruments, the obligation to investigate, prosecute,
and punish traffickers is established by the EU Framework Decision (Articles 3, 4, 5, 6).
The Trafficking Protocol also touches upon international co-operation to strengthen law
enforcement in Article 10. Further, Article 23(1) of the Council of Europe Convention
provides that:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that the criminal offences … are punishable by effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions. These sanctions shall include … penalties involving deprivation
of liberty which can give rise to extradition.
Other pertinent provisions in the Council of Europe Convention include Chapter V
(Investigation, Prosecution and Procedural Law) - Articles 27-31.
30. In relation to soft law, Principle 13 of the UN Principles and Guidelines provides that
states “shall effectively investigate, prosecute and adjudicate trafficking, including its
component acts and related conduct, whether committed by governmental or by non-state
actors.”32 Further, Guideline 5 of the same document goes further to elaborate on some of
the measures which should be taken by states. They include adequate training for law
enforcement agencies, enhancement of investigative powers and technology, and
establishment of anti-trafficking units.
31. It should be noted, however, that investigation, prosecution and imposing sanctions
must be carried out in accordance with international human rights law. This means that
the rights of those accused of trafficking must also be respected. The key human rights
principles which must be respected and protected include the right to liberty and security
(Article 5 of the ECHR and Article 9 of the ICCPR) and the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of
the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR).
Obligation to protect victims of trafficking
32. States also have an obligation under international human rights law to protect victims
of trafficking of human beings.
33. A number of human rights instruments including the Optional Protocol to the CRC33
contain provisions on protection of victims. Other pertinent provisions and instruments
include Articles 6 to 8 of the Trafficking Protocol, Article 7 of the EU Framework Decision,
and Chapter III (Articles 10-17) of the Council of Europe Convention, which is considered
in greater detail in Chapter 3 below. Further, Principles 7-11, and Guidelines 6, 8, and 9 of
the UN Principles and Guidelines elaborate on this obligation to protect victims of
trafficking.
30 General Comment No. 7 (Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment)(1982), paras. 1 and 2, and
Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, Communication No. 161/1983, CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983, para. 11.
31 Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women , E/CN.4/2000/68, paras. 51-53.
32 Principles 14 (Extradition) and 15 (Sanctions) are also pertinent.
33 Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Optional Protocol (see footnote 22).
16 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
34. Although other human rights instruments do not contain provisions specifically related
to the protection of victims of trafficking, the obligation can be inferred from a general
duty to secure, ensure, or restore rights, and to provide remedies. Article 2(3)(a) of the
ICCPR for instance, provides that:
States are under an obligation to ensure that “any person whose rights and freedoms
as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
Even though the wording may be different, a similar obligation is established by such
instruments as the CRC34 and ECHR.35
35. The obligation to protect also arises when states fail to take positive steps to prevent
non-state actors from committing illegal acts. A case which touched upon this is the Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. United States),
in which the International Court of Justice held that although attacks by militants were not
imputable to Iran, it was not “free of responsibility in regards to the attacks,” as Iran was
placed under an obligation to “take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the
United States Embassy and Consulates.” 36
36. There is no precise list of protection measures which states are required to provide or
implement, and some of the key measures will be described below. In Chapter 3 we
consider in greater detail the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention relating to
the assistance and protection of victims.
Identification of victims
37. A starting point is identification of victims. Article 10(2) of the Council of Europe
Convention obliges states to “adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary
to identify victims as appropriate in collaboration with other Parties and relevant support
organisations.” Guideline 2 of the UN Principles and Guidelines also stipulates that they
are “under an obligation to ensure that such identification can and does take place.” Some
of the measures recommended for effective identification of victims include development
of manuals and guidelines for law enforcement agencies which come in contact with
potential or actual victims, their training, and facilitation of law enforcement co-operation.
Non-refoulement
38. A related obligation to the identification of victims is the observance of the principle of
non-refoulement or non-return. This applies in particular to refugees in accordance with
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. Guidelines
1.6 and 2.7 of the UN Principles and Guidelines in this regard urge states to ensure that
“anti-trafficking laws, policies, programmes and interventions do not affect the right
of all persons, including trafficked persons, to seek and enjoy asylum from
34 Articles 2 and 3.
35 Articles l and 13.
36 ICJ Report 1980, paras. 58, 59, and 61.
Human trafficking 17
persecution in accordance with international refugee law, in particular through the
effective application of the principle of non-refoulement.”
39. Within the framework of the ECHR, the principle of non-refoulement is often invoked
in conjunction with Article 3 (prohibition against torture). The cases such as Soering v
United Kingdom37 and Chahal v United Kingdom38 in the European Court of Human
Rights have established that if someone faces the risk of torture on return to his or her state
of origin, then member states, including the UK, cannot return that person.
40. It has been accepted by UK courts that the obligation of states to respect this principle
extends to cases where persecution is attributed to traffickers if states are unwilling or
unable to bring them to justice. In a case involving a Ukrainian woman who was trafficked
into the UK for prostitution, it was held that the inability of the Government of Ukraine to
protect her made it more likely that she would be persecuted by traffickers if she was
returned to Ukraine.39 She was consequently granted asylum in the UK. The principle of
non-refoulement also applies to cases where people are likely to face torture, or inhuman or
degrading treatment perpetrated by non-State actors. This was affirmed in the case Bensaid
v. United Kingdom by the European Court of Human Rights.40 Moreover, it has been held
in the past that expulsion of a person to a State where he/she would be subjected to slavery
or forced labour might raise issues under the obligation to prohibit torture.41
41. In relation to soft law, Guideline 4.6 of the UN Principles and Guidelines urges states to
ensure “that the protection of trafficked persons is built into anti-trafficking legislation,
including protection from summary deportation or return where there are reasonable
grounds to conclude that such deportation or return would represent a significant security
risk to the trafficked person and/or her/his family.”
42. Some measures designed to secure the principle of non-refoulement comprise the
granting of reflection periods and/or temporary or permanent residence permits to victims
of trafficking so that they can legally reside in a given state. Such provisions are contained
in Article 7 of the Trafficking Protocol and Articles 13 and 14 of the Council of Europe
Convention. Although the UK is not bound by it, the EU Council Directive on the Short-
Term Residence Permit Issued to Victims of Action to Facilitate Illegal Immigration or
Trafficking in Human Beings who Cooperate with the Competent Authorities42 is also
37 Application No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989.In this case, it was held that the UK would be in breach of Article
3 ECHR if it returned Soering to the US because he would suffer from experiences amounting to inhuman and
degrading treatment.
38 Application No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996.The Court found in favour of the applicant’s claim that
there was a real risk that he would be subjected to treatment in contravention of Article 3 ECHR if returned to his
country.
39 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Lyudmyla Dzhygun(Immigration Appeals Tribunal), Appeal no. CC-
50627-99 (00TH00728), 13 April 2000.The Immigration Appeals Tribunal recognised that the respondent belonged to
a particular social group under the definition of a refugee.
40 Application No. 44599/98, Judgment of 6/2/01, para. 34.The applicant, a national of Algeria who was suffering from
mental illness, argued that his removal to Algeria, where he would not receive the degree of support and access to
medical facilities available in the UK, would place him at a real risk of a relapse in his illness, contravening Article 3
ECHR. The Court did not find in his favour.
41 Case of Barar v. Sweden (Application No. 42367/98) (unreported).Case Comment, 3 European Human Rights Law
Review 330 (1999).
42 Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are
victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration,
who cooperate with the competent authorities. Henceforth “the Council Directive on Residence Permits”. In
addition to the UK, Ireland and Denmark are not bound by this Directive.
18 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
pertinent at European level. It obliges member states to issue residence permits of at least 6
months. Finally, Principle 9 and Guidelines 4.7 and 6.6 of the UN Principles and
Guidelines urge states to permit victims to legally stay.
Voluntary repatriation
43. If trafficking victims wish to return to their source states, then voluntary repatriation
must be facilitated. Voluntary repatriation is closely linked to one’s right freely to return to
the state of origin and is enshrined in the ICCPR43 and the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (CERD).44 This is strengthened
by Article 8 of the Trafficking Protocol and Article 16 of the Council of Europe
Convention. In relation to soft law, Principle 11 and Guideline 6.7 of the UN Principles
and Guidelines also urge states to promote voluntary and safe return.
44. When destination states decide to expel people in accordance with domestic law,
international human rights law also stipulates that they must provide an opportunity to
appeal against the decision to expel.45
Consular assistance
45. For those trafficked who are foreign nationals, they must have an opportunity to seek
assistance from their own Governments. States of destination such as the UK have a duty
to provide access to consular assistance, while source states have the right to communicate
with their own nationals to provide assistance in accordance with the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations 1963.
46. It is important to note here that this Convention concerns both rights of states and
individuals. Although the Vienna Convention is not a human rights instrument per se, the
International Court of Justice, in the LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States) stated that
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates individual rights.46 The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights went further to state that consular assistance, as part of minimum due
process guarantees, is recognised under Article 14 of the ICCPR.47 Finally, Guideline 6.3 of
the UN Principles and Guidelines urges states to ensure that “trafficked persons are
informed of their right of access to diplomatic and consular representatives from their state
of nationality. Staff working in embassies and consulates should be provided with
appropriate training in responding to requests for information and assistance from
trafficked persons.”
43 Article 12(4) and General Comment No.27 (Freedom of Movement) (1999) of the UN Human Rights Committee.
44 Article 5 (d)(ii).
45 Article 13 of ICCPR and the General Comment No. 15 (Position of Aliens under the Covenant)(1997) of the Human
Rights Committee.
46 ICJ Report 2002, para. 77. This case involved two brothers of German nationality who were convicted of murder in
the US. The US authorities, however, failed to inform them of their right to consular assistance. Germany asked the
ICJ to grant a provisional measure to prevent the execution of one of the brothers. However, the US did not
implement the court’s ruling, and the ICJ later found in Germany’s favour and held that provisional measures were
legally binding.
47 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law,
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Ser. A,No. 16 (1999), paras. 80, 83, 84, 87, and 122-124.
Human trafficking 19
Participation in the criminal justice process
47. An effective investigation into cases of trafficking can be regarded as a form of redress
available to some victims. An integral part of this remedy is the right of victims to
participate in investigations and judicial processes against traffickers.
48. There are several steps which must be taken in order to secure this right of victims to
participate. The first is to ensure that they can remain in a state at least while criminal
investigations or proceedings are under way (see the principle of non-refoulement and
related obligations above). Second, states should also secure effective witness protection to
protect the identities of victims, coupled with such measures as free access to interpreters
and legal advice. These measures are stipulated in Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the Trafficking
Protocol, Articles 12(1)(e) and 15 of the Council of Europe Convention, and Principles 9
and 10, and Guidelines 6.5 and 6.6 of the UN Principles and Guidelines.
49. A right of all people to equal treatment before national tribunals is established under
international human rights law,48 and states must therefore take positive steps to secure “an
effective right of access to the courts.”49
Compensation
50. Source states bear the primary responsibility in this regard, as the fact that people are
trafficked illustrates their failure to prevent traffickers from abusing the human rights of
those trafficked. However this obligation can also be imposed upon states of transit and
destination, if they fail to fulfil pertinent human rights obligations illustrated above. The
obligation to provide compensation is explicitly stipulated in Article 6(6) of the Trafficking
Protocol and Article 15 of the Council of Europe Convention.
51. In relation to other human rights instruments, the obligation to provide compensation
may be inferred from Article 2(3) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ECHR. It is worth
noting in this regard that where the right to life or prohibition against torture is involved,
the European Court of Human Rights has held in the past that the payment of
compensation may be required.50
52. Further, Guideline 9 of the UN Principles and Guidelines notes that:
Trafficked persons, as victims of human rights violations, have an international legal
right to adequate and appropriate remedies. This right is often not effectively
available to trafficked persons as they frequently lack information on the possibilities
and processes for obtaining remedies, including compensation, for trafficking and
related exploitation. In order to overcome this problem, legal and other material
assistance should be provided to trafficked persons to enable them to realize their
right to adequate and appropriate remedies.
48 General Comment No. 13 (Equality before Courts)(1984) of the Human Rights Committee; and General
Recommendation No. 20 (Non-Discriminatory Implementation of Rights and Freedom)(1996) in which the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination notes that the right to equal treatment applies to “all
persons living in a given State.”
49 Airey v. Ireland (Application No. 6289/73), Judgment of 9 September 1979, para. 25.
50 Z and Others v. United Kingdom, paras. 108 and 109.
20 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
3 The Council of Europe Convention
Background to the Convention and Status of Ratification
53. The Council of Europe has been at the forefront of the fight against trafficking of
human beings. While it started dealing with the issues in relation to the subject matter in
the 1980s, a concentration of activities emerged from the early 1990s.51 It has, for example,
established the Group of Experts on trafficking in women, promoted awareness raising
campaigns through seminars, meetings of experts and research studies, and drafted a
model action plan.52 In 2006, the Council of Europe Campaign to Combat Trafficking in
Human Beings was launched.53 The campaign aims to raise awareness among
Governments, parliamentarians, NGOs and civil society of the extent of the problem of
trafficking in human beings in Europe today. It will highlight the different measures to
prevent the practice, as well as measures to protect the human rights of victims and
prosecute the traffickers. The campaign also aims to promote the widest possible signature
and ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings.
54. Alongside these activities, the Council of Europe has been active in developing a legal
framework for member states to follow. Some of the early examples include
Recommendation No. R(2000)11 on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings for the
Purpose of Sexual Exploitation, Recommendation 1545 (2002) on Campaign Against
Trafficking in Women, and Recommendation 1610 (2003) on Migration Connected with
Trafficking in Women and Prostitution. These instruments, however, were not legally
binding.
55. The Council of Europe then saw the need to adopt a legally binding instrument which
goes beyond recommendations.54 While recognising the existing instruments which are
applicable to trafficking such as the ECHR, the Council of Europe considered that an
instrument with a stronger focus on protection of victims would supplement the current
legal framework and promote a pan-European action against the practice.55 The adoption
of a new instrument was supported by various bodies including the OSCE and the United
Nations.
56. The Committee of Ministers then approved a plan to draft a Convention in April 2003,
and the Ad Hoc Committee on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CAHTEH)
was established.56 In September of the same year, the Council of Europe started
negotiations on the Convention itself, and it was finalised in February 2005.
51 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and its Explanatory
Report (2005) (henceforth Explanatory Report).For more information on the Council of Europe and Trafficking, visit
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Trafficking/
52 Ibid., paras. 13-18.
53 Council of Europe website.
54 Explanatory Report, para. 29.
55 Ibid., para. 30.
56 Ibid., para. 33.
Human trafficking 21
57. The Convention was finally adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 May 2005,
and opened for signature on 16 May 2005 in Warsaw. As of September 2006, the
Convention has been signed by 32 member states.57 Under Article 42 of the Convention, 10
ratifications are necessary in order for the Convention to take effect. Only Moldova and
Romania have so far ratified it. The UK has neither signed nor ratified the Convention.
58. The Government participated actively in the drafting and negotiation of the
Convention, and says that it fully supports its key aims.58 While it has not signed or ratified
the Convention as yet, a decision has not been taken and the Government may do so in the
future. The Government is exploring, with various NGOs and others working in the field,
the potential benefits and disadvantages of the Convention.59 A cross-government group of
officials has been meeting on numerous occasions to analyse in detail all aspects of the
Convention and continues to report progress at regular intervals.60 Further, the
Government claims that a significant amount of work has already been undertaken to look
at potential changes to legislation and policies to minimise the impacts of abuses on
immigration controls, should the Government adopt the Convention.61 However, there are
still some areas of concerns surrounding the instrument, and the Government argues that
it requires more time before reaching a final decision.
Overview of specific provisions
59. The Convention is a comprehensive treaty which recognises trafficking as a grave
violation of human rights and focuses mainly on the protection of victims of trafficking
and the safeguarding of their rights. It embodies the international human rights standards
in this area and will strengthen the protection measures afforded by the Trafficking
Protocol. It applies to all forms of trafficking, including sexual and labour exploitation.
60. The Convention is divided into 10 Chapters. For the purpose of this part of our Report,
we will concentrate on Chapter III on protection of victims. As the Explanatory Report to
the Convention acknowledges, Chapter III is an essential part of the Convention as it
places the human rights of trafficked people at the centre of the anti-trafficking strategy.62
Article 10 (Identification of the victims)
61. This Article places a clear obligation upon “competent authorities”, such as police and
immigration authorities, to identify victims. Such identification is essential for victims to
receive all the necessary protection measures. In order to facilitate effective identification,
Article 10 obliges the authorities to co-operate with each other and other support groups,
such as NGOs. However, it goes further than simply identifying the victims. For instance,
57 Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, FYR Macedonia, and Ukraine. One non-Member
State (Montenegro) has also signed. See the Chart of Signature and Ratification at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=197&CM=8&DF=8/22/2006&CL=ENG
58 Appendix 1, para. 65
59 Ibid., para. 70.
60 Ibid., para. 71.
61 Ibid.
62 Explanatory Report, para. 130.
22 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
the competent authorities are also obliged to have trained and qualified individuals to
identify and protect victims and to issue residence permits in appropriate cases in
accordance with Article 14 of the Convention.63 If there are reasonable grounds to believe
that a person is a victim of trafficking, the competent authorities are to refrain from
removing or deporting that person until the identification process is complete and to
afford the protection stipulated in Articles 12(1) and (2).64 Articles 10(3) and (4) relate to
protection of children. Under Article 10(3), if the age of the victim is uncertain and there is
a reasonable ground to believe that he or she is a child, then the authorities must proceed
on the basis that he or she is a child and afford special protection, in compliance with the
CRC.65 When a victim is an unaccompanied child, states are obliged to appoint a legal
guardian who will act in the best interests of that child, take steps to ascertain his or her
identity and nationality, and locate his or her family.66
Article 11 (Protection of private life)
62. Under this Article, states must protect the privacy and identity of victims. Protection of
privacy and identity is essential not only to protect the physical and mental safety of
victims, but also to preserve their chance of integration into their destination states.67
63. In order to protect victims’ privacy and identities, various measures are provided for
under Article 11. Article 11(1) stipulates that victims’ personal data is to be stored and
utilised in accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data.68 This Convention provides, among other things,
that personal data are to be stored and used for lawful purposes only, and that states must
take steps to prevent unauthorised access, alteration and disclosure of such data.69 Article
11(2) is designed to safeguard the privacy and identity of child victims of trafficking, as
they are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Finally, Article 11(3) places an
obligation to encourage media to protect victims’ privacy and identities through selfregulation
or regulatory measures, while simultaneously respecting their right to freedom
of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.
Article 12 (Assistance to victims)
64. Article 12 is perhaps the most important as it provides for detailed measures of
protection to be implemented by states. This Article applies to all victims, whether victims
of trafficking within national borders or transnational trafficking.70 Measures to be taken
include, but are not limited to, secure accommodation, access to emergency medical
assistance, translation and interpretation services, counselling and provision of
information in the languages victims can understand, assistance during judicial
63 Article 10(1).
64 Article 10(2).
65 Explanatory Report, para. 136.
66 Article 10(4).
67 Explanatory Report, para. 138.
68 ETS No. 108. The UK has ratified this Convention on 26 August 1987.
69 Explanatory Report, para. 141.
70 Ibid., para. 146
Human trafficking 23
proceedings, and access to education for children.71 Victims lawfully residing in destination
states can receive protection wider than those residing illegally. Those measures include
additional medical assistance and access to employment, vocational training and
education.72 If someone’s status is not confirmed as a victim, he or she may receive
protection under Articles 12(1) and (2) and not all Article 12 measures. Another important
point on Article 12 is that it obliges states to co-operate closely with NGOs and other
members of civil society, and to ensure that assistance to victims is not made conditional
on their willingness to act as witnesses.73
Article 13 (Recovery and reflection period)
65. Article 13 obliges states to provide a recovery and reflection period of at least 30 days
where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is a victim of trafficking. The
Explanatory Report states that “this minimum period constitutes an important guarantee
for victims and serves a number of purposes.”74 Major purposes include recovering from
violations of human rights and deciding whether or not to co-operate with authorities.75 It
is important to keep in mind that the grant of a recovery and reflection period “is not
conditional on [victims] co-operating with investigative or prosecution authorities.”76
66. The competent authorities are not permitted to implement enforcement measures such
as deportation during this period. Further, protection measures as stipulated in Articles 12
(1) and (2) are to be afforded to victims.77 However, under Article 13(3), the competent
authorities do not have to grant a recovery and reflection period on grounds of public
security or if it is found that victim status is being claimed improperly. Many of those who
submitted evidence argued that a period of 30 days was not long enough and
recommended that the Government should grant a longer period, such as 3 months.78
Article 14 (Residence permit)
67. Under this Article, victims of trafficking are to be issued renewable residence permits.
This provision is designed to meet both victims’ needs and also requirements for law
enforcement.79 The victims’ personal circumstances to be taken into consideration include,
but are not limited to, their safety, health and family situation. If a victim is a child, his or
her best interests must be taken into consideration above all others.80
71 Article 12(1).
72 Articles 12(3) and (4).The Explanatory Report (at para. 166), however, states that Article 12(4) does not create
automatic right of access to labour market, vocational training and education. It is up to each State to consider
granting such access.
73 Articles 12(5) and (6).
74 Para. 173.
75 Ibid., paras. 173-174.
76 Ibid., para. 175.
77 Article 13(2).
78 Q 75, Appendix 10, para. 51, and Appendix 25, para. 99
79 Article 14(1).
80 Article 14(2).
24 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
68. Article 14 does not specify the length of residence permits, nor does it oblige states to
provide permanent residence permits. It allows a certain degree of discretion to states in
this regard. Article 14(3) states that “the non-renewal or withdrawal of a residence permit
is subject to the conditions provided for by the internal law of the Party.” However, the
Explanatory Report provides that states must set a length compatible with Article’s
purpose, and that permits must be “renewable.”81
Article 15 (Compensation and legal redress)
69. The purpose of Article 15 is to ensure that victims of trafficking are compensated for
damage suffered.82 This is in line with the obligation to compensate illustrated in Chapter
2. To begin with, Article 15(1) obliges competent authorities to provide information on
judicial and administrative proceedings in languages victims understand so that they can
obtain compensation from appropriate authorities or mechanisms. This obligation is
closely interlinked with the grant of residence permits under Article 14, as victims cannot
claim compensation without being able to remain in countries where proceedings take
place.83 Article 15(2) is designed to assist victims to go through often lengthy and
complicated legal processes in obtaining compensation.84 It should be noted, however, that
this Article does not give victims an automatic right to free legal aid. It is up to each state to
decide the requirements for obtaining such aid.85 In so doing, however, states must take
Article 6 of the ECHR and its jurisprudence into consideration, which may mean that legal
aid must be provided in certain circumstances.86
70. Article 15(3) establishes the right of victims to compensation. According to the
Explanatory Report, the compensation is pecuniary and covers both material injury (cost
of medical treatment) and non-material damage (suffering experienced).87 The victims’
right to compensation under this paragraph involves a claim against traffickers and not
against a state. However, in cases where traffickers are not found, disappear, or declare
themselves bankrupt (and therefore compensation cannot be claimed from them), Article
15(4) requires states to take steps to secure compensation by other means. A certain degree
of discretion is afforded to states in deciding what to do, but the establishment of the victim
compensation fund and social integration programmes is among measures recommended.
In any event, states are referred, among other things, to the European Convention on the
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (ETS No.116) in deciding compensation
arrangements.88
81 Explanatory Report, paras. 187 and 188.
82 Ibid., para. 191.
83 Ibid., para. 192.
84 Ibid., para. 195.
85 Ibid., para. 196.
86 Ibid.For the criteria in relation to legal aid, see, among others, Airey v Ireland, particularly paras. 24-26
87 Ibid., para. 197.
88 Ibid., para. 199. The UK ratified this instrument on 7 February 1990.
Human trafficking 25
Article 16 (Repatriation and return of victims)
71. A victim has a right to return to his or her own country, and the applicable
international human rights standards are illustrated in Chapter 2. Sending states should
not forcibly repatriate victims of trafficking, and Article 16 strengthens this obligation to
promote voluntary and safe return. When ECHR rights, such as Article 3, are involved,
states must take the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights into
consideration before making a decision on victims’ return.89 Articles 16(3) and (4) are
concerned with international co-operation between source and destination countries to
facilitate voluntary and safe return.90 Under Article 16(5), States must establish repatriation
programmes, including reintegration, by working with relevant national or international
institutions and NGOs. Article 16(6) further stipulates that states should provide
information on the organisations and programmes available once victims return to their
countries. In the case of child victims, states should not return them if it would not be in
their best interests, in accordance with Article 3 of the CRC.91
Article 17 (Gender equality)
72. This Article obliges states to promote gender equality in developing, implementing and
assessing protection measures to victims of trafficking. According to the Explanatory
Report, the main aim of Article 17 is to draw attention to the fact that women are the main
target group of trafficking of human beings and that they are marginalised and vulnerable
even before being trafficked.92 Therefore, states must also take into account various causal
factors which trigger the movement of women, and implement gender specific measures to
meet the need of female victims.
Arguments for and against signature and ratification
Argument for
73. Nearly all of those who submitted evidence to our inquiry called upon the Government
to sign and ratify the Convention. The following is a list of key reasons advanced for
ratification:
• The Convention sets minimum standards for protection and would oblige the
Government to protect the victims of trafficking. This has the effect of promoting a
human rights approach to the practice. This is also beneficial from a criminal justice
view point, as victims will be able to build a sense of trust towards authorities, making it
easier to facilitate co-operation.93
89 Ibid., para. 203
90 Ibid., para. 204.
91 Ibid., para., 207.
92 Ibid., para. 210.
93 Q 16 [Ms. Andrews]
26 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
• Signing and ratifying the Convention would signal regionally and internationally that
the UK is taking a lead on trafficking and that it supports a human rights approach to
the practice.94
• The Convention applies to all trafficked persons (not just those trafficked for sexual
exploitation), and therefore expands the scope of protection.95
• In addition to prohibition of trafficking itself, the Convention also obliges states to
prohibit sexual and labour exploitation, under Article 19. This is important as it will
oblige them to adopt tougher legislative and other measures against slavery and forced
labour.96 In other words, the Convention would encourage the Government to adopt a
holistic approach which addresses wider issues surrounding trafficking.
• Automatic reflection periods and residence permits as set out in the Convention were
an effective way of protecting the human rights of victims and enhancing prosecution
of traffickers.
• In countries which had introduced measure analogous to those set out in the
Convention, there was no evidence of abuse of the humanitarian measures or evidence
of a pull factor.
Argument against
74. On the other hand, the Government has expressed concerns about the Convention. For
instance, it fears that the automatic granting of recovery and reflection periods and
residence permits may act as a “pull factor” to the UK.97 By this the Government means
that they may provide incentives to those who are not victims of trafficking to make false
claims of such status, circumvent immigration control, and obtain benefits deceptively.98 In
support of this argument the Government claims that whenever new schemes, laws and
policies granting leave to remain have been introduced in the past, they have always been
abused by some.99
75. In addition, the Government states that abusive claims will have a negative impact on
the limited resources available to investigate and prosecute traffickers and support
victims.100 The Government also argues that introduction of reflection periods may have
the effect of causing delays in investigating crimes of trafficking while victims decide
whether or not to co-operate, endangering others being exploited by traffickers or resulting
in the loss of vital evidence.101
94 Q 48
95 Q 58 [Ms. Joshi]
96 Q 163
97 Appendix 1, para. 67
98 Q 141
99 Ibid.
100 Appendix 1, para. 75
101 Ibid., para. 76.
Human trafficking 27
76. Pointing out that a system of granting automatic reflection and recovery periods and
residence permits is a relatively new initiative across Europe, the Government argues that
there is no evidence to suggest that the case-by–case approach currently taken by the UK is
in any way less effective at offering targeted support.102 In view of all these factors, the
Government claims that it requires more time to assess the system before reaching a
conclusion. Later in this Report, we go on to report on the experience of Italy as an
example of a country that has provided for residence permits over a number of years.
102 Ibid., para. 69.
28 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
4 The scale and nature of human
trafficking in the UK
The UK as a destination and transit country
77. We received no evidence to suggest that the UK is a source state for human trafficking.
While there are indications that the UK has been used as a transit country—Anti-Slavery
International said that some unaccompanied asylum seeking children had been taken on to
other EU member states after arrival in the UK103 —research conducted thus far into the
scale and nature of trafficking in human beings indicates that, perhaps due to its
geographical location on the edge of Europe, the UK is primarily a destination state for
victims, rather than a transit country in trafficking routes.104 This contrasts with Italy, for
example, which is a significant entry point into the EU as well as a destination in its own
right.105 Evidence suggests that some people are brought directly to the UK. Meanwhile,
others are brought to the UK in stages and exploited in transit states before ultimately
arriving here. It is reported that the majority of people trafficked into the UK originate
from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, or from the Far East, particularly China and
Thailand.106 Recently, the UK has also seen a growing trend in trafficking for sexual
exploitation involving persons brought to the UK from within the EU, Lithuania and other
newly-acceded Eastern European states in particular.
Scale and extent of the problem
78. The vast majority of the evidence submitted to this inquiry referred to the lack of
reliable statistics on the scale of trafficking activity, be it locally, regionally or globally.
Nonetheless, there was a consensus that, from the information available, trafficking into
the UK occurs on a scale that merits serious attention by the authorities.107 Home Office
research from 2000 gave a widely varying estimate of between 142 and 1,420 women
trafficked in to the UK in 1998.108 The Home Office is currently conducting further
research into UK organised crime markets. Though this has not yet been published, the
Government told us that it showed that there were an estimated 4,000 victims of trafficking
for prostitution in the UK during 2003 at any one time.109 Because the research has not yet
been published, we have not been able to judge the validity of this figure. We note that
there are no reliable estimates for the numbers of children or adult men who have been
trafficked into the UK for labour exploitation purposes.
79. In the absence of reliable statistics outlining the scale of the trafficking problem, a
number of submissions sought to extrapolate estimates from other potentially relevant
103 Appendix 11
104 Q 85
105 Q 124
106 Q 85
107 Appendices 11, 14 and 21
108 Liz Kelly and Linda Regan, Stopping Traffic: Exploring the Extent of, and responses to, trafficking in women for
sexual exploitation in the UK, Home Office Police Research Series Paper 125, 2000
109 Appendix 1, para. 11
Human trafficking 29
data, e.g. relating to unaccompanied minors, private fostering, or non-UK sex workers. In
addition, much of the oral evidence provided by witnesses was based on anecdote and
extrapolated from estimates and statistics pertaining to related phenomenon, such as
migration data (including both legal and illegal entry), visas granted for domestic work, or
involvement in prostitution.110
80. Much of the oral evidence provided also focused on levels of demand as a measure of
the sex industry, and thus of trafficking for sexual purposes:
“What we have tried to do is look at the scale of the sex industry and that gives you a
reasonable picture of what is likely to happen in terms of women being trafficked in
for that industry. Recently we did some work looking at the sex industry and we saw
about 264,000 men spending at least £6.6 million per year on saunas, flats, et cetera.
That was taken from some work through Punternet where men talk about their
experience of buying sex. Certainly we are finding that the sex industry is expanding
in lap dancing, limousine services, takeaway services, and as long as you have got that
expansion you are likely to have women trafficked in to fulfil those services.”111
81. Referrals from the Poppy Project in some ways provide the most reliable figures on the
numbers of identified victims of trafficking for prostitution in the UK, since they relate to
actual women who have been encountered. Between March 2003 and May 2006, 489
referrals were made to the scheme, 99 women were accepted for accommodation and
support, and 25 women were provided with outreach services.112 However, the scheme
operates mainly in London, has tightly focused criteria, and depends upon self- or official
referral. As a result, there is reason to suspect that the number of victims nationwide will be
significantly higher, and indeed may well be higher than the estimated 4,000 provided by
the Home Office.113 The suggestion that the number of women being trafficked for
prostitution into the UK is on the increase seems to be corroborated by the fact that
“whereas 10 years ago 85% of women in brothels were UK citizens, now 85% were from
outside UK.”114
82. Deficiencies in information on the scale and nature of the problem of human
trafficking have caused difficulties throughout our inquiry. While intelligence suggests that
there has been an increase in the trafficking problem over the last two or three years, it
remains difficult to make an accurate assessment of the scale of the problem. In part, this is
due to a lack of co-ordination between the agencies involved in gathering intelligence of,
and responding to, trafficking (both nationally and internationally).115 However, due to the
clandestine and secretive nature of trafficking activity, it is also apparent that some of the
difficulties with data gathering will persist, despite the potential for improvement offered
by more coherent inter-agency cooperation.116 It is hoped that the establishment of the UK
Human Trafficking Centre, together with the recent reforms generated by the
110 Qq 53, 65, 78, 89
111 Q 3
112 Appendix 23
113 Ibid.
114 Q 19
115 Appendices 14 and 21
116 Q 10
30 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, will assist in ensuring better
procedures for co-ordinated intelligence gathering and sharing. As the Parliamentary
Under Secretary of State at the Home Office, Vernon Coaker MP, told us:
“We know that we need to do more to find out the scale of the problem. We know
anecdotally; from evidence that immigration officials pick up; from social services;
from the work that Operation Pentameter has done; and we know from all the nongovernment
organisations that there is an issue with respect to child trafficking. We
are trying to find out the scale of the problem and what more we need to do, and that
is why we have commissioned this piece of research.”117
We urge the Government to publish the research into organised crime markets
currently being conducted by Home Office researchers, which may assist in providing a
clearer picture of the scale and extent of human trafficking into the UK. We foresee
however a probable need for further follow-up research to be conducted to scope the
problem in relation to all forms of trafficking, and we urge the Government to give
priority to such research in order to give a more solid basis for the development of antitrafficking
policy.
Types of trafficking
83. One way of analysing the problem of human trafficking is by examining the underlying
purpose that the traffickers have for bringing a particular victim into the UK. The two
themes of sexual and labour exploitation are particularly prominent here but it would be a
mistake to conceive of the two as mutually exclusive: “we must note that children who are
trafficked, no matter what purpose they are trafficked for, become extremely vulnerable to
sexual exploitation even though they may not have been trafficked with that as the original
intent.”118
84. Before turning to consider these in more detail, it is heartening to note that, despite
including organ trafficking within our remit, no evidence suggesting that this occurs in the
UK was provided to us during this inquiry. Deputy Chief Constable Grahame Maxwell, the
Programme Director of Operation Pentameter, told us:
“During Operation Pentameter no information or intelligence came to light, or when
we were doing Reflex operations, that there was organ farming taking place in the
UK. There is information that it takes place in other parts of the world.”119
Labour exploitation
85. Labour exploitation takes place across a range of sectors, specifically agriculture,
construction, contract cleaning, domestic work and the care sector.120 The Chinese cocklepickers
who died at Morecambe Bay provide a vivid and tragic illustration of this
phenomenon. The quality of information regarding trafficking of persons into the UK for
117 Q 89. See generally Qq 85-92.
118 Q 21
119 Q 93
120 Q 53
Human trafficking 31
labour exploitation is even less adequate than that relating to trafficking for sexual
purposes.
86. Of particular concern to those who submitted evidence to this inquiry were domestic
workers, the majority of whom are “brought in as live-in workers, so they are particularly
vulnerable.”121 A typical picture involves a woman who has a family at home and has taken
the decision to leave that family, travel to a different side of the world and, often, care for
someone else's children.122 The issue arises when women arrive at their work and are
treated unacceptably. Ms Kate Roberts, a community support worker with the NGO
Kalayaan which assists migrant domestic workers in the UK, said that during August 2004
and August 2005:
“we registered 114 new migrant domestic workers at Kalayaan. Of these 114
individuals 65 of them - so well over half - had had their passports withheld by their
employer … I think the psychological abuse is really, really important because
domestic workers are living in their employer's household and they are constantly
being told they are an animal and they are stupid, and they cannot escape from that
because they are living in the house, often for years. More than one-third were not
allowed to leave the house, and over half, again, 57 per cent, did not have their own
room within the house, which meant they were sleeping in a public space in the
house - sometimes in the children's bedroom but we often register people who have
been sleeping under the kitchen table or in the lounge, which means that they are
working on call; they cannot shut the door and go home.”123
Sexual exploitation
87. Notwithstanding the evidence available on the exploitation of migrant domestic
workers, “the ILO has estimated that in developed countries the predominant form of
forced labour is commercial sexual exploitation.”124 It would certainly appear from the
evidence provided to our inquiry that trafficking for forced prostitution is the dominant
form in the UK. Despite some indications that traffickers are becoming more subtle, for
example using ‘boyfriend’ type relationships to lure women rather than overt violence and
coercion, it is clear that victims of sexual exploitation often suffer the most horrific and
brutal treatment. The stories of women at the POPPY Project speak for themselves.125 It is
important to raise awareness of the fact that many of these women would not become
involved in prostitution without coercion or duress:
“I think [the argument that women enter prostitution of their own volition] also
shows a misunderstanding of the nature of prostitution. If you look at how
121 Q 193 [Ms Roberts]. It is important to keep in mind, however, that migrant domestic workers cannot be regarded as
victims of trafficking in accordance with international definitions if they voluntarily come to the UK to perfom
domestic work, unless they are deceived as to the nature of their work and/or are forcibly transported to the UK to
perform domestic work against their will. In the case of children, their transportation for the purpose of
exploitation is itself to be regarded as trafficking even when it does not involve coercion or deception, in
accordance with Article 3(c) of the Trafficking Protocol, Article 4 (c) of the Council of Europe Convention and Article
1(3) of the EU Framework Decision.
122 Q 165
123 Q 166
124 Q 53
125 Appendix 23
32 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
prostitution is organised, most of the Glasgow women and ordinary Belfast women
will be involved in prostitution because they have a debt which is owed, so they are
debt bonded quite often to the owner of the brothel. One sauna in Glasgow in
particular advertised that on its website as a particular feature because it ensured
confidentiality and it said all their staff were bonded. There is no explanation for that
other than they were debt bonded. Those women would all say, if interviewed, "Yes, I
am doing this freely, I am not being coerced" but we know that there is coercion and
debt there.”126
88. Generally, prostitution takes place “off-street”127 and evidence relating to brothel
owners “sharing women and moving women from city to city” is extensive, but
anecdotal.128
Legal and illegal migration
89. The theme of indebtedness runs throughout the techniques used by traffickers to
exploit people. This debt often arises under the guise of recouping the travel costs incurred
in bringing them to the UK.129 Initial estimates arising from the victims rescued during
Operation Pentameter, an enforcement operation described further in Chapter 5 below,
are that about 60% arrived in the UK illegally, which means that 40% found themselves in
these terrible situations despite having arrived in the country legally.130 Operation
Pentameter discovered 84 people deemed to be victims of trafficking. Of these 25 were
from European states, and mainly from EU member states.131 Acknowledging the reality
that many victims of trafficking have entered the UK legally is important, not only in terms
of ensuring an appropriate response that accords with their entitlements, but also in terms
of preventing a misguided diversion into talk of illegal migration in the context of people
trafficking. Where people enter the UK legally but find themselves working in the sex
trade, which is, of course, not legal employment, they continue to experience considerable
vulnerability.
Who are the traffickers?
90. There appears to be a strong relationship between people trafficking activity and
organised criminal networks. Evidence submitted to us suggested, for example, that those
involved in trafficking tend to be “split between people from the Far East, the Chinese
gangs, and eastern European gangs”.132 As a result, knowledge of criminal networks is
becoming increasingly integral to understanding human trafficking.133 The inauguration of
the new Serious Organised Crime Agency will increase the prospect for success in this area,
although it was noted in evidence that criminal gangs tend to be remarkably resilient. In
126 Q 13 [Ms Hamilton]
127 Q 4
128 Q 6 [Ms Hamilton]
129 See “Katerina’s story”, Appendix 23.
130 Q 96
131 Q 95 [DCC Maxwell]
132 Ibid.
133 Q 121
Human trafficking 33
addition, there are also some indications of more informal instances of trafficking – in
situations of sex trafficking, this can often involve a boyfriend or partner figure. In the case
of trafficking in children for domestic service it can often involve a family member or
community friend. The child may have been sold into debt bondage by their family, which
raises serious problems with returning the child to their country of origin. In other cases
there may be cultural practices under which a child lives with a relative and performs
domestic duties in return for their education, or food being paid for.
91. The methods of recruitment used by traffickers are also considerably diverse, ranging
from grooming and befriending, through deception about the nature or conditions of work
in the country of destination, to outright coercion and violence. Often, it seems that a
combination of these techniques will be deployed both to recruit and then to maintain
control over victims of trafficking thereafter. While in some cases, those who have
organised the person’s transportation will continue to maintain direct control over that
person on arrival, in other cases (usually where there is a more complex and organised
network involved), they will be ‘sold on’ to another person who will exercise similar control
strategies to exploit them.
Who is being trafficked?
92. ILO estimates confirm that trafficking into developed countries predominantly takes
place for sexual exploitation, and that some 98% of those involved in prostitution as a
result are women. Nonetheless, there is also evidence which suggests that trafficking in
men and boys occurs for the purposes of sexual exploitation, albeit significantly less often.
In addition, the TUC and the Centre for Migration Studies, having looked at forced labour
across the construction, agricultural, contract cleaning and care sectors found that,
certainly as far as construction was concerned, the victims involved were exclusively male.
In agriculture, there was a mixture of men and women involved. As far as domestic and
care sectors are concerned, it is predominantly women.134
93. There was also considerable evidence presented to us of trafficking in children. While
there is no doubt that girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation, NGOs and children’s
charities suggest that trafficking for the purposes of domestic servitude is more common.
NGOs identify a particular problem with children coming from within African
communities for this purpose,135 and they also identify the trafficking in children from
Eastern Europe and East Asia.136 One issue which arises in regard to children relates to age
disputes. Yet evidence provided to us during this inquiry suggests that this problem is not
as intractable as it might seem: “there are psychological and social work assessments you
can get to determine the age of the child … We have got very experienced social workers
… it is not that onerous to establish the age of a child.”137
94. In addition, evidence emphasised the importance of not taking figures relating to adult
trafficking at face value, since although “at the time of identification the woman was over
134 Q 53
135 Q 21
136 Appendix 14.
137 Q 35
34 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
18, they may well have been under 18 and signalling a trend in child trafficking much
earlier on.”138
Trafficking push and pull factors
95. Factors such as globalisation, poverty and humanitarian crises all impact on the
problem of human trafficking. Ms Christine Beddoe, Director of ECPAT UK, said that the
vulnerability of victims stems from “the much broader issue of poverty, lack of opportunity
and gender inequality [in the country of origin] so we have to discuss prevention strategies
among a much broader framework.”139 Trafficked children often “come from countries
where there is civil unrest so they are orphans and the issue of consent is problematic for
our job but particularly for them.”140 In addition, an example given by the TUC shows that
structures of debt bondage ensure that problems relating to poverty can persist in the UK
for some time:
“One example I can think of is 24 Polish citizens who were brought into this country
on the basis that they would be working for £10 an hour, which in Polish terms is a
tidy sum of money, and found themselves working supposedly on the minimum
wage but, in fact, having unlawful deductions from that sum. As one of them said to
me, the problem is they have to somehow make it work because what savings they
had they actually spent in coming to this country, but they are constantly in a
poverty trap and, because of linguistic problems as well, they are finding it very hard
to break away from the employer.”141
96. With regard to trafficking for labour, one witness argued that restrictive immigration
laws and policies within the UK cause a shortage of low-paid domestic workers, whereas “if
those people were allowed to come in legally there would not be so much demand for
traffickers to feed off”.142 While this may be true in some situations, there was also evidence
submitted which indicated that the problem lay more with the demand rather than the
supply side of the dynamic, and in particular with the demand amongst unscrupulous
employers and ‘punters’ for trafficked women.143 This was exemplified in the labour
trafficking context by the following example also submitted by the TUC:
“We came across a group of Portuguese workers in Lincolnshire - so these are not
even A8 entrants; they had had a legal right to live and work in this country for years,
entirely unfettered - and they told us that they had had to buy fake Portuguese
passports to pretend to their employers that they were illegal Brazilian immigrants
pretending to be Portuguese, so that the employer would employ them knowing that
they were illegal and therefore were more exploitable, rather than saying to the
138 Q 25 [Ms Beddoe]
139 Q 24
140 Ibid.
141 Q 162 [Mr Bamford]
142 Q 62
143 Q 97
Human trafficking 35
employer: ‘I am a legal migrant; I have a perfect right to be here, just pay me my
wages.’”144
EU expansion and its possible implications
97. Of the 84 victims rescued during Operation Pentameter, “about 25 were from
European countries. One or two were from the emerging European countries, but the vast
majority were from member states or people already within the EU.”145 While the impact of
the impending accession to the EU of Romania and Bulgaria cannot be predicted, there is a
concern that it will pose new challenges in the context of people trafficking :
“Obviously, if the EU enlarges and people migrate, it is a different situation than if
they are coming outside of the EU. The important point to make is that when dealing
with people in these situations, although legally there are differences we try to take a
victim-centred approach to people who come before us … This is a new area of
work, something that five or ten years ago perhaps people very rarely talked of; but it
is a major challenge for us, and we are determined to do what we can to meet it.”146
On our visit to Italy we were told that Romania was one of the main source countries for
women trafficked into Italy for sexual exploitation. During that visit two members of the
Committee went out with night-time outreach teams and found that Romanian women
made up a significant proportion of those on the streets. We are concerned that criminal
gangs from Romania and Bulgaria could make use of the expansion of the EU and freedom
of movement provisions to traffic girls and women into the UK from these countries with
greater ease. We urge the Government to work with these countries to inform and
educate girls and women of the dangers that arise from accepting “job opportunities”
without going through the proper channels.
144 Q 181
145 Q 95 [DCC Maxwell]
146 Ibid.
36 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
5 Prohibition, prevention and law
enforcement
Prevention activities
In source states
98. The Government funds and implements various programmes in source states for the
purpose of prevention. For instance, DfID has provided £8.9 million to the ILO’s
International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) to deal with child
trafficking in South East Asia.147 The fund was used for awareness-raising, reintegration of
victims, education, and other activities. The FCO also communicates with source states
such as Bangladesh and India to raise awareness of the danger of trafficking.148 It has also
funded anti-trafficking and capacity building programmes in such countries as Albania,
Bosnia and Turkey.149
99. For the future, the Government intends to carry out more awareness-raising campaigns
and publicise successful UK prosecutions for trafficking offences in source and transit
states to send out a clear message to traffickers.150
100. While we welcome the efforts being made by the Government in relation to
prevention, we consider that the current measures are not sufficient in light of the human
rights framework we have described in previous parts of this Report. We suggest the
following measures for improvement:
• In relation to awareness raising programmes, it has been noted that although they
address the process of trafficking, many of them do not cover the causes of
trafficking, which are often extreme poverty and unemployment.151 In order to
promote a holistic approach which addresses wider issues surrounding trafficking,
these awareness-raising programmes should also aim to enhance people’s
opportunities, and encourage community action and education. In so doing, the
Government should communicate with local authorities and community
organisations in source states as far as possible, as they are better suited to assess the
local needs. Further, the awareness-raising should also include information on how
to migrate legally to the UK so that migrants are not exploited by traffickers, and on
the rights of migrant workers in the UK.
• We recognise that UK embassies and consulates in source states have an important
role to play in preventing people from being trafficked. They should be more
proactive in providing information on the dangers of trafficking so that potential
victims have a better idea of what to expect. In order for staff at embassies and
147 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, op.cit., p. 8.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p. 9.
150 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
151 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of Responses, op.cit. p. 20.
Human trafficking 37
consulates to carry out preventive activities, appropriate training and awareness
raising should be conducted more rigorously so that they are better able to identify
potential and actual victims of trafficking and prevent traffickers from exploiting
them.
• Further, the Government should provide greater technical assistance to law
enforcement agencies in source and transit states so that they can detect and tackle
trafficking and other organised crimes more effectively.
Tackling demand
101. The Government acknowledges that it has focused on supply reduction in the past.
However, it has also expressed its commitment to tackle demand and implemented a
number of initiatives. For instance, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, created under
the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, operates a licensing system to discourage employers
from exploiting migrants for labour exploitation.152 In addition, the Immigration, Asylum
and Nationality Act 2006 has introduced a civil penalty regime for employers of illegal
migrants and an offence of knowingly employing illegal migrants to curb the demand for
trafficked people.153
102. The Government is aware of the need to change the attitudes and opinion of men who
use prostitutes towards prostitutes who may have been trafficked and get the message
across that trafficked women are not consenting to sexual activities.154 In order to address
this, it has distributed campaign letters and leaflets to men’s magazines and other places
under Operation Pentameter.155 It also intends to publish recommendations for a coordinated
strategy to deal with the harms caused by the prostitution market, on-street
prostitution and exploitation of children, young people and women.156 In Scotland, the
Scottish Executive intends to introduce legislation on street prostitution to curb the
demand.157
103. Despite the various initiatives already taken by the Government, most of those who
submitted evidence were of the view that the current strategy to reduce demand is
inadequate. In relation to the reduction of demand for prostitution, for instance, the
current strategy was considered to be inadequate as it only targets street prostitution and
puts less focus on other forms of prostitution which take place in the UK.158 The existence
of small or “mini” brothels and other establishments such as strip or lap dancing clubs also
serves as a pull factor.159 It is also much easier for girls and women who have been
trafficked to be hidden and remain isolated in these establishments. As to labour
exploitation, strategies to curb demand will depend on greater understanding of the nature
152 Ibid., p. 26.
153 Q 109
154 Q 97
155 Ibid.
156 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, op.cit., p. 9.
157 Ibid.
158 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses, op.cit., p. 11.
159 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
38 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
and extent of the problem. Furthermore, it has been argued that there is a culture that is
negative towards migrants, making it easier for employers and others to exploit them.160
104. Based on the evidence submitted to us, we propose the following measures to be taken
by the Government to reduce the demand for trafficked people.
105. An understanding of what makes the UK an attractive destination for trafficking
requires an in-depth analysis. The Government must ensure that the research it is
currently conducting and its future research effort contributes to a much clearer
understanding of demand for trafficked people both for sexual and labour exploitation
in the UK, including the reasons why individuals and businesses in the UK continue to
seek trafficked people.161
106. The Government should also disseminate information obtained through research
to those responsible for combating the practice both within and outside the UK so that
they can use it as guidance to devise and implement policies to prevent people from
falling into the hands of traffickers.
107. There is a need to tackle the culture of exploitation and commercialisation of sex, and
attitudes towards women.162 In this regard, we commend the imaginative publicity
techniques employed by Operation Pentameter to change the attitudes of men towards
women and raise awareness of the phenomenon of trafficking. However, we
recommend the authorities evaluate the effectiveness of these techniques. We
recommend that the Government conduct further programmes and awareness-raising
campaigns to change the attitudes of the general public towards migrants so that their
rights and freedoms are protected.
108. Those who employ trafficking victims should be named publicly so as to prevent
potential employers and others from doing the same. The Government should also
engage in a dialogue with sectors of the business community which might be at risk of
employing migrants illegally. A similar programme exists in Sweden and it has produced
some positive results.163
109. The minimum wage legislation, as well as measures against illegal employment,
should be rigorously enforced to reduce the demand for trafficked workers.164 The
establishment of a single body (such as the Fair Employment Commission) to enforce
workers’ rights would be a desirable first step.
110. We broadly accept the argument that restrictions on legal entry will not reduce the
incidence of trafficking. It has been argued that such restrictions divert migration into
illegal channels and therefore increase opportunities for traffickers.165 As advocated by
some,166 and provided for by Article 5(4) of the Council of Europe Convention, we
160 Qq 179 and 181
161 Q 6
162 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses, op.cit., p. 26
163 ibid.
164 Appendix 26
165 Tackling Human Trafficking – Summary of responses, op.cit.p. 24.
166 Appendices 18 and 26.
Human trafficking 39
consider that the development of lawful and managed migration channels, which
recognise the essential role that migrant labour plays in the British economy, is an
essential part of a successful anti-trafficking strategy. This can prevent the involvement
of traffickers and therefore violations of the human rights of victims.
UK legislation to prohibit trafficking
111. The UK has signed and ratified the Trafficking Protocol, and therefore is obliged by
international law to implement legislative measures to prohibit trafficking of human
beings. As already described, in relation to trafficking for sexual exploitation, the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, which came into force on 1 May 2004, established wide-ranging
offences of trafficking of people into, within or from the UK for sexual purposes, with a
maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment. Equivalent Scottish provisions are contained
in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. Legislative provision relating to trafficking for
labour and organ exploitation is contained in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of
Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, section 4 of which established offences also carrying a maximum
of 14 years’ imprisonment.
112. In addition to legislation specific to offences of trafficking for sexual and labour
exploitation, there are other pertinent laws applicable to trafficking for both sexual and
labour exploitation:
• The Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 established the Gangmasters Licensing
Authority (section 1). This body is responsible for setting up and operating a licensing
scheme for labour providers in agriculture, shellfish gathering and associated
processing and packaging sectors. This scheme opened in April 2006. The Act prohibits
anyone from acting as a gangmaster in the specified area without a licence (sections 6
and 12). In addition, it makes it an offence to enter into an arrangement with an
unlicensed gangmaster (section 13). The Act and the Gangmasters (Licensing
Authority) Regulations 2005 apply to all parts of the UK.
• Under section 15 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, employers
who employ illegal migrants are subject to a civil penalty. The penalty carries a
maximum of £2,000 per illegal migrant worker. Further, section 21 of the same Act
makes it an offence to knowingly employ illegal migrants with a maximum penalty of 2
years’ imprisonment and unlimited fine.
• The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 allows concerned authorities to confiscate criminal
assets. This legislation applies across the UK, and trafficking of human beings is
included as a lifestyle offence.167
• Article 3 (prohibition on torture) and Article 4 (prohibition on slavery) of the ECHR
can be invoked to address certain aspects of trafficking by virtue of the Human Rights
Act 1998.
113. There are also several provisions in the Children Act 1989 which are relevant to the
prohibition of trafficking, and the investigation, prosecution and punishment of traffickers.
Section 47, for instance, obliges a local authority to investigate if it has a reasonable cause to
167 Appendix 1, para. 19
40 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
believe that a child, who lives or is found in their area, is suffering from harm. Section 49
establishes an offence of knowingly and without lawful authority abducting children. In
relation to private fostering, section 67 authorises a local authority to inspect premises used
for private fostering, and section 69 grants them the power to prohibit private fostering
under certain circumstances.
114. Under the Children (Private Arrangements for Fostering) Regulations 2005, those
who plan to foster children privately must notify their local authorities of the
arrangements, and local authorities in turn must visit the premises and speak to the foster
carers and children. Further, the Children Act 1989 as amended by the Children Act 2004
obliges a local authority to raise awareness of the notification requirements with local
communities and to ensure that staff or volunteers encourage notification.
Conclusions on prohibition of trafficking
115. The Government considers that the current legislative framework to prohibit
trafficking for sexual and non-sexual purposes is in line with the Trafficking Protocol and
the EU Framework Decision on Trafficking.168 In analysing the evidence submitted, we
broadly agree that the current framework to prohibit and criminalise trafficking
complies with the relevant human rights obligations to prohibit the practice. In relation
to sentencing, 14 years’ imprisonment is longer than many European counterparts, and
therefore the penalty goes further than the regional and international standards.
116. Some specific concerns were however raised in relation to the current legislative
framework:
• Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004
makes it an offence to enter into the UK without valid passports and visas. This, it was
claimed, is detrimental to trafficked victims as many of them use false documentation
to enter.
• While the introduction of a new offence of knowingly employing illegal migrants is an
important step forward, a concern was expressed that this could increase the likelihood
that illegal migrants would be employed in ever more hidden forms of work.169 Further,
the Act is designed to punish the administrative failure to check documentation rather
than labour exploitation.170 This does not really address the core of the trafficking
problem, which is exploitation.
We recommend that the Government should give urgent consideration to the extent to
which these legislative provisions fail to address the specific circumstances of
trafficking and its victims.
117. More generally and crucially, almost all of those who submitted evidence to us argued
that, while adequate laws were in place to prohibit trafficking and prosecute traffickers, the
current legislative framework lacked a human rights approach enforcing and promoting
the rights of victims. A number of witnesses pointed out that anti-trafficking legislation
168 Ibid., para. 17
169 Appendix 26 and Q 181
170 Appendix 18
Human trafficking 41
could not be considered in isolation from the Government’s overall immigration
legislation and policy, which presented a key obstacle to the promotion of a human rights
approach taking into account the rights of victims. Victims may often find themselves
treated as immigration offenders and face enforcement actions such as detention and
removals. Further, restrictions are placed upon access to health care, public funds,
accommodation and other relevant support.171 There is also variation in the support
available to victims in different parts of the country, and between EU and non-EU
nationals. Individuals and NGOs alike argued that all of this serves as a barrier to
safeguarding their human rights.172
118. We agree with those who argued that the legislative framework on trafficking must
reflect a human rights approach. To begin with, the protection of victims of trafficking
should be incorporated into, and placed at the heart of, the legislative framework. This
will require the Government to review immigration laws and policies currently in place
in the context of their impact on the victims of trafficking . The focus should be shifted
from immigration control to the prevention of exploitation of migrants and workers,
and care of victims. Promotion and protection of workers’ rights through enforcement
of laws on slavery, working hours and the minimum wage, for instance, can also reduce
incentives for employers to exploit migrants and therefore reduce the demand for
trafficked people. In this regard, the Government must have due regard to its
obligations under Article 4 (prohibition on slavery) of the ECHR and Articles 6 (Right
to Work) and 7 (Right to Just and Favourable Conditions of Work) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.
Investigation, Prosecution and Punishment of Traffickers
119. We now turn to consider the various agencies which are in the forefront of UK law
enforcement in relation to human trafficking, and the operations they have undertaken.
Reflex
120. Reflex is a multi-agency taskforce on organised immigration crime established in
2000. Its remit is to co-ordinate operations against organised immigration crime, develop
intelligence and strategic planning, and target the infrastructure which supports such
criminality.173 It is chaired by a representative of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA) and includes representatives from the Home Office, the Immigration Service, the
Security and Intelligence Agencies, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the Crown
Prosecution Service (CPS) and UK police forces co-ordinated by the Association of Chief
Police Officers (ACPO) and its Scottish equivalent.174 Reflex receives £20 million annually
from the Home Office for its activities.175
121. While Reflex has focused on trafficking for sexual exploitation in the past, it now deals
with other forms of exploitation simultaneously. In September 2005, for instance, a new
171 Q 58 [Ms. Joshi]
172 Q 26
173 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, op.cit., p. 13.
174 Ibid.
175 Appendix 1, para. 24
42 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
Joint Workplace Enforcement Pilot was established in the West Midlands. It aims to
explore the scope of co-ordination among different agencies on the use and exploitation of
illegal migrant workers.176 In addition to on-going intelligence and enforcement related
activities, other initiatives under Reflex include national briefing and training of police,
immigration and other agencies, and distributing information on trafficking at ports of
entry for victims.177
122. In addition to its domestic operations, Reflex has established a large network of liaison
officers who work abroad to collect intelligence and prevent trafficking at source and
transit.178 It also provides funds to implement various anti-trafficking and capacity building
activities. Some activities include advertising campaigns targeted at potential victims,179
training of law enforcement agencies, and operational co-operation.180
SOCA
123. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 established the SOCA, which
started its operations in April 2006 and now leads operations conducted under Reflex.
Human trafficking is regarded by the agency as its second priority after drug trafficking.181
For the financial year 2006/2007, the SOCA will receive £416 million on resource funding
and £41 million in capital provision.182 The SOCA Board has determined that
approximately 25% of its entire resources and effort will be devoted to combating
organised migration crimes (next to 40% for class A drugs).183
124. In Scotland, the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency has been dealing with the issue of
human trafficking. The agency is to be renamed as Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement
Agency in April 2007 under the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act
2006. This agency will be a key partner of the SOCA in the fight against trafficking of
human beings.184
UK Human Trafficking Centre
125. The newest initiative taken by the Government is the proposed establishment of the
UK Human Trafficking Centre (UKHTC) in October 2006. The key function of the
UKHTC will be to improve the UK’s law enforcement response to trafficking of human
beings for sexual, labour and organ exploitation by:
• developing an ACPO strategy on trafficking;
176 Appendix 1, para. 35
177 Q 129
178 Appendix 1, paras. 32 and 33
179 Q 113 [Mr. Bolt]
180 Q 129
181 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, op. cit.,p. 14.
182 SOCA Annual Plan.
183 Ibid.
184 Tackling Human Trafficking – Consultation on Proposals for a UK Action Plan, op. cit, p. 12.
Human trafficking 43
• becoming a central point for the development of police expertise and operational cooperation;
• delivering a victim-centred approach to trafficking; and
• promoting the UK as a world leader in the prevention and investigation of
trafficking.185
126. The UKHTC will be based in Sheffield and become operational from 2nd October
2006. It will be overseen by an ACPO/multi-agency group, chaired by Deputy Chief
Constable Grahame Maxwell of South Yorkshire Police, and consist of 6 functional groups
(Training, Law Enforcement and Partner’s Education, Research, Victim Care, Intelligence,
and Operations and Interventions). The UKHTC will be staffed by representatives of the
police, SOCA, CPS, and Immigration Service.186
Operation Pentameter
127. Operation Pentameter was a nationwide Reflex-funded enforcement operation
launched in February 2006. Its main aim was to tackle trafficking for sexual exploitation, at
the same time raising awareness of the problem across all police forces in the UK. Some of
its activities included information campaigns in the media, distribution of leaflets and
information in 19 languages at major ports of entry such as Victoria Coach Station and
Dover, and training and education for police, immigration, and tour operators.187 Even
though only a small number of known massage parlours were targeted, in total 515
operations have been conducted, 232 people arrested with 134 charges laid, and 84
trafficking victims identified and rescued from sexual exploitation, 12 of whom were
minors.188 The Operation ended in June with the decision to establish the UKHTC.
Operation Maxim
128. Operation Maxim is an anti-trafficking initiative conducted by the Metropolitan
Police. It provides a dedicated response to Reflex issues, working in partnership with the
Immigration Service and Passport Service. It was established in response to the deaths of 58
Chinese people in a lorry truck in Dover. Between January 2005 and February 2006,
Maxim officers made over 150 arrests and seized over 1200 illegal passports.189 The Maxim
team also co-ordinates intelligence and operational developments with other specialist
departments, funded either wholly or in part through Reflex:
• the Human Smuggling Unit (HSU), based at Heathrow, provides both a reactive and
proactive response to organised immigration crime.
185 Appendix 5
186 Ibid.
187 Q 106 [DCC Maxwell] and Qq 107 and 115.
188 Q 122 [DCC Maxwell]
189 Website of the Metropolitan Police at http://www.met.police.uk/op_maxim/.
44 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
• the Metropolitan Police’s Clubs and Vice Unit (CO14): as part of its remit, this unit
deals with trafficking for prostitution, and conducts regular joint visits with the
Immigration Service to premises frequented by sex industry workers in central London.
Operation Paladin Child
129. Operation Paladin Child was a three-month scoping initiative (August-November
2003), led by the Metropolitan Police in partnership with the Immigration Service, the
NSPCC and Social Services. The main aim was to examine the impact of trafficking of
minors into the UK via Heathrow Airport. The study identified 1,738 unaccompanied
minors (mostly aged between 12-16) during that period, and found that the vast majority
of them were not trafficked or exploited.190 Nevertheless, as a result of this exercise,
awareness has been raised across agencies dealing with unaccompanied minors, and the
study has been able to identify the need to establish a multi-agency response to child
protection.191
130. Following on from this operation, a number of initiatives have been undertaken. The
Children’s Taskforce of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, for instance, has
provided specialist training to identify and protect children, and co-ordinated activities
with other agencies.192 Child Protection Officers are now based at Heathrow Airport and
both Child Protection Officers and Social Service staff are based at the Croydon Asylum
Screening Unit to ensure a more joined up approach.193 The Immigration Service, along
with the Department for Transport (DfT) is also setting up a voluntary code of practice to
be followed by airlines when carrying children who are either unaccompanied or traveling
with an adult who is not a family member.194
131. In recent times, the Government also set up minor teams, which consist of speciallytrained
immigration officers who conduct interviews with children.195 By September 2006,
600 staff will have received specialised training, and there will be a 24-hour, 7-day a week
system in place to assist child victims.196
Statistics on law enforcement in the UK
132. To illustrate the extent of law enforcement operations against trafficking and
organised immigration crimes in the UK, between April 2004 and March 2005, there were
343 Reflex led operations, which resulted in 1,456 arrests, 149 disruptions and the seizure
of over $5.5 million in cash (across immigration crimes as a whole).197 Figures for the
numbers of these operations relating to trafficking crime are not available.198 As of June
190 Metropolitan Police, Paladin Child: A Partnership Study of Child Migration to the UK Via London Heathrow, July
2004, pp. 7-8.
191 Ibid.
192 HC Deb,6 April 2005, cols. 1503W -1504W
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Appendix 1, para. 25
198 Q 119
Human trafficking 45
2006, there have been 30 convictions for trafficking for sexual exploitation.199 The length of
sentences has varied depending on the degree and extent of the crimes, but some longer
than the 14-year statutory maximum have been imposed in some serious cases when other
counts were added to the indictment.200
Conclusions on investigation, prosecution and punishment in the UK
133. The Government argues that its overall anti-trafficking policy is based on a “twintrack”
approach, which combines a victim-centred (or human rights) approach to
protection of victims and a tough law enforcement approach to prosecute traffickers, and
that this is the most effective way to combat trafficking.201 We acknowledge and applaud
the ongoing effort of the Government to improve investigation, and the bringing to
justice of traffickers, and agree that the second arm of the “twin-track” approach, the
tough law enforcement approach, is now being pursued with some effectiveness.
Operation Pentameter, in particular, has not only had success in bringing traffickers to
justice, but has raised media and therefore public awareness of the evils of trafficking. We
also warmly welcome the establishment of the UK Human Trafficking Centre to
provide further co-ordination and focus to law enforcement efforts.
134. Nevertheless, as we have already said in relation to the anti-trafficking legislative
framework itself, the main criticism levelled against the Government’s approach by
witnesses to our inquiry is that the first arm of the “twin-track” approach, the protection of
victims, has not been promoted and implemented effectively. In this context the UKHTC
must ensure as a matter of urgency that its objective of developing a victim-centred
approach to trafficking is articulated clearly and swiftly, that this objective remains a
central one, informing all its law enforcement and other activities, and that policies are
implemented consistently by the UK’s different police forces and enforcement
authorities. Enforcement of the law against trafficking must always make the interests
and the needs of the victims a primary consideration, and their protection should be at
the heart of any law enforcement measures. In our view, this is necessary to ensure that
the Government fully meets its human rights obligation to investigate, prosecute and
punish traffickers fully.
135. In addition, the UKHTC and all other authorities will need to address the concerns
expressed by many of those who submitted evidence that there is a lack of adequate
knowledge, training, co-ordination/communication and resources on trafficking
among law enforcement agencies, other concerned agencies, and NGOs at local and
national levels.202 Once again, this makes it difficult to achieve the “twin-track” approach
advocated by the Government.
136. While the legislative framework to prohibit trafficking is clearly in place, we share
the concerns of those who say that there have not been enough prosecutions under the
existing laws on trafficking,203 compared to the number of victims arrested, detained
199 Q 120
200 Appendix 1, para. 29.
201 Qq 94, 104, and 123 [Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Policing, Security and Community Safety, Home
Office, Vernon Coaker MP]
202 Q 9 [Ms. Hamilton], Q 65, and Qq 192 and 201 [Mr. Tudor]
203 Qq 7 and 26
46 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
and deported. Lack of awareness and training among law enforcement agencies may be
contributing factors for this. Also, we recommend that the courts should be more proactive
in issuing confiscation orders to seize assets from traffickers.
137. In the light of the scale of the problem, in terms of both victims and criminals, we
recommend that the Government takes steps to identify best practice in other countries
where the volume of both victims rescued and criminal convictions is higher.
Human trafficking 47
6 Protection of victims
138. In this Chapter we consider the effectiveness of the policies and mechanisms
established in the UK for the protection of the victims of trafficking, and how they can be
improved. In our view this is the most important human rights question falling within the
scope of our inquiry, and the protection of victims should be the starting point from which
all other policies relating to trafficking, such as the legislative framework to prohibit
trafficking and enforcement of the law against traffickers, which we have already discussed,
should flow. A victim-centred approach, which the Government claims it is seeking to
adopt,204 is not identical with an overall human rights compatible strategy against
trafficking, which comprises a mixture of obligations. Protection of victims must
nevertheless be firmly at the centre of any such strategy. This conclusion would appear to
be borne out by the comparative example of the Italian approach to combating trafficking,
which we also describe in this Chapter.
Identification and referral of victims
139. In the first instance it is clearly of vital importance, within a human rights approach to
the issue of trafficking, that strategies are developed to ensure that those persons who have
been the victims of human trafficking be properly identified. Identification, after all, is not
only the first step towards generating better intelligence and securing the criminal
prosecution of traffickers and exploiters, it is also essential to ensuring that victims’ human
rights are protected through the provision of appropriate social services and other support.
140. There are a number of reasons why victims of trafficking may not wish to identify
themselves as such to officials – clearly fear of reprisal from their trafficker or exploiter is a
significant factor. In addition, evidence suggests that in many cases, victims who are in the
UK illegally are concerned that if they come forward, they will simply be returned to their
source state, and potentially also charged and punished for a migration offence. Victims of
trafficking who come from different cultural backgrounds may experience a distrust of
police or other officials, stemming from the corruption of such organisations in their
countries of origin. There is also, in many cases, a desire to avoid returning to their home
country, which may involve both letting their family and friends know what has happened
to them and being placed back in a position of poverty and increased vulnerability,
including to re-trafficking. For some victims, moreover, the reason they may be reluctant
to identify themselves to authorities as trafficked is because there is insufficient incentive in
terms of the treatment afforded to them in the UK to render this worth pursuing,
particularly in light of its attendant risks. Finally, it is perfectly possible that, even if stopped
and questioned (especially when this occurs at the point of entry only), they may genuinely
not yet be aware of what is happening to them.205 This is particularly so in cases where the
victim is a child.
141. These obstacles to victim self-identification do not preclude strategies designed to
provide information to vulnerable persons and to encourage victims to seek out sources of
204 Q 94
205 Q 52 [Ms Patel]
48 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
assistance directly. In addition, though, they enhance the need for training those officials
most likely to encounter victims of trafficking in successfully identifying them, rather than
waiting for self-referral. Dedicated training regimes have been implemented for police,
immigration service and social services officers, and the Home Office Crime Prevention
Unit has developed an anti-trafficking toolkit:
“Since 2005, all immigration officers have received awareness training on this subject
in the identification of victims as part of their induction training. Guidance
documents are available to them setting out who to contact and what services are
available. Trafficking profiles are in use in all of our intelligence units up and down
the country, and the Home Office has an online tool that is now available to
immigration staff or to assist them in the process. In terms of the victim, they are
always spoken to in their own language. Whatever the language, they will always be
interviewed in that language. Social worker teams are in place at five ports and also
screening units, basically to help with the way the person is handled, particularly the
needs of unaccompanied children. We have set up minors teams, which are
specially-trained teams of immigration officers in interviewing techniques of smaller
children, unaccompanied children. Their training is very specialised and it tries to
get them to recognise the triggers in the process. It will help them not just to identify
the victims but also the perpetrators. By September this year, 600 staff will have
received that specialised training so that there is a 24-hour, 7-day a week system in
place by which they refer to local authorities for assistance in placing the child.”206
142. In addition, Operation Pentameter “did look at ports and … had posters and training
of immigration and police officers which gave them profiles of what a trafficking victim
might look like.”207 Operation Paladin Child involved profiling nationalities and ages of
children who were not met at ports and then asking social services to go and look into
those children and see what was happening to them.208 These specific examples suggest
recognition of the need for further training in the identification of victims of trafficking, as
well as the creation of greater will to ensure that this training is provided and taken on
board.
143. However, evidence provided to us suggests that the overall picture is one in which,
despite many examples of localised good practice, there is a lack of a standardised response,
little effective cooperation between agencies, and, crucially, no centralised data collection of
numbers of victims, and no clearly defined policy statement on action to be taken to
protect victims:
“There are a number of guidance documents, some of which are quite good. The
Crime Prevention Unit of the Home Office has a good anti-trafficking toolkit. Anti-
Slavery has produced a very good toolkit about how to spot a trafficked person, and
actually, interestingly enough, the immigration services' recent “Children Arriving in
the UK” document is very good at describing what trafficking is and which countries
are likely to use trafficked children, but then there is a holding process, so at the
206 Q 113
207 Q 60
208 Q 62
Human trafficking 49
moment if these children and adults get seen at the airport or at the port of entry
they may well come into the category of trafficking but no-one is actually nationally
collecting together a database of those people.”209
144. A variety of systemic, procedural and cultural issues arise with regard to the lack of
multi-agency cooperation aimed at combating human trafficking. There seems widespread
acceptance that “[t]here are a number of agencies that should be involved in the
identification of victims - the police and immigration but also social services [and] health
professionals, prison officers, probation, the CPS”.210 Some steps have been taken towards
better cooperation. However, despite these encouraging developments, it has been argued
that such measures must take place “right across the country at points of entry” in order to
be effective.211 Concerns have also been expressed that there seem to be no plans to
continue nationwide monitoring now that Operation Pentameter has come to an end.212
One witness reflected the consensus, calling for a “UK-wide system of identification and
referrals, which is what the OSCE recommends”.213 Such a system should encompass
authorities likely to come into contact with victims once they are in the country, such as
social services and health authorities.
145. In addition, evidence suggests that there may be cultural obstacles to identification
and referral within governmental agencies whose guiding imperatives tend not to revolve
around victim protection. Of the 387 referrals to the POPPY Project last year, fr example,
“only 16 were made by immigration. The vast majority were by the police and NGOs.”214
This suggests that, despite the initiation of training on identification, more work needs to
be done to assist immigration officials in recognising trafficked persons as victims of crime
and human rights abuse, rather than as migration offenders. In the absence of this training,
evidence provided to us suggests that people who have been trafficked into the UK may not
be asked appropriate questions by officials, and as a result will fail to be identified as
victims. Various witnesses provided anecdotal evidence of trafficking victims having been
sent immediately to detention facilities, to await expedited removal along with nontrafficked
illegal migrants. Once in these removal centres, moreover, the likelihood of
identifying persons as trafficked is significantly lessened: it is therefore essential that
removal centre staff are fully trained in identification of victims.
146. Despite the improvements which have been made to enable trafficking victims to
be identified, we agree with those who argued that further significant progress is
required so that they can reliably receive protection and co-operate with law
enforcement authorities. The law enforcement agencies must work closely with local
authorities, NGOs, and other members of civil society in this regard, and further
development of training, especially on a multi-agency basis, is required, including for
the judiciary and the CPS. We also agree that a national identification and referral
system should be established in line with OSCE recommendations. We believe the
Government should fund a public outreach and awareness campaign through
209 Q 66 [Ms Finch]
210 Q 65
211 Q 36 [Ms Beddoe]
212 Q 65
213 Q 66 [Ms Joshi]
214 ibid.
50 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
advertising and the use of a freephone number for victims to self-refer and for those
who use prostitutes to refer women whom they think may have been trafficked. Such
measures would ensure that the UK was in line with the requirements of Article 10 of
the Council of Europe Convention, which requires member states to establish an
effective system of identification and referral and to implement training among law
enforcement agencies.
147. There is, of course, one further way in which victims of trafficking may be identified,
which is via referrals or ‘tip-offs’ from clients who purchase their sexual services, or who
frequent establishments where others make such purchases. We were told at the Poppy
Project that referrals have been made in this way.
148. This presents a dilemma since on the one hand police strategies to quash demand
adopt a zero tolerance approach to those who purchase trafficked women’s sexual services
(with rape being suggested as a possible charge) while on the other hand those who use
prostitutes can provide a vital source of intelligence, as well as a route to rescuing trafficked
women, and must be encouraged to come forward.215 While sexual intercourse without
consent is clearly an offence, we consider that men who have used the services of
trafficked prostitutes should not be discouraged from reporting to the authorities their
suspicions that the women concerned may have been trafficked. While we note and
welcome Mr Coaker’s view that those who genuinely come forward to identify
trafficking victims would not be prosecuted for rape,216 it is clearly inconsistent for the
authorities to suggest that men who use the services of a prostitute who has been
trafficked will be prosecuted for rape, especially given the legal obstacles to successful
prosecution, and at the same time urge such men to report such activity to the
authorities or a helpline. While we understand and recognise the reasons why
politicians of all parties have called for prosecution of such men for rape, it does appear
that this may have been counter-productive. We would welcome further clarification of
the Government’s position on this question in its response to this Report.
149. When identified, victims of trafficking should be promptly informed of their
rights in the UK. Such information on rights under the ECHR and other instruments to
which the UK is a party should also be disseminated as widely as possible, in cooperation
with human rights organisations and other representatives of civil society,
among sectors of the population which may include trafficking victims, to encourage
them to report cases of human rights abuses with confidence and ease. In this respect
we commend an initiative of the Home Office to distribute a document on workers’
rights, published by the TUC, to Accession 8 workers.217
150. In relation to child victims of trafficking, we welcome the initiatives which have
been taken so far to assist in identifying them, such as the Operation Paladin Child and
the establishment of minor teams at Heathrow Airport. We recommend that
consideration should be given to the extension of such initiatives to other major rail, air
and sea ports of entry to the UK, so that the Government can properly monitor the
215 Qq 101–102
216 Q 102
217 Q 185
Human trafficking 51
flows of trafficked unaccompanied minors and better ensure that they are identified
whenever possible on arrival in the UK.
Protection of victims’ privacy and identity
151. Under Article 11 of the Council of Europe Convention, as already explained, member
states must protect the privacy and identity of victims. In the UK, the Data Protection Act
1998 may be invoked for this purpose.218 However, various instances have been reported
where victims’ privacy has been invaded during court proceedings and they have been
traumatised as a result. Protective measures in court, for instance, are ad hoc and not used
systematically and consistently.219 The decision to employ them is a judicial one, and judges
do not necessarily have adequate knowledge of the particular needs of trafficked victims.
One of the trafficked women we met on our visit to the Poppy project had found her
experience of giving evidence against her trafficker a highly traumatic one in the absence of
measures to protect her identity. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
contains provisions allowing for more sophisticated witness protection programmes to be
established in the UK, though we did not receive evidence detailing how these provisions
might be used in trafficking cases. We urge the Government to address the question of
protecting victims’ identities in court proceedings, through judicial training if
appropriate.
152. Further, while the media has played, and continues to play, an important role in
raising awareness of trafficking in the UK, some coverage has also been criticised as being
prurient and showing little consideration for victims’ on-going safety.220 Examples include
reporters being notified in advance of police raids and the publishing of the names and
whereabouts of the victims.221 In order to discourage media practices which may affect
the safety of victims, the Press Complaints Commission should have, and use, wider
powers to protect the privacy of victims, as breaches of its Code.222
Initial and early treatment of victims
153. Once a victim of human trafficking has been identified by the UK authorities, a whole
new range of problems arises—as a police officer said to one witness, “What do we do?”223
The evidence provided to this inquiry indicates that many services simply do not have the
capacity to respond to the needs of victims:
“In many cases the police are having to go to their own budgets to accommodate and
support women, which we say is an incorrect use of police resources, and trafficking
is one of those crimes for which the police do not have performance indicators and
218 Appendix 25, para. 40
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid., para. 41.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., para. 44.
223 Q 61
52 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
are loath to divert the resources outside of the specialist anti-trafficking unit. They
will just not have the time and the resources to make that identification.”224
154. At present in the UK there is no nationwide support and protection scheme in place
for victims of trafficking but “if you do not have the support agencies to refer those women
and children to you are in a bind as to exactly what to do.”225 The current level of support
provision may be somewhat clearer when the results of Operation Pentameter are
published later this year:
“One of the issues around Pentameter was that we asked for an assessment to be
done by each force of what the social services provision was or specialist provision in
their area, and if they did rescue a person where they would intend to put that
person. There were a different range of agencies, some governmental, some nongovernmental,
and some social services. Some involved charitable organisations such
as CHASTE, churches in Europe and the Salvation Army. There are different refuges
in different parts of the country.”226
155. As things stand, the current approach to victim assistance relies to a large extent upon
the Poppy Project. This project provides safe accommodation for trafficked women, run by
Eaves Housing in London. It can cater for a maximum of 25 women at one time. Entry to
the Poppy Project is determined on what many of those giving evidence to this inquiry
considered to be overly narrow criteria – in particular only women who have been
trafficked for sexual exploitation and who have been involved in prostitution within the
last 30 days are eligible. That said, we heard on our visit to the Poppy Project that it does
not find these criteria too problematic, particularly as it has the discretion to be flexible in
some cases (15 of the 99 women accepted for accommodation under the scheme between
2003 and 2006 did not in fact meet all the criteria). But some eligible women have had to be
turned away due to a lack of space. It was suggested to us on our visit that the Poppy
Project is half the size it needs to be, properly to meet the demand for its services, and that
similar projects need to be established in other cities. We believe there is clearly
insufficient capacity in the system to provide shelter and specialist support services for
the women who need them, and we urge that capacity be expanded as a matter of
priority.
156. Once admitted to the Project, women have access to counselling and advice, as well as
medical services and safe accommodation. They will be helped to purchase basic clothing,
invited to social events and introduced to health, education and English language services.
Bearing in mind that 85% of those involved in prostitution come from outside of the UK,227
trafficked women who come to the Poppy Project need and have the benefit of interpreters.
The Project is also developing its use of cultural mediators to assist women from diverse
cultural backgrounds to understand and deal with what is happening to them. While the
Home Office has agreed to continue funding the Poppy Project until 2008, its funding
position remains dependent upon regular review. Inevitably, this makes long-term
planning difficult for those involved with the Project, and does little to create a feeling of
224 Ibid.
225 Q 66 [Ms Joshi]
226 Q 132 [DCC Maxwell]
227 Q 19
Human trafficking 53
stability and security for the women involved in the scheme. We believe it is essential that
security of funding is provided for projects of this sort.
157. Alongside the Poppy Project, there are also a number of other NGOs and voluntary
organisations that seek to offer assistance to victims of trafficking (including, in Glasgow, a
new centre working specifically with trafficked victims228). However, much like the Poppy
Project, these organisations remain in an uncertain financial position and frequently report
that they are not able to provide as much assistance as they would like, or as they believe is
required. The importance of these organisations at all stages of the process should not be
underestimated: they often “encounter [trafficking victims] first, whether they are
community workers, NGOs, people in churches or in anti-racist groups”.229 And the task
faced by these bodies is particularly difficult because “a lot of women from other countries
do not have the same understanding of social work services and other NGOs that women
have in the UK, so there is a bit of mistrust”.230
158. For women who do not secure access to the Poppy Project, avenues of less
coordinated support remain available. Women who are from the EU are entitled to claim
housing benefits, and women who are able to claim asylum may qualify for support and
accommodation from the National Asylum Support Service. In both cases, however, this
provision does not ensure safe accommodation.231 In addition, they may be eligible for
further support, depending on their migration status and their ability to lodge a compelling
case for an asylum application. People trafficked into the sex industry may also benefit
from the support of sex worker outreach projects, and may be able to access medical
services through them. Victims of sex trafficking must have specialist support.
159. Beyond these issues of immediate housing, food and medical assistance, a further
question arises regarding the level of legal assistance given to victims of trafficking. There
are difficult questions relating to funding of legal assistance for victims who wish to make
asylum claims upon their discovery. Evidence to our inquiry expressed concerns about the
impact of legal aid restrictions, which have “resulted in many asylum applicants being
unable to obtain access to good quality legal advice and representation at all stages in the
asylum process.”232 One witness, for example, was concerned that “if we cut off legal aid
after a certain number of hours in investigating a woman's immigration claim that might
also be discriminatory because the cases of trafficking tend to be more complicated and it
takes longer to get the information from the individual.”233 There was also some concern
expressed regarding the quality of the initial legal assistance that was being provided to
victims of trafficking, the following being a situation described as typical by one witness:
“They were given access to legal representation but the information that we got from
the POPPY Project who interviewed those women was that the duty solicitor was not
really in a position to give them much advice or guidance. There was not any
228 Q 18
229 Q 6 [Ms Dudley]
230 Q 19 [Ms Hamilton]
231 Appendix 10, para. 55
232 ibid., para. 68
233 Q 70
54 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
assessment of whether an appropriate adult might be needed for women who were
clearly quite vulnerable and intimidated…”234
160. Given the trauma that is attendant upon the experience of being trafficked, many
victims may not be in a position to assess whether they wish to pursue such prosecution, or
to assist police in their investigations, immediately upon their rescue. While women who
are admitted on to the Poppy Project are given 28 days within which to decide whether
they wish to take part in the investigation, there is evidence that others are not given the
benefit of a similar period of reflection delay, with many being removed from the UK
within 24 to 48 hours, unless they are able to claim asylum.235 As noted above, there is a
concern that many victims of trafficking are simply not recognised as such by the
authorities and so are treated and removed as illegal migrants. What is more, even in those
cases where it is recognised that a person has been a victim of trafficking, there are no
automatic guarantees that removal proceedings will be held in abeyance pending their
decision on whether or not to assist the authorities with further investigations. Decisions to
allow victims who are not part of the Poppy Project to remain temporarily in the UK are
generally taken by the authorities on a case-by-case basis. Witnesses expressed some
concerns about this approach:
“if we were able to categorically say to women: ‘You are entitled to this assistance
from us for this period of time’ it would allow women breathing space and they
would not be concerned about their immediate future or whether they were going to
be immediately deported back or remain in police custody. It would go some way
towards offering reassurance which women need to have within that initial period of
contact with the authorities…Even to offer them that level of support and that
categorical reassurance for even just four weeks would be very important in building
up women’s ability to trust workers and to begin to slowly disclose what has
happened to them.”236
Victims of trafficking, upon discovery, should have the opportunity to report their
experiences to the police and to ask that, where possible, steps be taken against their
traffickers or exploiters.
161. In addition, witnesses also noted that there was some evidence to suggest that linking
victim support to police co-operation could be counter-productive not only in terms of the
victim’s recovery, but also in terms of securing convictions, since it can be attacked by
defence lawyers as an incentive to testify.237
Specific issues relating to children
162. Children are not eligible for entry to the Poppy Project. In April 2004, a safe house for
16 and 17 year old girls who had been trafficked was opened in Sussex. It was, however,
closed only a few weeks later, in part due to a lack of referrals from the local authority. No
similar schemes have been undertaken since. As a result, the support of child victims of
234 Q 68
235 Appendix 10, para. 47
236 Q 16 [Ms Andrew]
237 Q 69 [Ms Biden]
Human trafficking 55
trafficking falls to be dealt with under the general obligation imposed on local authorities
by virtue of the Children Act 1989. This imposes a duty to safeguard and promote the
welfare of children who are in need within its area and to provide services with a view to
assisting these children.
163. In the context of trafficking, reliance on this general approach can, however, be
problematic: “social services have to take these children on but do not really know what to
do, so we have case material of trafficked children being put in semi-independent,
inadequate accommodation without a lot of support.”238 We were told on our visit to the
Poppy Project that, while there are some pockets of good practice, the support offered to
trafficked minors is generally of a poor standard, with cases being encountered where
young women disappear without receiving any support. In their evidence to the
committee, both ECPAT UK and the NSPCC noted with concern that “most trafficked
children are put through an immigration and asylum process without recognition of their
special needs as victims of trafficking”.239
164. One suggested solution to at least some of the problems presented by initial and early
treatment of child victims was “the appointment of some sort of guardian or advocate for
that young person who has been trafficked, not by the voluntary sector but by the local
authority.”240 It was also suggested by witnesses that greater consideration should be given
to more “cultural and linguistic support for children who have been trafficked.”241 This
support should extend from first contact through to the long-term care of trafficked
children:
“One of the things that strikes us about the children we work with is the absolute
isolation that they feel … it does take a long time to build a relationship with a child,
for them to tell you his or her story and what has happened. We would ask for
sustained funding for good services for those children who can offer a variety of
needs in different areas: health, accommodation, a lot of befriending, a lot of
emotional support, so they can relate the abuse they have experienced and start
recovering.”242
165. The Government told us, in relation to the appointment of a guardian for trafficked
children during court proceedings, that local authorities had various relevant
responsibilities under the Children Act 1989, and expressed the hope that a situation in
which there was no one in a position to communicate a child’s point of view to a court
would be the exception. We nevertheless consider that the question of the support
available to trafficked children in legal proceedings, in dealings with other authorities,
and in their daily lives, is a matter which needs to be reviewed urgently. We are not
persuaded that, generally, local authorities have developed the necessary expertise to
cater for the very special needs of trafficked children.
238 Q 30
239 Appendices 14 and 21
240 Q 34
241 Ibid.
242 Q 37
56 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
Longer term treatment of victims
166. In the context of long-term care for victims of human trafficking, “[t]here is a range of
psychological and physical health issues that may emerge as well as the need for
counselling.”243 This support should be provided primarily as a response to the needs of the
victims. However, there may be a secondary reason why it could be useful and “that would
be to possibly present as a witness for the prosecution of traffickers and bring them to
account.”244 This was recognised by several witnesses:
“Obviously, where victims are prepared to give evidence, we need to give appropriate
levels of support. That involves supporting them in terms of emotional support but
also practical support in terms of payment for travel back to the UK if they have
returned home in the meantime, or providing them with support if they remain in
the UK pending giving evidence.”245
167. For those who have been victimised, there may be a strong need to see justice done
and to be involved in court proceedings against their traffickers, which should be facilitated
while ensuring that only suitable cases are brought to court. We have already considered
the question of witness protection for victims of trafficking. In some cases it may also be
necessary to liaise with police forces in the source state to ensure protection for the
witness or his or her family (although we recognize that ensuring this kind of
protection will not always be easy or possible).
168. Separate from the question of victims participating in cases against traffickers are
issues pertaining to legal proceedings that relate to the victims themselves. A number of
those who gave evidence to this inquiry raised the issue of a right to compensation, which
was felt to be particularly important in labour exploitation:
“I think, again, if somebody has been exploited, if they have not been paid any
money, the idea of them accessing their employment rights is also a bit illusory. It is
very difficult for domestic workers to present their argument in an employment
tribunal: they do not have any evidence; they will not have any contracts and often
they will not have had any tax and national insurance paid on their behalf, so their
case might not even be eligible to go to an employment tribunal … So, I think, in
trying to obtain and trying to access the rights that they should have, technically it is
very difficult in practice for them to do that.” 246
169. However, the difficulties faced by employees in obtaining redress against employers
who exploit labour migrants were also highlighted. Often, the immigration status of
victims “is such that unless they are employed as a domestic worker they are in breach of
the terms of their visas, so if they were to try and seek further support they need to be in
employment for their visa still to be valid.”247 For this reason—and the fact that workers
feel they must keep a constant stream of funds going back home to their families— it is not
uncommon that “the same domestic worker [is] abused by a number of employers because
243 Q 16 [Ms Dudley]
244 Ibid.
245 Q 126 [Mr Bolt]
246 Q 175
247 Q 197
Human trafficking 57
… they are a vulnerable person with a lot of responsibility back home.”248 It is important
for the authorities to be especially vigilant in this area because often such people “are not
recognised as having been exploited because they came here on a legal visa; they have rights
in theory but these rights cannot be accessed in practice.”249 Charities expressed
considerable disquiet about proposed changes to the domestic worker regime which
require domestic workers to enter the country with a named employer, their visa becoming
invalid if they leave their employ. In our view this change would mean that domestic
workers who are trying to flee a violent employer would be less likely to do so, and less
likely to approach public authorities for help or to report their abuse. We urge the
Government urgently to review these proposals and to ascertain their likely negative
impact on victims of trafficking.
170. The Government provides limited legal assistance to trafficking victims in the form of
state funded “legal help” to cover their initial asylum or human rights claim and “merits
based help” for any subsequent appeals against the Home Office.250
171. As for compensation to victims, the UK has a system of providing compensation to
victims of crime. They may, for instance, benefit from the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme, established under the Criminal Justice Act 1988.251 Under this scheme, victims
suffering from criminal injuries are entitled to compensation. Criminal injuries include,
but are not limited to, rape, assault, kidnapping, and abduction. In addition, section 130 of
the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2002 authorises the UK courts to make
compensation orders against perpetrators of crimes. Further, under the Victims of Violent
International Crime (Arrangements for Compensation) (European Communities)
Regulations 2005 (in force as of 1 July 2006), the UK provides access to compensation in
cross-border situations in EU Member States. Some of these crimes certainly are relevant
to trafficking of human beings.
172. Despite these mechanisms being available, as of July 2006 no compensation has yet
been awarded to a victim of trafficking.252 When traffickers are in prison and in no position
to pay, judges do not normally order compensation, and there is little point in them doing
so.253 As one witness put it:
“The right to compensation is provided for in the Palermo Protocol which the UK
has ratified and also in the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime
which the UK has ratified. It is also provided for by the Council of Europe
Convention which we hope the UK will sign up to in the future. At the moment, the
way the compensation mechanisms are working, there are no recorded examples and
no support provided that we are aware of where compensation has been awarded
either from the UK government or via traffickers where assets are seized as part of
the prosecution process. The court does have powers to award compensation in
248 Ibid.
249 Q 165
250 Appendix 25, para. 132
251 Followed by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c. 53).
252 Q 82 and Appendix 23
253 Appendix 25, para. 135
58 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
addition to custodial sentences. There is some scope for compensation to come from
the proceeds of crime, not out of the general government, Treasury pool.”254
173. Taking into account the various international instruments bearing on obligations to
provide compensation to trafficking victims which we have already set out in Chapter 2,
and the obligations which would be incurred under Article 15 of the Council of Europe
Convention if that were ratified, we consider that, for the avoidance of doubt, the
simplest way to achieve this would be to clarify the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Scheme rules as to the entitlement of trafficking victims to claim under the Scheme.
This could be dealt with as part of the current review of the Scheme.
Asylum and removal
174. A further issue which arises in regard to the long-term protection and legal
representation of victims of trafficking relates to their options in terms of residence within
the UK. The difficulties with obtaining legal aid and proper representation for asylum
claims discussed above clearly have a bearing in this context, since while the representation
is required immediately, its impact is decidedly longer-term. Even where the applicant has
been identified as a victim of trafficking, the asylum interviews and appeals hearings are
interrogative, rather than investigative. According to Amnesty International, the
Government does not always have procedures in place for protecting victims of trafficking,
enabling them to give an account of their experiences and investigating risks in source
states.255 Women who are admitted onto the Poppy Project are allowed to remain there for
up to 12 weeks, so long as they are co-operating with the authorities and are in a position to
be able to provide information that is relevant to any future prosecution of those who may
have trafficked and exploited them. Thereafter, they must either return to their source
states, or apply to remain in the UK via normal procedures. Under these procedures, the
UK operates a case-by-case system, under which each application to remain is considered
on its individual merits. Mr David Wilson of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate
told us that the immigration service would only take a decision to remove and repatriate a
victim of trafficking where it was appropriate to do so.256 In all cases, the option remains for
the victim to be allowed to stay in the UK, either on a temporary or a permanent basis,
most commonly because he or she was assisting in criminal proceedings or because it was
deemed to be unsafe to return them to their country of origin. There is, however, no
provision to conduct a formal risk assessment in all cases involving trafficking victims
prior to their return.257 Without such an assessment it is not possible to be certain that
removal or repatriation of a victim would be appropriate. We recommend that such
assessments be introduced.
175. Evidence frequently noted the difficulties with securing asylum for victims of
trafficking: “of the POPPY Project women who, of course, all were known to the Home
Office, none were granted asylum when they first applied for it but many of them were
granted it on appeal.”258 Of course, the fact that such leave was eventually obtained can be
254 Q 82
255 Appendix 10
256 Q 156 [Mr Wilson]
257 Appendix 2
258 Q 66 [Ms Finch]
Human trafficking 59
read in a positive light, but evidence presented to us frequently indicated that such cases
represented very much the exception, rather than the rule.
176. Mr Wilson also told us that most victims of trafficking are not deported and are not
subject to deportation procedure: rather they may be subject to administrative removal.259
We were assured that whatever the nature of the removal process, immigration officers
take the ECHR, particularly Articles 3 and 8, into consideration in making decisions.260 Mr
Coaker emphasised that the Government would not knowingly return a trafficking victim
to his or her country of origin if they were going to be re-trafficked,261 and that the
Government liaises with the governments, NGOs and others in source countries to make
sure that people who are sent back are not re-trafficked.262
177. In practice, however, from other evidence we have received it would appear that
trafficking victims who have entered the UK illegally may find themselves treated as
immigration offenders rather than victims of human rights violations.263 Mr Coaker
himself referred to six of the women rescued by the highly-publicised raid on the Cuddles
massage parlour as “immigration offenders”,264 though he later said that not all people
coming into contact with the authorities as a result of trafficking operations were treated as
such.265 The immigration authorities are said to be under pressure to meet removal targets,
and removal inevitably is going to be the priority for them.266 The process is speedy, and
this, coupled with a lack of adequate knowledge and training, makes it difficult to identify
victims properly, the first stage in assuring the protection of victims’ rights.267
178. Where victims of trafficking are removed and returned to their source states, it
appears that the UK authorities are limited in the measures they can take to ensure that
they receive sufficient care thereafter. The form of this work is primarily “through liaison
with governments, through the work we try to do with non-government organisations in
those countries, and with other groups.”268 While some respondents suggested that retrafficking
was not especially prevalent upon repatriation, other witnesses indicated that
this simply reflected a lack of knowledge and monitoring.269 What is more, others
suggested that the risk of re-trafficking once returned to a source state remained serious:
“In terms of people being returned from the UK we are aware from the POPPY
Project that they have anecdotal evidence to suggest that there is a high vulnerability
to retrafficking when people are returned from the UK. Approximately 20 per cent of
the women that they have been supporting they find are retrafficked. In one case a
person was resold by her family within three days of being returned so there is
259 Q 156 [Mr. Wilson]
260 Ibid.
261 Q 128
262 Q 136
263 Q 27 [Ms. Patel] Q 189, Appendix 16, para. 51, and Appendix 25, para. 27
264 Qq 127, 128
265 Q 154
266 Q 65
267 Appendix 16, para. 53.See also Qq 23 and 65, and Appendix 10, para. 31, and Appendix 23
268 Q 136
269 Q 78
60 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
certainly evidence emerging in returns specifically from the UK where retrafficking is
a big problem.”270
179. In addition, although witnesses often supported voluntary return, many expressed
concerns about the ‘safe list’ of countries from which asylum claims are presumed to be
unfounded (which includes key trafficking source states such as Moldova and Albania),271
as well as the IND forced returns programme which is currently looking at Vietnam, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola:
“We are extremely concerned by this particular programme given the nature of
information about children who we believe have been trafficked in from Vietnam at
the moment, all of whom have been brought into the UK from Vietnam but who are
in a very high risk situation. The risk to re-trafficking if they are not returned with a
long-term and monitored durable situation is something that we should be avoiding.
We should not be sending children back to a situation if we cannot guarantee and
monitor a long-term response for each and every child. The risk to children in
Vietnam of re-trafficking is extremely high and there is enough documented
information about this because of the trafficking patterns from Vietnam to China to
Hong Kong to Cambodia and there are very good organisations working on these
issues.”272
180. In relation to child victims, evidence submitted to us emphasised the potential conflict
between UK immigration and asylum policy and child protection principles, which dictate
that the primary consideration is the best interests of the child. Calls were made for the
Government to remove its reservation to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in
relation to immigration control.273 The previous JCHR pressed the Government to
remove this reservation,274 and in our view the need for this to be done is further
strengthened by its potential effect in relation to child trafficking victims if their best
interests are not to be compromised. In their submissions, both the NSPCC and
ECPAT UK emphasised the need for specialist support services and safe houses for
child victims of trafficking, and suggested that such victims should automatically have
a right of residence regardless of their willingness to take part in criminal
proceedings.275 We agree with these recommendations.
181. The Poppy Project said that a number of victims of trafficking are subjected to
immigration detention and deportation once they have provided evidence to the police,
and that deportations take place without any regard for the abuses that victims have
suffered in the UK and in source states, and without risk assessments.276 Although
unaccompanied minors are not returned to their source states as noted earlier, a concern
was expressed over the forced returns programme in Vietnam and other countries
270 Q 77 [Ms Biden]
271 Appendix 10, para.88
272 Q 45
273 Q 27, 39 & 40
274 Tenth Report of Session 2002-03, The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, HL Paper 117/HC 81, para. 87, and
Seventeenth Report of Session 2004-05, Review of International Human Rights Instruments, HL Paper 99/HC 264,
para. 49
275 Appendices 14 and 21
276 Appendix 23
Human trafficking 61
currently being promoted by the Home Office, which can be applied to victims of
trafficking.277
182. Such a practice can be seen as a violation of victims’ human rights, and Article 16 of
the Council of Europe Convention would oblige the UK to make sure that victims return
to their source states voluntarily and safely. The Government should conduct more
rigorous research on source countries in order to make an accurate assessment on
victims’ return. In relation to voluntary repatriation, as we have already suggested, the
Government must work closely with appropriate authorities and NGOs in source
countries to ensure that victims are able to reintegrate into their societies.
The Italian approach
183. Italy’s approach to dealing with human trafficking was commended to us both in
formal evidence and in informal discussions as one which unequivocally placed the
interests and welfare of trafficking victims at its centre, and was an example which might
be followed by the UK in devising a more human rights sensitive strategy in relation to
trafficking. We therefore decided to visit Italy to see what we could learn from their
practice. We held discussions in Rome and Venice, principally with officials from the
Communes, or municipal authorities, of those two cities responsible for the social
protection programmes provided for trafficking victims, as well as with representatives of
NGOs who provided support services under those programmes. Our discussions related
almost exclusively to the issue of trafficking for sexual exploitation, the predominant form
of trafficking in Italy, as it appears to be in the UK.
184. The cornerstone of Italian legislation to afford assistance and protection to victims of
trafficking is Article 18 of Legislative Decree 268/98 (henceforth “Article 18”). Enacted in
1998, this was described to us as the first specific anti-trafficking legislation adopted by a
European country. The law provides a right to a six-month residence permit and social
protection assistance to trafficking victims who co-operate with the authorities. Such cooperation
could take two forms, either a formal denunciation made by the victim to police
and then the giving of evidence against those accused of trafficking (the “judicial path”), or
the less formal giving of a statement to police in association with an application for a
permit made on behalf of the victim by social services or NGOs (the “social path”).
185. In connection with Article 18 a national freephone telephone number has been
instituted, which received nearly 500,000 calls from July 2000 to March 2006. Most of these
came from ordinary Italian citizens, but about 47,000 came from trafficking victims and
about 25,000 from the clients of victims, providing a major source of referrals for social
protection.
186. The initial six-month residence permit may be extended for one year or for a longer
period if required for judicial purposes. The underlying intention behind the system as
described to us was that while benefiting from temporary residence permits trafficking
victims can receive accommodation, and welfare, health and education services with a view
to integrating them into Italian society. Residence permits can therefore be converted into
work permits when victims obtain employment. No provision was made in Italy for
277 Q 45
62 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
reflection periods as such. In a sense, the residence permit itself provides a reflection
period. At the same time it was explained to us that it had been a conscious decision not to
appear to be placing pressure on trafficking victims by giving a deadline for co-operation
with the authorities.
187. The Italian authorities granted 851 residence permits under Article 18 in 2002. In
2003, they granted 848 permits, in 2004 436, in 2005 367, and in 2006 (up to the end of
May), 349. The drop in numbers from 2004 onwards came as a result of a change in the law
in that year, whereby integration of individuals into society was sought by encouraging the
issue of work permits rather than by renewing residence permits. Overall, between 1999
and 2006, 448 Article 18 social protection projects were operational throughout Italy.
Between 2000 and 2005, 9,398 women participated in projects, and 4,625 had been helped
to find employment. Most of the women assisted (52%) were from Nigeria, with significant
numbers also coming from Eastern European countries, mainly Romania, Moldova,
Albania and Ukraine.
188. Co-ordination and oversight of Article 18 social protection projects is undertaken by
the social services departments of local authorities, co-funded with central Government.
Some services are provided directly by local authorities, others by religious or secular
NGOs following submission of tenders to the local authority. In Rome the social protection
project “Roxanne” cost the municipality €1,400,000 a year, with the central Government
Department for Equal Opportunities contributing €120,000 in addition. This funded four
outreach teams to contact people on the streets, teams to provide legal and social
counselling, ten community shelters to house women who had escaped prostitution after
being trafficked, providing 55 places in total at any one time, as well as health and
educational provision. Approximately 5,000 women were contacted each year on the
streets of Rome (a figure which includes non-trafficked women as well as those who have
been trafficked), and, between 1999 and 2004, 328 women had been sheltered within
communities under the project. In Venice, we were told that 172 people had begun Article
18 social protection programmes since 1999, of whom 158 had successfully concluded
them. In both Rome and Venice an important role was played by so-called “cultural
mediators”, people usually of the same nationality as the victim who could understand her
experiences and explain to her the rights which she had within Italian society.
189. Aside from Article 18 social protection projects, Italy employs a variety of other
mechanisms in its anti-trafficking strategy. A new definition of the offence of human
trafficking was introduced into law in 2003, carrying a sentence of between 8 and 20 years
imprisonment on conviction, with more severe sentences in the case of aggravating
circumstances such as an offence involving a victim of less than 18 years of age. Italy also
has an assisted repatriation programme, working with the International Organisation for
Migration, for those victims who wish to return to source states. The programme seeks to
repatriate people in total safety, with occupational training to enable them to secure
employment in their home countries. Approximately 80 people a year were repatriated
under the programme, and we were told that none had been re-trafficked. Alongside this,
Italy also has a prevention programme involving aid for Eastern European countries: in its
first year, this programme covered Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and Albania, with
Bulgaria, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia also included in the second year,
ending in March 2006. Activities run under the programme included meetings with local
organisations and talks to schoolchildren, as well as involving the media and TV
Human trafficking 63
advertising campaigns, to get across the message that trafficking ruined lives. Significant
reductions had been achieved in the numbers of those trafficked from the four countries
included in the first year of the programme.
190. Though it is not easy to assess the scale of trafficking into Italy in comparison with
trafficking into the UK, we were highly impressed by the way in which the proactive
victim-centred approach adopted in that country has allowed such high numbers of
trafficking victims to be supported and ultimately integrated into Italian society. The
Article 18 social protection process also appears to have had a significant effect in securing
successful prosecutions of traffickers, by assuring victims that their security will not be
jeopardised if they denounce or give evidence against those who have trafficked them. If
victims feared they would be deported after co-operating with the authorities, we were told,
they would not be motivated to give such co-operation. Notwithstanding the difficulties of
unravelling the complex international criminal organisations involved in human
trafficking, in 2004, in Italy, 3,266 people had been reported to the judiciary for trafficking
offences, of whom 412 had been arrested. In 2005, 2,943 people had been reported,
resulting in 356 arrests.
191. Successful prosecutions of traffickers, along with prevention programmes in source
states, have reduced significantly numbers of women trafficked into Italy from Albania,
Moldova and Ukraine. This did not necessarily mean an overall reduction in numbers
trafficked, as new patterns of trafficking were emerging from other Eastern European
countries and from countries such as Thailand. But Italian officials, rightly in our view, did
not see this as an argument against taking action. Perhaps as significantly as the impact on
numbers trafficked from individual states, we heard that the successes of Article 18 and
associated policies had caused traffickers to moderate the previously brutal levels of
violence and psychological coercion which they employed against the women they
trafficked, both to make the women less likely to seek Article 18 protection and to reduce
the likelihood of them being convicted of trafficking offences.
192. We were assured that safeguards were present against the abuse of Article 18
protection. The principal safeguard was that a precondition of social protection assistance
was an investigation by the police into relevant offences, with the victim’s co-operation
taken into account. NGOs running social protection programmes had to be officially
registered, with checks every 6 months into organisations and individuals being afforded
protection. If people failed to follow the programmes provided for them, residence permits
could be revoked, although this occurred in a minority of cases. In Venice, for example, we
were told that 13% of those who had begun a social protection programme had failed to
complete it.
193. Nor did the Italian authorities consider that an immigration “pull” factor was
operating as a result of the support and assistance provided under Article 18. Claims for
social protection have to be supported by evidence of victim status as a result of specific
offences of trafficking, and residence permits are refused in the small percentage of cases
where such evidence is not forthcoming.
194. The Italian system is not always perfect in practice. We heard of isolated instances
where trafficking victims had been deported without being informed of their rights to
Article 18 assistance, and of the police being unwilling to accept the validity of the social
64 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
path to claiming a residence permit. The condition for Article 18 assistance of co-operation
with the authorities could also be criticised on the grounds that protection should be
afforded on the basis of need, not contingent on other factors. However, this criterion did
not appear to be applied in practice so stringently as to cause any noticeable deterrent
effect.
195. Despite these flaws, the overall picture we encountered in Italy was one of a concerted
and well-designed policy founded on the strong moral basis of the need to assist women to
escape from the servitude of trafficking for sexual exploitation, to which all other
considerations were secondary. This policy, applied energetically and with political and
administrative will by central and local government and NGOs, has not only served its
immediate purpose of reducing the suffering and misery of such women, but has also
materially assisted in bringing traffickers to justice. The numbers of trafficking victims
assisted in Italy, and the numbers of traffickers arrested, far exceed the comparable figures
for the UK. One reason for this, we believe, is that in Italy street prostitution is not
unlawful, which means that the victims themselves are both visible and accessible to the
outreach teams. While all elements of the Italian anti-trafficking approach may not be
transferable to the UK context, the fundamental philosophy behind it is one which we
found highly attractive and impressive. Its clear harmony with human rights principles
has had a profound influence on our thinking about human trafficking policy within
the UK, and we commend it as a model for our own Government in developing its
strategy against human trafficking. We further urge the Government to conduct its
own research into the effectiveness of the Italian approach.
Conclusions on protection of victims
196. In the course of this Chapter so far we have considered current practice in the UK in
relation to the protection of trafficking victims and found that, despite some welcome
improvements, evidence shows that the human rights imperative to protect victims still
takes second place in practice to other public policy demands, including in particular the
desire to control immigration. This clearly compromises the Government’s declared
intention to promote a victim-centred approach.278 The various recommendations we have
already made would all have the effect, in our view, of bringing the Government much
more fully into line with the relevant provisions of the international human rights
instruments to which the UK already subscribes, as well as going much of the way to
making it possible for the Government to sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Convention in good faith. We now summarise our principal conclusions and
recommendations in relation to the protection of victims, and give our views on those
Articles of the Convention which have been the focus of most attention and controversy,
and which have been cited by the Government as the principal reason for their delay in
deciding whether to sign the Convention, relating to recovery and reflection periods and
residence permits.
197. As we have made clear, despite the legislation in place to criminalise trafficking, there
is no specific legislation in the UK granting protection to the victims of trafficking.
Protection is given on a discretionary case-by-case basis, and on the condition that victims
co-operate with the authorities. While many of those who submitted evidence agree that
278 Q 154
Human trafficking 65
the Government has started taking some significant steps, and notwithstanding
assurances given to us, we consider that the current level of protection provided to
trafficking victims as a whole is still far from adequate. Either through legislation or
other means, effective protection of trafficking victims must be put on a far more
reliable basis in order to meet the UK’s human rights obligations.
198. More specifically, the Government needs to—
• improve and develop training in the identification of victims, and ensure that those
who are identified as victims of trafficking are not treated as criminals or
immigration offenders
• ensure a more comprehensive approach to the provision of basic support and
assistance to victims upon their discovery
• place finance for victim support and accommodation on a secure footing, although
its provision will extensively involve the experience, assistance and resources of
NGOs
• put adequate procedures in place to ensure that victims of trafficking are provided
with appropriate support (including interpreters and legal advice) to pursue
effectively an application for residence within the UK
• do more to assist those who are returned to their country of origin (or voluntarily
repatriated) to re-integrate into their home society without increased vulnerability,
particularly to re-trafficking.
Reflection periods and residence permits
199. We have carefully considered the concerns expressed by the Government about the
potential for reflection periods and residence permits, as provided for in Articles 13 and 14
of the Council of Europe Convention, to act as an immigration pull factor. The
Government has made no claim that they would create a pull factor in terms of actual
victims of trafficking.279 Given that trafficking takes place under conditions of coercion or
deception such a claim would not of course make sense. It is not credible to suggest that a
woman would voluntarily submit to indeterminate sexual slavery of the most brutal kind
for the purpose of obtaining UK residency. Instead the Government argues that a pull
factor could be created for those who would be willing to make fraudulent claims of
trafficking victim status.280
200. The bulk of the evidence submitted by NGOs in this inquiry suggests, however, that
such concerns are largely, if not entirely, unfounded. Nor did we find any evidence of a pull
factor resulting in fraudulent claims to have been trafficked arising from Italy’s Article 18
procedure. Safeguards exist within the Convention itself, so that reflection periods do not
have to be provided if fraudulent claims are made. We therefore do not accept that there
is any realistic likelihood that the Convention’s provisions relating to reflection periods
and residence permits would act as a pull factor for migration into the UK.
279 Q 142 [Mr Coaker]
280 Q 141
66 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
201. On the other hand, evidence clearly suggests that these provisions would perform a
vital role in ensuring that victims have appropriate access to basic information on what
their rights might be in terms of immediate support and protection and health care, in
terms of their right to claim asylum, and in terms of their right to legal assistance or to
compensation.281 The evidence also suggests the provisions would be helpful in ensuring
the eventual prosecution of traffickers.
202. We find the twin concepts of reflection periods and residence permits to be highly
attractive as guarantors of the protection of the human rights of trafficking victims and
of the provision of other protection and support measures to them. In Italy, as we have
noted, there is no provision for reflection periods as such, although temporary
residence permits provide de facto reflection periods, and have protected victims’
human rights effectively. However, especially given the safeguards contained in the
Convention, we consider that all the evidence supports the case for the UK to adopt
these provisions.
203. In the case of reflection periods, Article 13 of the Convention provides for them to be
a minimum of 30 days. Given the depth of trauma and suffering that many victims of
trafficking will have experienced, we share the view of those who consider that this period
will not be long enough in a significant proportion of cases for victims to recover and
decide whether to co-operate with the authorities. We understand the point made by the
Government that delays in co-operation with the authorities by victims may reduce the
likelihood of successful apprehension and conviction of traffickers, but the welfare of
the victim must be the paramount consideration. We consider that three months would
be an appropriate standard length of time for reflection periods.
204. We welcome the fact that renewable residence permits under Article 14 of the
Convention are to be granted if either a victim’s personal need makes it necessary or in
order for them to co-operate with investigations or criminal proceedings. The Article does
not specify the length of the temporary residence permits which must be granted under it.
Although we recognise that the UK is not bound by it, we recommend that the
Government uses the Council Directive on Residence Permits as a model for residence
permits for victims. This Directive obliges Member States of the EU to provide
residence permits of six months.
Signature and ratification of the Council of Europe Convention
205. We are firm in the belief that the UK should sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Convention. We can see no convincing argument against this course of action. While it
would be possible for the UK to construct a coherent human rights based approach to
tackling human trafficking outside the Convention, adherence to it in concert with the
other nations of the Council of Europe will in our view greatly strengthen the
framework of anti-trafficking policy in the UK, notably in relation to the core matter of
the protection of victims.
281 Q 58 [Ms Joshi]
Human trafficking 67
7 Conclusions and recommendations
The Government’s consultation on a UK Action Plan
1. We welcome the Government’s consultation on its National Action Plan to combat
human trafficking, and urge the Government to take the responses to that
consultation on board in order to promote an effective human rights approach to
combating trafficking. While this Report is not a formal response to the
Government’s consultation, many of our conclusions and recommendations mirror
those submitted to the Government during that consultation. We expect the
conclusions and recommendations contained in this Report to be given serious
consideration by the Government when it decides the contents of that Action Plan.
(Paragraph 10)
The scale and extent of the problem
2. We urge the Government to publish the research into organised crime markets
currently being conducted by Home Office researchers, which may assist in
providing a clearer picture of the scale and extent of human trafficking into the UK.
We foresee however a probable need for further follow-up research to be conducted
to scope the problem in relation to all forms of trafficking, and we urge the
Government to give priority to such research in order to give a more solid basis for
the development of anti-trafficking policy. (Paragraph 82)
Prevention measures in source countries
3. In light of the impending accession to the EU of Romania and Bulgaria, we urge the
Government to work with these countries to inform and educate girls and women of
the dangers that arise from accepting “job opportunities” without going through the
proper channels. (Paragraph 97)
4. We suggest the following measures for improvement of the Government’s actions
for prevention of trafficking in source countries:
• In relation to awareness raising programmes, it has been noted that although they
address the process of trafficking, many of them do not cover the causes of
trafficking, which are often extreme poverty and unemployment. In order to
promote a holistic approach which addresses wider issues surrounding trafficking,
these awareness-raising programmes should also aim to enhance people’s
opportunities, and encourage community action and education. In so doing, the
Government should communicate with local authorities and community
organisations in source states as far as possible, as they are better suited to assess
the local needs. Further, the awareness-raising should also include information on
how to migrate legally to the UK so that migrants are not exploited by traffickers,
and on the rights of migrant workers in the UK.
• We recognise that UK embassies and consulates in source states have an important
role to play in preventing people from being trafficked. They should be more
68 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
proactive in providing information on the dangers of trafficking so that potential
victims have a better idea of what to expect. In order for staff at embassies and
consulates to carry out preventive activities, appropriate training and awareness
raising should be conducted more rigorously so that they are better able to identify
potential and actual victims of trafficking and prevent traffickers from exploiting
them.
• Further, the Government should provide greater technical assistance to law
enforcement agencies in source and transit states so that they can detect and tackle
trafficking and other organised crimes more effectively. (Paragraph 100)
Tackling demand
5. The Government must ensure that the research it is currently conducting and its
future research effort contributes to a much clearer understanding of demand for
trafficked people both for sexual and labour exploitation in the UK, including the
reasons why individuals and businesses in the UK continue to seek trafficked people.
(Paragraph 105)
6. The Government should disseminate information obtained through research to
those responsible for combating trafficking both within and outside the UK so that
they can use it as guidance to devise and implement policies to prevent people from
falling into the hands of traffickers. (Paragraph 106)
7. We commend the imaginative publicity techniques employed by Operation
Pentameter to change the attitudes of men towards women and raise awareness of
the phenomenon of trafficking. However, we recommend the authorities evaluate
the effectiveness of these techniques. We recommend that the Government conduct
further programmes and awareness-raising campaigns to change the attitudes of the
general public towards migrants so that their rights and freedoms are protected.
(Paragraph 107)
8. Those who employ trafficking victims should be named publicly so as to prevent
potential employers and others from doing the same. The Government should also
engage in a dialogue with sectors of the business community which might be at risk
of employing migrants illegally. (Paragraph 108)
9. The minimum wage legislation, as well as measures against illegal employment,
should be rigorously enforced to reduce the demand for trafficked workers. The
establishment of a single body (such as the Fair Employment Commission) to
enforce workers’ rights would be a desirable first step. (Paragraph 109)
10. We consider that the development of lawful and managed migration channels, which
recognise the essential role that migrant labour plays in the British economy, is an
essential part of a successful anti-trafficking strategy. (Paragraph 110)
Human trafficking 69
Prohibition of trafficking
11. We broadly agree that the current framework to prohibit and criminalise trafficking
complies with the relevant human rights obligations to prohibit the practice.
(Paragraph 115)
12. We recommend that the Government should give urgent consideration to the extent
to which section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.)
Act 2004 and the provisions of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
concerning employment of illegal migrants fail to address the specific circumstances
of trafficking and its victims. (Paragraph 116)
13. We agree with those who argued that the legislative framework on trafficking must
reflect a human rights approach. To begin with, the protection of victims of
trafficking should be incorporated into, and placed at the heart of, the legislative
framework. This will require the Government to review immigration laws and
policies currently in place in the context of their impact on the victims of trafficking .
The focus should be shifted from immigration control to the prevention of
exploitation of migrants and workers, and care of victims. Promotion and
protection of workers’ rights through enforcement of laws on slavery, working hours
and the minimum wage, for instance, can also reduce incentives for employers to
exploit migrants and therefore reduce the demand for trafficked people. In this
regard, the Government must have due regard to its obligations under Article 4
(prohibition on slavery) of the ECHR and Articles 6 (Right to Work) and 7 (Right to
Just and Favourable Conditions of Work) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. (Paragraph 118)
Investigation, prosecution and punishment of traffickers
14. We acknowledge and applaud the ongoing effort of the Government to improve
investigation, and the bringing to justice of traffickers, and agree that the second arm
of the Government's “twin-track” approach, the tough law enforcement approach, is
now being pursued with some effectiveness. (Paragraph 133)
15. We warmly welcome the establishment of the UK Human Trafficking Centre to
provide further co-ordination and focus to law enforcement efforts. (Paragraph 133)
16. The UK Human Trafficking Centre must ensure as a matter of urgency that its
objective of developing a victim-centred approach to trafficking is articulated clearly
and swiftly, that this objective remains a central one, informing all its law
enforcement and other activities, and that policies are implemented consistently by
the UK’s different police forces and enforcement authorities. Enforcement of the law
against trafficking must always make the interests and the needs of the victims a
primary consideration, and their protection should be at the heart of any law
enforcement measures. In our view, this is necessary to ensure that the Government
fully meets its human rights obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish
traffickers fully. (Paragraph 134)
17. The UK Human Trafficking Centre and all other authorities will need to address the
concerns expressed by many of those who submitted evidence that there is a lack of
70 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
adequate knowledge, training, co-ordination/communication and resources on
trafficking among law enforcement agencies, other concerned agencies, and NGOs at
local and national levels. (Paragraph 135)
18. While the legislative framework to prohibit trafficking is clearly in place, we share the
concerns of those who say that there have not been enough prosecutions under the
existing laws on trafficking, compared to the number of victims arrested, detained
and deported. Lack of awareness and training among law enforcement agencies may
be contributing factors for this. Also, we recommend that the courts should be more
pro-active in issuing confiscation orders to seize assets from traffickers. (Paragraph
136)
19. In the light of the scale of the problem, in terms of both victims and criminals, we
recommend that the Government takes steps to identify best practice in other
countries where the volume of both victims rescued and criminal convictions is
higher. (Paragraph 137)
Protection of victims
20. Despite the improvements which have been made to enable trafficking victims to be
identified, we agree with those who argued that further significant progress is
required so that they can reliably receive protection and co-operate with law
enforcement authorities. The law enforcement agencies must work closely with local
authorities, NGOs, and other members of civil society in this regard, and further
development of training, especially on a multi-agency basis, is required, including
for the judiciary and the CPS. We also agree that a national identification and referral
system should be established in line with OSCE recommendations. We believe the
Government should fund a public outreach and awareness campaign through
advertising and the use of a freephone number for victims to self-refer and for those
who use prostitutes to refer women whom they think may have been trafficked. Such
measures would ensure that the UK was in line with the requirements of Article 10 of
the Council of Europe Convention, which requires member states to establish an
effective system of identification and referral and to implement training among law
enforcement agencies. (Paragraph 146)
21. While sexual intercourse without consent is clearly an offence, we consider that men
who have used the services of trafficked prostitutes should not be discouraged from
reporting to the authorities their suspicions that the women concerned may have
been trafficked. While we note and welcome Mr Coaker’s view that those who
genuinely come forward to identify trafficking victims would not be prosecuted for
rape, it is clearly inconsistent for the authorities to suggest that men who use the
services of a prostitute who has been trafficked will be prosecuted for rape, especially
given the legal obstacles to successful prosecution, and at the same time urge such
men to report such activity to the authorities or a helpline. While we understand and
recognise the reasons why politicians of all parties have called for prosecution of such
men for rape, it does appear that this may have been counter-productive. We would
welcome further clarification of the Government’s position on this question in its
response to this Report. (Paragraph 148)
Human trafficking 71
22. When identified, victims of trafficking should be promptly informed of their rights
in the UK. Such information on rights under the ECHR and other instruments to
which the UK is a party should also be disseminated as widely as possible, in cooperation
with human rights organisations and other representatives of civil society,
among sectors of the population which may include trafficking victims, to encourage
them to report cases of human rights abuses with confidence and ease. In this respect
we commend an initiative of the Home Office to distribute a document on workers’
rights, published by the TUC, to Accession 8 workers. (Paragraph 149)
23. In relation to child victims of trafficking, we welcome the initiatives which have been
taken so far to assist in identifying them, such as the Operation Paladin Child and the
establishment of minor teams at Heathrow Airport. We recommend that
consideration should be given to the extension of such initiatives to other major rail,
air and sea ports of entry to the UK, so that the Government can properly monitor
the flows of trafficked unaccompanied minors and better ensure that they are
identified whenever possible on arrival in the UK. (Paragraph 150)
24. We urge the Government to address the question of protecting victims’ identities in
court proceedings, through judicial training if appropriate. (Paragraph 151)
25. In order to discourage media practices which may affect the safety of victims, the
Press Complaints Commission should have, and use, wider powers to protect the
privacy of victims, as breaches of its Code. (Paragraph 152)
26. We believe there is clearly insufficient capacity in the system to provide shelter and
specialist support services for the women who need them, and we urge that capacity
be expanded as a matter of priority. (Paragraph 155)
27. We believe it is essential that security of funding is provided for projects such as the
Poppy Project. (Paragraph 156)
28. Victims of sex trafficking must have specialist support. (Paragraph 158)
29. Victims of trafficking, upon discovery, should have the opportunity to report their
experiences to the police and to ask that, where possible, steps be taken against their
traffickers or exploiters. (Paragraph 160)
30. We consider that the question of the support available to trafficked children in legal
proceedings, in dealings with other authorities, and in their daily lives, is a matter
which needs to be reviewed urgently. We are not persuaded that, generally, local
authorities have developed the necessary expertise to cater for the very special needs
of trafficked children. (Paragraph 165)
31. In relation to the involvement of victims in court proceedings against their
traffickers, in some cases it may be necessary to liaise with police forces in the source
state to ensure protection for the witness or his or her family (although we recognize
that ensuring this kind of protection will not always be easy or possible). (Paragraph
167)
32. In our view proposed changes to the domestic worker regime would mean that
domestic workers who are trying to flee a violent employer would be less likely to do,
72 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
and less likely to approach public authorities for help or to report their abuse. We
urge the Government urgently to review these proposals and to ascertain their likely
negative impact on victims of trafficking. (Paragraph 169)
33. We consider that, for the avoidance of doubt, the simplest way for the Government
to meet obligations relating to the provision of compensation to trafficking victims
would be to clarify the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme rules as to the
entitlement of trafficking victims to claim under the Scheme. This could be dealt
with as part of the current review of the Scheme. (Paragraph 173)
34. We recommend that risk assessments be introduced in relation to removal or
repatriation of trafficking victims to their countries of origin. (Paragraph 174)
35. The previous JCHR pressed the Government to remove its reservation to the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to immigration control, and in our
view the need for this to be done is further strengthened by its potential effect in
relation to child trafficking victims if their best interests are not to be compromised.
In their submissions, both the NSPCC and ECPAT UK emphasised the need for
specialist support services and safe houses for child victims of trafficking, and
suggested that such victims should automatically have a right of residence regardless
of their willingness to take part in criminal proceedings. We agree with these
recommendations. (Paragraph 180)
36. The Government should conduct more rigorous research on source countries in
order to make an accurate assessment on victims’ return. In relation to voluntary
repatriation, as we have already suggested, the Government must work closely with
appropriate authorities and NGOs in source countries to ensure that victims are able
to reintegrate into their societies. (Paragraph 182)
37. While all elements of the Italian anti-trafficking approach may not be transferable to
the UK context, the fundamental philosophy behind it is one which we found highly
attractive and impressive. Its clear harmony with human rights principles has had a
profound influence on our thinking about human trafficking policy within the UK,
and we commend it as a model for our own Government in developing its strategy
against human trafficking. We further urge the Government to conduct its own
research into the effectiveness of the Italian approach. (Paragraph 195)
38. While many of those who submitted evidence agree that the Government has started
taking some significant steps, and notwithstanding assurances given to us, we
consider that the current level of protection provided to trafficking victims as a
whole is still far from adequate. Either through legislation or other means, effective
protection of trafficking victims must be put on a far more reliable basis in order to
meet the UK’s human rights obligations. (Paragraph 197)
39. More specifically, to improve protection of trafficking victims the Government needs
to—
• improve and develop training in the identification of victims, and ensure that those
who are identified as victims of trafficking are not treated as criminals or immigration
offenders
Human trafficking 73
• ensure a more comprehensive approach to the provision of basic support and
assistance to victims upon their discovery
• place finance for victim support and accommodation on a secure footing, although its
provision will extensively involve the experience, assistance and resources of NGOs
• put adequate procedures in place to ensure that victims of trafficking are provided with
appropriate support (including interpreters and legal advice) to pursue effectively an
application for residence within the UK
• do more to assist those who are returned to their country of origin (or voluntarily
repatriated) to re-integrate into their home society without increased vulnerability,
particularly to re-trafficking. (Paragraph 198)
40. We do not accept that there is any realistic likelihood that the Council of Europe
Convention’s provisions relating to reflection periods and residence permits would
act as a pull factor for migration into the UK. (Paragraph 200)
41. We find the twin concepts of reflection periods and residence permits to be highly
attractive as guarantors of the protection of the human rights of trafficking victims
and of the provision of other protection and support measures to them. In Italy, as
we have noted, there is no provision for reflection periods as such, although
temporary residence permits provide de facto reflection periods, and have protected
victims’ human rights effectively. However, especially given the safeguards contained
in the Council of Europe Convention, we consider that all the evidence supports the
case for the UK to adopt these provisions. (Paragraph 202)
42. We understand the point made by the Government that delays in co-operation with
the authorities by victims may reduce the likelihood of successful apprehension and
conviction of traffickers, but the welfare of the victim must be the paramount
consideration. We consider that three months would be an appropriate standard
length of time for reflection periods. (Paragraph 203)
43. Although we recognise that the UK is not bound by it, we recommend that the
Government uses the Council Directive on Residence Permits as a model for
residence permits for victims. This Directive obliges Member States of the EU to
provide residence permits of six months. (Paragraph 204)
44. We are firm in the belief that the UK should sign and ratify the Council of Europe
Convention. We can see no convincing argument against this course of action. While
it would be possible for the UK to construct a coherent human rights based approach
to tackling human trafficking outside the Convention, adherence to it in concert with
the other nations of the Council of Europe will in our view greatly strengthen the
framework of anti-trafficking policy in the UK, notably in relation to the core matter
of the protection of victims. (Paragraph 205)
74 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
Formal minutes
Friday 22 September 2006
Members present:
Mr Andrew Dismore MP, in the Chair
Lord Judd
Baroness Stern
Dr Evan Harris MP
*******
Draft Report [Human Trafficking], proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 205 read and agreed to.
Summary read and agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Twenty-sixth Report of the Committee to each House.
Several papers were ordered to be appended to the Report.
Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House of Commons and that
Baroness Stern make the Report to the House of Lords.
Ordered, That the provisions of House of Commons Standing Order No. 134 (Select
committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.
[Adjourned till Monday 9 October at 4.00 pm.
Human trafficking 75
Witnesses
Page
Monday 22 May 2006
Ms Annie Campbell, Director and Ms Rebecca Dudley, Women’s Aid Volunteer, Women’s
Aid Federation Northern Ireland; Ms Ann Hamilton, Principal Officer, Glasgow City Council
and Chair and Ms Bronagh Andrew, Counter Trafficking Development Officer, Glasgow Inter
Agency Trafficking Working Group Ev 1
Ms Christine Beddoe, Director, End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and the Trafficking of
Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT UK) and Ms Nasima Patel, Area Children’s Service Manager,
London, NSPCC Ev 6
Monday 5 June 2006
Ms Nadine Finch, Barrister, Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, Miss Stephanie Biden,
Committee Member, Solicitors’ International Human Rights Group, and Ms Poonam Joshi,
Gender Policy Adviser, Amnesty International UK Ev 3
Monday 26 June 2006
Mr Vernon Coaker, MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Home Office, Deputy Chief
Constable Grahame Maxwell, South Yorkshire Police, Programme Director, Operation
Pentameter, Mr David Bolt, Executive Director of Intelligence (SOCA) Chairman of Reflex and a
representative from IND, and Mr David Wilson, Director, Immigration and Nationality
Directorate Intelligence Service Ev 25
Thursday 29 June 2006
Ms Kate Roberts, Community Support Worker and Ms Camilla Brown, Health and Advice
Worker, Kalayaan Mr Owen Tudor, Head of Department and Mr Sean Bamford, Policy Officer,
European Union and International Relations Department, TUC Ev 40
76 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
List of Written Evidence
Page
1 Memorandum from the Home Office, dated 8 May 2006 Ev 3
2 Letter from the Chair to Rt Hon Dr John Reid MP, Secretary of State for the Home
Department, dated 8 May 2006 Ev 62
3 Letter from Vernon Coaker MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Home
Office, dated 6 June 2006 Ev 63
4 Letter from the Chair to Vernon Coaker MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State,
Home Office, dated 3 July 2006 Ev 3
5 Letter from Vernon Coaker MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Home
Office, dated 18 July Ev 64
6 Letter from the Chair to Rt Hon Margaret Beckett MP, Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, dated 8 May 2006 Ev 65
7 Letter from Kim Howells MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
dated 31 May 2006 Ev 65
8 Letter from the Chair to Rt Hon Beverley Hughes MP, Minster of State for Children
and Families, Department for Education and Skills, dated 12 June 2006 Ev 66
9 Letter from Parmjit Dhanda MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Children
and Families, Department for Education and Skills, dated 19 July 2006 Ev 66
10 Memorandum from Amnesty International UK, dated 12 March 1996 Ev 67
11 Memorandum from Anti-Slavery International, dated 16 December 2005 Ev 88
12 Memorandum from Asylum Aid, dated 13 January 2006 Ev 92
13 Memorandum from CHASTE (Churches Alert to Sex Trafficking across Europe), dated
31 December 2005 Ev 94
14 Memorandum from ECPAT UK (End Child Prostitution, Pornography and
Trafficking), dated 13 January 2006 Ev 97
15 Memorandum from Glasgow Inter Agency Trafficking Working Group,
dated 13 January 2006 Ev 108
16 Memorandum from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA),
dated 13 January 2006 Ev 110
17 Memorandum from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM),
dated 6 June 2006 Ev 128
18 Memorandum from the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI),
dated 13 January 2006 Ev 128
19 Memorandum from JUSTICE, dated 20 January 2006 Ev 131
20 Memorandum from Kalayaan Ev 133
21 Memorandum from the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
(NSPCC), dated 12 January 2006 Ev 134
22 Memorandum from Oxford Pro Bono Publico, dated 15 January 2006 Ev 139
23 Memorandum from Eaves (POPPY Project), dated 31 May 2006 Ev 156
24 Memorandum from The Salvation Army, dated 13 January 2006 Ev 167
25 Memorandum from the Solicitors’ International Human Rights Group (SIHRG) Ev 168
26 Memorandum from the TUC, May 2006 Ev 194
Human trafficking 77
27 Memorandum from Women’s Aid Federation Northern Ireland Ev 201
28 Memorandum from West Sussex County Council, Children and Young People
Services, dated 8 June 2006 Ev 207
29 Memorandum by Professor Ryszard Piotrowicz, Department of Law, University of
Wales, Aberystwyth, dated 9 January 2006 Ev 207
78 Twenty-sixth Report of Session 2005-06
Reports from the Joint Committee on
Human Rights in this Parliament
The following reports have been produced
Session 2005–06
First Report Legislative Scrutiny: First Progress Report
HL Paper 48/HC 560
Second Report Deaths in Custody: Further Government Response to
the Third Report from the Committee, Session 2004–
05
HL Paper 60/HC 651
Third Report Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:
Terrorism Bill and related matters Volume I Report
and Formal Minutes
HL Paper 75-I/HC 561-I
Third Report Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:
Terrorism Bill and related matters Volume II Oral and
Written Evidence
HL Paper 75-II/
HC 561-II
Fourth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill HL Paper 89/HC 766
Fifth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Second Progress Report HL Paper 90/HC 767
Sixth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Third Progress Report HL Paper 96/HC 787
Seventh Report Legislative Scrutiny: Fourth Progress Report HL Paper 98/HC 829
Eighth Report Government Responses to Reports from the
Committee in the last Parliament
HL Paper 104/HC 850
Ninth Report Schools White Paper
HL Paper 113/HC 887
Tenth Report Government Response to the Committee’s Third
Report of this Session: Counter-Terrorism Policy and
Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters
HL Paper 114/HC 888
Human trafficking 79
Eleventh Report Legislative Scrutiny: Fifth Progress Report HL Paper 115/HC 899
Twelfth Report Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Draft
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in
force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2006
HL Paper 122/HC 915
Thirteenth Report Implementation of Strasbourg Judgments: First
Progress Report
HL Paper 133/HC 954
Fourteenth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Sixth Progress Report
HL Paper 134/HC 955
Fifteenth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Seventh Progress Report HL Paper 144/HC 989
Sixteenth Report Proposal for a Draft Marriage Act 1949 (Remedial)
Order 2006
HL Paper 154/HC 1022
Seventeenth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Eighth Progress Report HL Paper 164/HC 1062
Eighteenth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Ninth Progress Report HL Paper 177/ HC 1098
Nineteenth Report The UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT)
Volume I Report and Formal Minutes
HL Paper 185-I/
HC 701-I
Nineteenth Report The UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT)
Volume II Oral and Written Evidence
HL Paper 185-II/
HC 701-II
Twentieth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Tenth Progress Report HL Paper 186/HC 1138
Twenty-first Report Legislative Scrutiny: Eleventh Progress Report HL Paper 201/HC 1216
Twenty-second Report Legislative Scrutiny: Twelfth Progress Report HL Paper 233/HC 1547
Twenty-third Report The Committee’s Future Working Practices HL Paper 239/HC1575
Twenty-fourth Report Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights:
Prosecution and Pre-Charge Detention
HL Paper 240/HC 1576
Twenty-fifth Report Legislative Scrutiny: Thirteenth Progress Report HL Paper 241/HC 1577

SURVEYING

Surveying
I INTRODUCTION
Surveying, mathematical science used to determine and delineate the form, extent, and position of features on or beneath the surface of the Earth for control purposes—that is, for aligning land and construction boundaries, and for providing checks of construction dimensions. Land boundaries are set or measured for accurate description; the topography of landforms and natural or artificial objects are depicted on maps; and major construction and civil engineering works such as dams, bridges, railways, and roads are controlled by surveying methods. The measurements of a survey are linear or angular, and principles of geometry and trigonometry are usually applied.
II SURVEYING INSTRUMENTS
Horizontal linear measurements are made with calibrated rules or tapes and sometimes electronically by timing the travel of light or radio waves between points. Vertical linear measurements are made with a graduated vertical rod to find differences of elevation and heights above sea level. The so-called engineer's level, a tripod-mounted telescope equipped with a spirit bubble and a cross wire, is used to sight the graduations on the rod. The horizontal or vertical angles are measured by a transit or theodolite, a tripod-mounted telescope with cross wires, the graduated circles of which indicate angles in degrees, minutes, and seconds.
Electronic distance-measuring devices are being perfected and can give extremely accurate results, up to 1 in 6 million or better. Also under development are electronic angle-measuring devices of great precision. Theodolites and transits using glass circles permit greater magnification and can thus be smaller than in the past; these instruments are also more accurate, being capable of measurements to hundredths of a second of arc. An automatic type of engineer's level, employing a pendulum prism or reflecting light from a liquid surface, is also used in place of the spirit-level bubble for differential levelling.
III PLANE SURVEYING
Plane surveys treat any small segment of land or water as a horizontal plane. Such surveys are customarily projected and calculated on a horizontal rectangular grid, oriented north-south and east-west, although the grid can be oriented in an arbitrary, rather than true, north-south direction. From a given starting point, or station, of known or assigned coordinates, the horizontal distance is measured to another point, then to another convenient point, and then to succeeding points, to close on the original point or on any point of known coordinates. A succession of such lines or courses forms a traverse. The horizontal angles between successive courses are measured with a transit or theodolite at each hub, or station. From a known or arbitrarily assigned starting direction, the directions, or bearings, of successive traverse lines can thus be calculated. Plane geometry and plane trigonometry relationships are used to determine the coordinates of traverse stations. The north or south distance of a traverse course is its length multiplied by the cosine of the bearing; the east or west distance of a traverse course is its length multiplied by the sine of the bearing. Coordinates enable the plotting of the hubs to any scale on a grid that can serve as a plot or as control for further details drawn on a map or chart.
Triangulation can be used instead of a traverse, measuring only one baseline, but measuring all the angles in a chain of triangles, to calculated coordinates of successive hubs. The choice of traverse or triangulation is dictated by the type of terrain to be surveyed.
IV GEODETIC SURVEYING
For large areas, surveys must take into account the basic shape of the Earth, the geoid, and are therefore called geodetic surveys. These surveys are based on a spheroidal shape approximating the geoidal or geographic (nearly spherical) shape of the Earth at sea level. They are based on a true north-south meridian as defined by the Earth's rotational axis and on spherical geometry. In the United States, plane-coordinate systems exist for most states, with conversion between plane coordinates and geodetic coordinates made convenient by tabulated relationships. Typically, a road-route survey extending for many kilometres would require geodetic adjustment to avoid accumulation of error resulting from the convergence of meridians.
V LAND SURVEYING
Land surveys are made to establish boundaries of land areas by setting corner markers or monuments, to ascertain coordinates of these corners, and to obtain boundary and area information required for record-deed descriptions and for plotting areas of property. Property surveys are accomplished with a degree of precision depending on the value of the land involved, and permanent visible and recoverable monuments are set at the corners. These markers are desirable for public record and to ensure correct title for the rightful owner of the land. In addition to surveying techniques, land surveyors must also be knowledgeable in property law; registration of practitioners is usually required by law.
VI TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEYING
Topographic surveys are three-dimensional; they employ the techniques of plane surveying and other special techniques to establish both horizontal and vertical control. The relief or configuration of the terrain and the natural or artificial features are located by measurement and depicted on a flat sheet to form a topographic map. Contour lines, connecting points of the same elevation, are used to portray elevations at any one of various intervals measured in metres or feet.
Much topographic mapping is done by means of aerial photogrammetry, which uses stereoscopic pairs of photographs taken by aerial surveys and, more recently, from artificial Earth satellite. Horizontal and vertical ground surveys must appear in the photographs. These photos are then reconstituted into stereo models for drafting true-scale maps. Precise cameras are required; and precision-mapping equipment is used to depict natural and artificial objects in true position and to show true elevations for all points in the mapped area. Elevations on topographic maps are shown chiefly by use of superimposed contour lines, connecting points of equal evaluation, to give a readable picture of the terrain.
VII ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION SURVEYING
Engineering surveys establish control points by traverse, baseline, or other methods to obtain information required for engineering designs and to set out construction from design drawings by use of these control points. Topographic surveys, and the maps produced by them, provide horizontal location information and elevations needed for the design of structures such as buildings, dams, canals, roads, bridges, power lines, and sewers. Using the engineering designs these works are then laid out from the same control points used in the original engineering surveys.
Construction surveying involves the guidance and supervision of engineering surveying dealing with the laying out and building of highways, bridges, dams, tunnels, buildings, and other structures.
VIII CARTOGRAPHIC SURVEYING AND CARTOGRAPHY
Surveys to set control points and to obtain detail for map and chart making are called cartographic surveys. Charts and maps of a small scale (covering large areas) are compilations of larger-scale maps with much detail omitted. Coastal charts depict the shoreline, but show only significant navigation aids along the shorelines and indicate water depths. Air-navigation charts show only significant geographical features, obstructions, air lanes, radio beacons, and guidance features such as railways and roads. See Cartography.
IX HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYING
The surveying and mapping of sea, river, harbour, or lake bottoms to ensure safe navigation depths are done by hand soundings located by observations to or from control points on shore. Sonar soundings with simultaneous radar-type location of the sounding vessel also permit rapid and exact charting. Farther out from the shore, less accuracy of location results; Loran devices are used for this purpose, and satellite-navigation devices are also used for fairly accurate offshore positioning of vessels furnished with modern equipment.
X MINING SURVEYS
Mining surveying is used to establish surface location and boundaries of mining claims. During mining or tunnelling operations, the mine survey helps to establish the location of the underground workings horizontally and vertically, to lay out shaft connections, and to guide the tunnelling. This is three-dimensional traversing, not essentially different from surface surveying.
Microsoft ® Encarta ® Encyclopedia 2004. © 1993-2003 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Cartography
I INTRODUCTION
Cartography, the art and science of map-making. To quote the writer Paul Theroux, “Cartography is the most scientific of the arts and the most artistic of the sciences”.
II THE NATURE OF CARTOGRAPHY
Cartography—or map-making—is both a set of skills and a subject for academic study. The making of maps has traditionally required:

(1) The ability to find and select information from many sources on different aspects of geography, then to synthesize the results into a single, consistent, and accurate set of data. (2) Design skills to create a final map which will correctly portray the intended “message” to readers who vary greatly in their map-reading skills. (3) Manual dexterity to draw the information using symbols, lines, and colours so that “clutter” is minimized and the map is everywhere legible. (4) Graphic design skills to simplify often complex patterns into simple ones.
But maps are not just artistic creations which demonstrate the skills of their creators. They are historical and sociological documents. In Britain, for instance, Ordnance Survey first produced maps from the beginning of the 19th century; these maps are a vital record of the landscape up to the present day, showing long-forgotten industrial works and former railways. They give a clue to land which may be contaminated by past use. A more sinister example is the use of misleading maps as propaganda in Nazi Germany to demonstrate the “threat” to Germans who were being “outnumbered and encircled” by Poles and other Eastern Europeans. In earlier times the use of Mercator's map projection in Britain exaggerated the apparent size of the British dominions in Canada in contrast to the French colonies which were mostly nearer the equator. For this reason, maps and their creators are the subject of much academic study, for they illuminate history.
There is no one “correct” way to make a map. The way it is done depends on the tools available to the cartographer, the purpose of the map, and his or her knowledge base. There are, however, many good “rules of thumb” which can guide the new map-maker.
III DIFFERENT TYPES OF MAP
It is as well to realize that different types of map require different treatments and even different skills to create. The most common subdivision is made between topographic and thematic maps. The first shows the features of the natural and built landscape selected according to some (usually country-wide) specification. This might show the transport networks (roads, railways, canals, footpaths, and airports), hydrographic features (rivers, lakes, and coastal features), settlements (villages, towns, and cities), the shape and altitude of the land, and so on. Thematic maps show, as the name suggests, specific themes (such as the geology of the area), usually on top of the topographic map. But this distinction is not very meaningful, for the topographic map is itself a thematic map. And into which category does land use and land cover fall?
One more substantial distinction is between large- and small-scale maps. The large-scale ones in Europe and some other parts of the world show details of individual houses. Indeed, the most detailed maps are often those showing land and property ownership: those for Sweden have been compiled since the early 17th century. Such maps are usually made at scales between 1:500 and 1:5,000 and little generalization or simplification of the selected information is required. For most practical purposes, the user needs little knowledge of the map projection employed. The more densely populated the area, the larger the scale used.
Small-scale maps, on the other hand, may well be highly generalized. Roads and other features may be moved in order to reduce clutter, provided that the features are still placed in their correct relationship to each other, for example, a road crosses a river over a bridge. In the extreme case (maps at 1:1 million scale and smaller) the result is often a caricature which can be a good illustration yet a very poor source of reliable quantitative information (such as the distance between two places). The map projection chosen may dramatically affect the appearance and value of the map. To complicate matters still further, cartographers in different countries not only produce maps to different specifications—they also call them different things. In the United States, for instance, the official maps at 1:6,500 scale are often regarded as large-scale maps while in the much more intensively mapped Britain these would be regarded as small-scale ones.
Finally, most of “old cartography” has been produced by official mapping bodies which are part of the public service. Commercial cartographers have rarely produced national map series: they have concentrated solely on areas for which there are many customers. In many countries, the commercial cartographers obtain their information (sometimes at no cost but this is becoming more rare) from official ones.
IV THE BIRTH OF THE NEW CARTOGRAPHY
The old cartography flowered after the invention of the printing press. For five centuries cartographers created maps on paper. The methods with which they created the image to be printed evolved from engraving on stone and copper to scribing on plastic and the creation of “colour masks” by sophisticated photographic techniques.
In the last 30 years, and especially since 1990, the situation in cartography has changed radically. This has come about through the introduction of the computer into map-making. The earliest work seems to have been carried out by meteorologists and biologists in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. But the vital work was carried out in a British research group, the Experimental Cartography Unit, in the period from 1968 to 1973, by researchers in Harvard University at about the same time, and thereafter by many others throughout the world.
Several significant changes came out of all the research which have transformed cartography for ever. These are that:
(1) Maps are now commonly made from computer databases. Such maps are one (very important) by-product from the database. The computer is no longer used simply to automate traditional cartographic drawing skills, but has become an engine for checking the quality of data, linking data together, searching to find material of interest, and portraying the results in any way the user desires. (2) Customization of the results is normal. Ordnance Survey's Superplan service, for instance, enables a customer in a shop to select on a computer screen an area of interest of whatever shape. A map is then printed out on paper; what the map contains is a matter for the user to choose, as is the scale within the range of between about 1:100 and 1:5,000. (3) Virtual maps are commonplace. Such maps are produced on a computer screen and may never be printed out in paper form. (4) Data and computer programs to make such maps are increasingly available. As a result, there are now far more maps made than ever before, often by people who are not trained cartographers.
Some of the new maps are fundamentally different to the older “line map” style ones. Geometric distortions in aerial photography and satellite imagery can now be removed by computer. As a consequence, “photomaps” can be made semi-automatically and these are excellent where previous maps are very out-of-date (for example, in many urban areas in the United States) or for certain types of landscapes (for example, estuary or wetland areas).
Many of the national mapping agencies of governments around the world have recognized the effects of technology change and adapted to it. The pioneers have included the mapping agencies in Britain, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, France, the United States, and Canada.
V GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
In the period up until about 1985, the various different roles of professionals in topographic mapping were clear and obvious. The geodecist made the detailed instrumental readings and computed results which defined the basic shape of the country. From this information, land surveyors filled in detail on the ground or photogrammetrists provided mapping using aerial photography. Cartographers redrew their efforts into an attractive form which met high standards of graphic elegance and communicated the information effectively and unambiguously. Other collectors of geographic information such as geologists or soil surveyors used these maps as a base on which to collect other details of interest to them.
In the last decade, however, this cosy and stable structure has been rocked by the advent of new technology. Much of the highly skilled work has been replaced by the introduction of the Global Positioning System satellites and new surveying equipment. Data collectors have built into their field computers software which allows them to produce elegance and readability akin to that of their home-based cartographic colleagues. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the numbers employed in official mapping and tension has arisen between the different groups.
But it is quite wrong to think of this as a declining industry. The commonplace use of computers has resulted in the development of a new set of tools called Geographical Information Systems or GIS. The first of these was built in Canada in 1965 to make an inventory of the state of the fauna and flora across the country. Now there are many tens of thousands of these in use across the world and the numbers are growing at about 20 per cent per year. Indeed, GIS is now claimed to be a multi-billion-dollar business internationally with many major commercial firms involved in creating software and tailoring these to meet the needs of different customers.
The range of tasks that a GIS can be called o